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The present study consists of six chapters. The first 
chapter introduction deals with the background of the study. In 
this chapter attempts have been made to highlight the rise of 
Arab Nationalism and contemporary Islamic movement of Arab 
world. 
The chapter second gives a detail about the causes of 
downfall of Ottoman empire and the rise of modern Arab 
World. In this chapter a brief account of Arab revolt and the 
effect of World War I on Arab world has been discussed. 
The third chapter attempts to analyse the thoughts of 
three great Islamic thinkers, Jamal al-Din Afghani, Abduh and 
Rashid Ridha. These three thinkers had been of immense 
importance in the history of Islamic movement of 20"^ century 
Arab world. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the contemporary Islamic 
political activism in Arab world. The part first and second of 
this chapter deals with the personality and ideology of Hasan 
al-Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the 
ideologue of Brotherhood Syed Qutb. The third part deals with 
the ideology of a non Arab Islamic political thinker, Mawlana 
Mawdudi. Mawdudi has been made part of the present study 
because of his immense influence on the Arab Islamic 
movement. Mawdudi is the first non-Arab thinker who has been 
a constant source to the radical Islamists of the Arab world 
even up to the present times. 
The fifth chapter aspires to understand the thoughts of 
two main think tanks of Iranian revolution of 1979, Khomeini 
and Ali Shariati. Iranian revolution has been made part of the 
present study because of its role in catalyzing the Islamic 
militant forces of Arab world. 
The sixth and the last chapter discusses the rise of 
transnational and political Islam in cotemporary Arab world. In 
this chapter attempts have also been made to highlight the 
activities and the rise of some major Islamic militant groups. 
At the end of the chapters there is summary and 
conclusion of the study. After summary and conclusion there is 
also a bibliography and glossary of some Arabic term used in 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern idea of Al-quawmiyya al-arrbiya, generally 
rendered in English as 'Arab Nationalism ' is not equivalent to 
the Arabic al-qawmiya, the latter derived from qawm, is a new-
comer to the Arab political terminology.' Before the twentieth 
century, the word qawm had no political connotation, but as 
used during present time it has come to denote all the Arab 
speaking people, disregarding, in principle, the geographical 
and political boundaries which separate the Arab states. Thus, 
the term al-qawmiyya al-arrbiya stands, today, not only for 
'Arab Nationalism ' but also for the Arab unity. 
Although there has been a language obstacle in 
understanding Arab Nationalism by non-Arabs, still attempts 
have been made by several western and non-Arab scholars to 
understand the phenomenon of Arab Nationalism. The study of 
Arab Nationalism by them has helped a lot for the better 
understanding of Arab world. 
Arab Nationalism as an ideology and a factor in West 
As ian politics is a twentieth century phenomenon and 
comprehensive doctrine of Arab Nationalism emerged after 
World War I. However, it is not to say that its appearance in 
twentieth century is mere fortuitous event. On the contrary. 
considered as a doctrine, and divorced from the accidents of the 
war and politics, which have facilitated its prodigious spread, it 
is possible to see in it the outcome of the severe intellectual 
crisis that Islam experienced during the nineteenth century. 
The absence of a specific ideology of Arab Nationalism 
until the end of the First World War is indeed note worthy. It 
was not until the 1930's that a serious attempt was made to 
define the meaning of Arab Nationalism. In the manifesto 
written by the members of Decentralization Party, appeals were 
made to the non-Muslims to fight for the common cause with 
the Muslim Arabs against Turks.^ 
In the early days of the twentieth century, two ideologies 
competed for the loyalties of the Arab inhabitants of Ottoman 
territories, which lay to the East of Suez. The dominant 
ideology, Ottomanism, defended the continuation of Ottoman 
empire. The challenging ideology, Arabism, proclaimed that the 
Arabs were a special people who possessed peculiar virtues and 
rights. Arabism, as propounded by its creators and advocates 
was a defence and vindication of Islam and the East in the face 
of the dominance of Christian West. Arabism in short was 
special manifestation of a general reaction against the failure 
of Ottoman territories to keep pace with the advancement of 
Europe. 
The earliest significant manifestation of political Arabism 
within the Ottoman empire was the formation of the Ottoman 
Arab Brotherhood in 1908. After this, society was suppressed 
in 1909 its place was taken by the Arab Club of Constantinople. 
Although the public societies and activities of Arab 
Nationalism were directed towards no more than the attainment 
of Arab right within the Ottoman empire, many who 
participated in the movement had independence in mind and 
covertly worked for this goal. Some Arabs began to organize 
secret societies within a revolutionary programme. The two 
famous secret societies were the Young Arab Society (al-Fatat) 
and the Convenant Society (Al-Ahd).'^ 
No independent school of Arab political thought existed 
until Nationalism emerged as an ideological force towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. In the past, practically every 
Muslim intellectual in the West-Asia had tried to interpret 
social and political conditions according to Islamic notions of 
government and authority. It was mainly the Christian Arabs of 
Lebanon and Syria who had developed an interest in their local 
history as early as the eighteenth century. Muslim Arabs, did 
not experience a truly nationalist awakening until the end of 
the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century. The 
Wahhabi movement, founded by Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab (1703-87), was not a nationalist but a religious 
movement. Even the early nationalist writings, such as the 
mainfesto of Paris Nimr and the poem of Ibrahim al-Yaziji 
(1879) addressed to the Arabs, were not so much nationalist 
appeals as exhortations to reject fanaticism and embrace a new 
outlook of life. The Secret Society established in Beirut to 
evict the Ottomans attracted no support among the Muslim and 
dissolved itself.^ 
The rise of Egypt as a separate political system in open 
defiance of the Sultan at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century had far reaching effects on the Ottoman government 
and eventually on the Arab world. Egypt, despite occasional 
appeals to the Arabs developed essentially as a national state. 
It took the banner of Arab Nationalism mainly after world 
War 1.^  
With the final disintegration of the Ottoman empire, 
western penetration became western domination, and Arab 
Nationalism, which in the World War I allied itself with Britain 
against the Turks, became the formula for resistance to Western 
economic and political power.^ 
The Arab National revolt of 1916 against the Ottomans 
directed by King Husayn, the Sharif of Mecca with the help of 
British, was a symptom of changing Arab world. Arabism was 
not yet a popular creed, even in Arabia itself. The loyalty of 
Arabs to the Muslim nation was superior to every other 
loyalty.^ It was not the revolt in Mecca against Ottoman Turks 
that gave birth to Arabism. On the contrary, it was the defeat 
that befell the Turks in World War I that awakened the Arabs 
and stimulated Arab Nationalism, which thenceforth became an 
instrument of resistance. The frustration encountered by the 
Muslim in Arab and other lands as a result of collapse of the 
last Islamic Empire was another important factor, which 
stimulated Arab Nationalism and, indeed other national 
movements in other Islamic lands. 
Once started through the medium of literary revival the 
Arab national movement soon became political. Its steady 
progress during the later half of the nineteenth century, though 
under the depotism of Abdul-Hamid it had necessarily to work 
in secret. Abdul Hamid's policy of Pan-Islamism was 
particularly design to attract the Arab element in the Empire, 
and thus assumed a special significance for Arab Nationalism. 
A rival, doctrine, of Islamic revival under Arab leadership and 
Arab caliphate, was preached by a Syrian, Abdul-Rahman 
Kawakibi (1849-1902), whose books published in Cairo, were 
secretly circulated among Arab nationalists in Syria.^ 
When the Ottoman caliphate collapsed, a lack of authority 
and a sense of community was bound to be felt and Arab 
Muslim in particular were affected by this loss for a long time. 
At the same time the experience complicated the problems of 
.political and social change, which arose from the challenge of 
the modern world especially of an expanding modern Europe. 
When Arab Nationalists looked for political ideas or the 
philosophies, they found complex pattern, which was new to 
them. However, the principal source of inspirations was 
undoubtly Arab Nationalism.'° Even the most conservative 
Arab thinkers felt inspired by it. Various movements with 
varying shadows of nationalism. Islamic revivalism and 
Marxism rose during that period.'^ 
The assault which Islamic world had to endure in the 
nineteenth century was two fold. It consisted, in the first place, 
of military attack on Muslim states or their political 
subjugation by different European powers, and in the second 
place, criticism of Islam as a system of beliefs and a way of 
life. The latter attack was perhaps ever more dangerous and 
insidious than political and military subjugation, for it could 
penetrate the spiritual defences of the Muslim community and 
of its intellectual leaders, there by effecting a dissolution of 
Islam such as foreign rule, by itself, could hardly accomplish. 
In so parlous situation, Islam was bound to make many attempts 
at its own defense, and of these attempts the most significant, 
and the most influential, was that of Jamal al-Din al-Afgani.'^ 
Both the activities and teachings of al-Afghani 
contributed to the spread of revolutionary temper and a new 
attitude towards politics all over the Muslim East. He was 
deeply involved in Afghan politics, he lived among Indian 
Muslims and his short stay in Egypt ended in expulsion because 
of his subversive activities. In Pairs, where he lived for a time, 
he edited an influential newspaper, al-arwat al-wuthqa (The 
indissoluble link) and preached Muslim unity and solidarity in 
the face of European encroachments. He was never the less 
instrumental in engineering a successful boycott of tobacco in 
Iran, in protest against the Shah's granting the tobacco 
monopoly to a foreign concessionaire. He spent the last few 
years of his life, busy with intrigue and politics, as the 
pensioner of the Sultan, in Istanbul.'^ 
The Salaffiyah movement of eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries had arisen as a conservative religious reaction within 
Islam to a perceived corruption of Islamic faith. This 
corruption was more often than not, seen to be primarily 
internal in nature, the result of Ottoman decadence and the 
declining zeal of ulama. In contrast, the Islamic intellectual 
reformers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
motivated by an external challenge to Islam: the decline of 
Ottoman empire and the concomitant expansion of European 
influence in the Arab world.''* 
Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839-96), Muhammad Abduh 
(1849-1905) and Rashid Ridha (1865-1935) played a 
fundamental role in formulating an Islamic response to the twin 
problem of domestic development and western imperialism. 
Their doctrines, formulation at a time when European pressure 
on the Islamic world had reached new heights with the Russo-
Turkish War (1877), French occupation of Tunis (1881), and 
the British occupation of Egypt (1882), were to have a lasting 
effect on social and political thought in the Islamic world, and 
one which can be seen to the present day.'^ 
Muhammad Abduh was born in Egypt in 1849 and 
educated at Al-Azhar University, the centre of higher Islamic 
studies in Muslim world. A friend and ideological ally of al-
Afghani, Abduh struggled for revolution in Egypt. He actively 
supported Ahmad Urabi's revolution in 1882 and, on its failure 
was jailed briefly, then exiled for six years. While in exile in 
Paris, Abduh Joined al-Afghani in secret society and helped 
him in publication of his newspaper. Abduh's revolutionary 
activism was focused on Egypt, though his ideological 
perspective derived from the broad framework of Islamic 
Ummah. His primary concerns were with nation building and 
British imperialism.'^ 
Rashid Ridha was the most prominent and dedicated 
disciple of Muhammad Abduh. Born in Tripoli in 1865, he 
pursued religious studies and Journalism in Syria until 1897, 
when he moved to Cairo there he established a periodical, al-
Manar, through which he disseminated, interpreted and 
elaborated the ideas of Muhammad Abduh and others. Ridha's 
main contribution to Islamic political thought was his 
dissemination of the ideas of al-Afghani and Abduh. He also 
championed the cause of the Wahhabi doctrine in his Journal. 
A feature apparent in the writings of many Islamic 
modernization reformers concerned the role of nationalism and 
its place in development. European nation state centred 
conceptions of national identification were relatively new to an 
Islamic world, which had historically been united by the 
transcendent appeal of Islam itself. 
The fundamental centrality of Islamic unity and Pan-
Islamic cooperation in the works of al-Afghani and Abduh 
reduced nationalism to a secondary element. They regarded 
Islamic ummah as a superior basis for cohesion and 
commitment to European nationalism. Al-arwat al-wuthqa, the 
influential Paris-based Journal edited by al-Afghani and Abduh 
observed that religion is the strongest bond that unites the 
Arabs and Turks, the Persian and Indian, the Egyptian and 
Moroccan. 
Emergence of Arab Nationalism as an ideology after 
World War I played a greater role for the self-determination, 
independence and the active participation of indigenous 
population (civil society) in deciding its general well being. 
The total Ottoman collapse was followed by the failure of 
various local Arab movements to achieve full independence, or 
devise viable political systems and sustainable economic 
growth. Indeed, in one single decade (1920-30) one Arab 
rebellion after another, all directed against European 
colonialism, was either utterly defeated or achieved partial and 
ephemeral success. This was the case in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, the 
Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. Additionally, the question 
of Palestine, particular the failure of the Palestinian revolt in 
1936 against British occupation and Zionist settlement, served 
to sharpen the need for solidarity among Arabs through out the 
region.^^ 
It was in this period that the concept of Arabism and the 
Arab Nations were elaborated in more rigorous terms. Although 
patriotism, confined to a particular Arab country, remained a 
10 
powerful force, it began to be increasingly submerged, by the 
desire and drive for a wider Arab unity. In 1930s it was argued, 
that the overwhelming domination of European powers could 
only be encountered by pan Arab, well-organized movement. 
Political parties, with hierarchical structures, were 
consequently formed in a number of Arab countries. 
During the twentieth century, Islam played a great role in 
the politics of Muslim world, inspiring anti-colonial, 
nationalist movements and their struggle for independence. The 
ground had been prepared by the late nineteenth century 
Muslim reformer Jamal-al-Din Afghani, the father of modern 
Muslim Nationalism. 
In the Arab East countries such as Syria, Lebanon and 
Egypt, Islam's role was more limited since a significant, well 
educated, and articulate Christian minority had been a major 
force in the formation and development of an Arab Nationalism 
that emphasized Arab ethnic/linguistic bonds. Despite this, 
Islam played an important role in the formation of nationalist 
ideology. The legacy of Afghani and Abduh's Salaffiyah 
movement would develop in many directions. However, during 
this period, whether in the writings of Rashid Ridha, Sakib 
Arslan, Lutfi al Sayyid, or Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, Islam 
remained an important factor in defining national identity and 
11 
ideology.'* Emphasis was not placed on Islamic unity or Pan-
Islam. Rather, religion was seen as a foundational source of 
Arab Nationalism. 
The Palestinian debate in 1948 boosted the revolutionary 
trends of Nationalism, in place of the liberal Nationalism. The 
wars of 1948 and 1956 showed up military weakness of Arabs 
and their disunity. This again increased their desire to cling 
together, to form one mighty state that could deal with Israel. 
Palestinian question thus has acted as a catalyst by which Arab 
Nationalism inflames itself. 
In the late 1950s and 60s, Islam again can be clearly 
identified as a factor in the Muslim politics as Syria and Egypt 
gained their independence and radical government came to 
power. In these countries, old regimes were overthrown and 
replaced by more radical groups (Socialist in orientation) and 
committed to Arab unity. The old Liberal-Nationalism gave way 
to Arab Nationalism /Socialism (Nasserism in Egypt and Ba'th 
in Syria). These radical governments distinguished themselves 
from their predecessors by rooting their ideology in 
Arab/Islamic heritage. They insisted that unlike previous 
regimes, theirs was not a borrowed or foreign ideology. In the 
first years after the revolution of 1952, Egyptian Nationalism 
continued along a secular path; yet after 1955,as Nasser sought 
12 
to propound an ideology that would both unify the Egyptian 
people behind him and strengthen his position as the spokesman 
for the Arab world, he increasingly broadened Egyptian 
Nationalism into an Arab Nationalism, rooted in a common 
Arab/ Islamic past. Nasser's Nationalism provided a sense of 
common history, identity, and solidarity that served as basis of 
Arab unity. ^^  
In the 1950s, with the advent of Nasserism and the rise of 
Ba'th party to power, the question of relation between Arab 
Nationalism and Islam became once again a topic of intense 
debate. In the early years of Nasser's rule, there was a 
distinctive trend towards interpreting Arab Nationalism in 
terms of political and economic unity of Arabs. But this only 
lasted until the end of 1950's, when a sudden resurgence of 
emphasis on the affinity between Islam and Arab Nationalism 
became the theme of hundreds of books and articles, the 
cultural factor and more specially the religious factor, was still 
alive in Egypt and consequently capable of providing a 
theoretical and emotional foundation for Arab Nationalism.^° It 
is difficult to trace, a sustained theory of Arab Nationalism in 
speeches and writings of Nasser. In practice, however, he 
wavered between emphasizing a secular and Islamic approach 
13 
of Nationalism according to the dictates of political realities in 
the Egypt of his day. 
The fundamental ideological principles of Aflaq's Ba'ath 
party are more advanced and more elaborate than those of other 
nationalist parties in the Arab countries, but it is curious that 
while the party's constitution stresses the historical continuity 
of Arab Nation, it makes no mention of Islam. This does not 
mean that its leaders are less concerned with the question of 
religion. In fact there is a great similarity between the concept 
of Michell Aflaq and earlier views of al-Huri and others. For 
Aflaq, Islam was the beginning of Arabism. In his book Fi 
Sabil al-ba'th two lengthy articles are devoted to religion. 
Radical Arab governments also made major use of Islam 
to justify socioeconomic reforms. Turning to a rich Islamic 
heritage, they interpreted Quaranic texts and Prophetic 
traditions in order to legitimize and gain popular support for 
their Islamized brand of Socialism. In addition, Islam and 
Islamic institutions were used to support government 
programmes and politics. Egypt founded the Islamic congress in 
conjunction with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and created the 
supreme council of Islamic affairs which, among other 
activities published minbar al-Islam, a leading Journal that 
espoused religious reforms in the Muslim world and served as 
14 
primary source for articles supporting Nasser's Arab 
Socialism. 
Since Aflaq and Nasser interpreted Islamic concepts to 
advance their own ideologies, they will not be part of present 
study as the main thrust of this study is to analyse 
contemporary Islamic Political thought and place of Arab 
Nationalism in it. 
15 
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Chapter II 
RISE OF ARAB NATIONALISM AND IMPACT 
OF WORLD WAR I 
A. Decline of Ottoman Empire 
(i): The ottoman Empire 
Modern Turkey is a successor to the Ottoman Turkish 
empire, the heart of the Islamic world for four centuries, from 
1517 to 1918. 
The Arab-empire did not survive the Umayyad caliphate, and 
from the Abbasid caliphate onward it was more a Muslim empire 
than an Arab one. The Turks entered the Islamic world, as 
converts, as tribal invaders, as adventurers and mercenaries who 
became its rulers. Turkish tribes of Central Asia were the early 
converts to Islam and a group of these, the Oghuz Turks, in 1040 
occupied Merv in Persia under the leadership of SelJuq clan. They 
established semi-independent principalities in Persia, Syria, and 
part of Anatolia and Armenia. The Mongol invasion in thirteenth 
century broke up the SelJuq Sultanate in Asia Minor, but from its 
ruins a Turkish-dynasty, the Ottoman, emerged in northwest Asia 
Minor and gradually extended its influence. Ottoman expansion 
was crowned by the capture of Constantinople in 1453, which 
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brought an end to the Roman empire of the east and brought a 
good part o South eastern Europe to the Islamic system. 
By the middle of the Ninth Century Abbasid caliphs had 
already lost most of their power to provincial governors who were 
frequently Turkish mercenaries. It was the Turks who ultimately 
provided the strong political framework, which the Islamic empire 
established, by the Arabs had lacked. In 1258 the Mongol invasion 
which brought the Abassid caliphate to an end also destroyed the 
SelJuq sultanate in Asia Minor, but before the end of the century 
the foundation of the Ottoman empire had been laid on its ruins 
by Othman, a Turkish mercenary recently concerted to Islam. He 
and his successors gradually extended their rule throughout Asia 
Minor and their influence into the Balkans. 
The Ottoman ancestors for two centuries were no more than 
rootless nomads, who sold their services to the highest bidders, 
leaving their claimed connection with the SelJuqs very 
questionable. Further, it was considerably afterward, after the 
Ottomans had built an empire, that they spread the idea that their 
ancestors had entered Anatolia as military Commanders in SelJuq 
service rather than as common nomads, to enhance their own 
claims to rule.'' 
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The first century of Ottoman existence was their heroic age. 
The founders of the dynasty were no more than commanders of 
Turkish tribes organized primarily to raid and conquer the infidel 
territory around them. Advancing rapidly through Thrace and 
Macedonia, the Ottomans took much of Bulgaria, north Greece, 
Bosnia, and Serbia, developing a system of rule by which the 
native Christian princes retained their positions and lands in 
return for acknowledging Ottoman suzerainty and providing 
soldiers and money."* 
The first Ottoman empire was, then, based on both religious 
and economic motives. Its followers sought to extend the 
dominion of Islam and to secure booty. But when the last ruler of 
the period tried to use the wealth and power gained by European 
conquests to capture the Turkish and Muslim East, he brought on 
himself and its state the onslaught of new nomadic hoard, led by 
Tamer lane, who defeated the Ottoman army, broke up the empire, 
and reduced the Ottomans to the equal status with the other 
restored Turkoman principalities.^ 
When Muhammad 11(1451-81) seized Istanbul in 1453 he 
became heir to the Byzantine empire. Under Selim 1 (1512-20) the 
Ottoman empire acquired Islamic primacy by usurping the 
caliphate from the Mamluks based in Cairo, the Ottoman ruler 
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thus becoming the Sultan Caliph, the secular religious ruler. The 
empire expanded until the late seventeenth century, stretching 
from the Persian Gulf to Algeria and from Sudan in the South to 
Southern Russia in north east, and just beyond Budapest (in the 
Balkans) to north-west.^ Like its rivals, the Tsarist and Persian 
empires, it had Muslim, Christian and Jewish subjects. 
(ii) Ottoman Decline 
Ottoman rule was a military-religious autocracy of the 
Islamic pattern centred on Sultan-Caliph, whose office was 
hereditary in the house of Othman but became increasingly 
subject to the will of Janissaries. Authority within the empire was 
devolved either regionally through local governors or viceroys, or 
through semi-independent princes in treaty relations, or through 
communities, each of which had internal autonomy under an 
ecclesiastial functionary with temporal powers. At its best 
Ottoman rule, providing internal security and communications 
over a vast area and considerable individual and communal 
freedom in return for the payment of taxes and some degree of 
personal conscription, was preferable and preferred to other 
governments of its time. During its time of decay it became 
tyrannical, arbitrary, and inefficient; and Janissaries became 
increasingly rebellious and uncontrolled, especially from the 
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seventeenth century onwards Muslims began to be admitted to the 
corps and the whole system was decisively weakened. The 
massacre of the Jainissaries in 1826 by the Sultan Mahmud 11 
(1808-39) enabled him to further the process of modernizing the 
army began by Selim III (1789-1807), and gained a century's 
respite for the empire, which, under the name of Turkey, was 
accorded the nominal status of power like those of Europe. The 
system of the Capitulations, or the grant of extra-territorial 
privileges in the empire to the subjects of foreign states, became 
the means by which different European powers secured rights 
amounting in the end almost to complete control of Ottoman 
7 
economy. 
The decline of Ottoman empire is a process to whose 
beginning a date is not easily assigned. The year 1683 has been 
chosen, as it was then that the Ottoman armies were forced to 
abandon the siege of Vienna, and the symptoms of decay appeared 
for the entire world to see. The Ottomans, for so long victorious, 
could not comprehend the reasons for their failure. They blamed 
their former ally, John Sobieski, on the incompetetence of Turkish 
Army, instead of their failure to compete with the advances made 
by West. Young and vigorous nations had emerged in Europe, 
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fired by new ideas, equipped with new knowledge and techniques, 
while the Ottoman Empire was marking time. 
The retreat from Vienna was the first of a series of setbacks, 
which culminated in the loss of Budapest to the Austrians (1686) 
and was interrupted in 1699 by the treaty of Carlowitz. 
Mustafa 111 (1757-1773) laid all the Turkish 
misfortunes at the door of Janissaries, corrupt, pampered and 
undisciplined, zealous only in guarding their own privileges. 
The Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 did nothing to awaken 
the Ottoman government to a sense of reality. Selim III, who 
became sultan in 1787, during the ruinous war that had been 
provoked by Russia's seizing the Crimea, was one of the most 
enlightened members of the house of Othman. Although it is his 
military reforms that have attracted most attention, he was not so 
narrow minded as his father, Mustafa 111, who had regarded the 
Janissaries as the root of all evil. For Selim 111 was not blind to 
the anarchy that reigned among the ulama, the hierarchy whose 
leaders had the power to vote any measure which they regarded as 
contravening the sacred law. But Selim 111 was wiser not to 
under rate the religious opposit ion." 
The Nizam-I-jedid, the 'new order' that he planned, 
embraced the whole administration of the empire. Selim and his 
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handful supporters were not strong enough to fight against the 
entrenched forces of the old order. Incited by ulama, the people of 
Istanbul rose against him in 1806. The new troops were defeated 
by the Janissaries, and the Mufti (Seyah-ul-Islam) pronounced it 
lawful to depose the impious Sultan. 
By the early nineteenth century, owing mainly to rapid 
advances made by European powers in technology and 
administration, the military balance began to turn against the 
Ottoman empire. Sultan Mahmud (1808-39) tried to rectify the 
situation by introducing administrative and military reforms along 
European lines under the title of Tanzimat (literally 
Reorganization) in 1827. Tanzimat, 'Regulation' or 'reordering', is 
the name given to the programme of reform that was inagurated in 
November 1839. Its architect, Mustafa Resid Pasha, was a well 
read and a foresighted statesman who had served as Ambassador 
in Paris. He was very anxious to save his country from the doom 
that had overtaken the French monarchy.'^ 
Resid and his companions were of the opinion that if nothing 
was done to remove the grievances of the subjects the empire 
might crumble into ruin even without foreign interference.'"* 
Yet the Tanzimat was still born; it 'stopped at the door step 
of sublime Porte'. Good intentions were not enough; however 
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much European liberals applaud this manifestation of a genuine 
desire for reform on the part of the Ottoman statesmen, public 
opinion in Turkey was hostile. For as yet the only educated class 
of any size among Muslim Turks was that of the ulama, who saw 
no reason for altering the Status quo, although they deemed in 
prudent to pay lip-service to the ideals of the Tanzimat, being 
indeed singled out in charter for a special threat of punishment m 
the event of their obstructing the reforms.' On November 3, 
1839, Sultan Abdul Mejid (1839-1861) gathered the notables of 
the empire in the palace and had his foreign minister read a 
statement which has come to be known as the hatti Sharif or the 
"noble rescript." Seventeen years later, on February 18, 1856, the 
same Sultan issued another statement which is known as the hatti 
Humayun "Imperial rescript". Both of these rescripts were issued 
under pressure and were partly made for the purpose of appeasing 
European governments. Nevertheless, they did inaugurate an era 
of reform in the Ottoman empire, which is called Tanzimat. It 
must be noted, however, that Tanzimat was as much the result of 
upheavals in the eighteenth century as it was the cause of change 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. European favoured 
Tanzimat; but that did not deter them from attacking the Ottoman 
empire. Tsarist Russia was the most aggressive, determined to act 
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as the militant protector of twelve million Eastern orthodox 
Christians under the Ottomans. 
Taking their cue from Russian aspirations towards the 
Christians of the Ottoman empire, the leaders of the central Asian 
Muslims appealed to Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876) to establish 
himself as the guardian of Muslims in Tsarist Russia. But Abdul 
Aziz, heavily indebted to European powers, could do little. In the 
mid 1870's, at the Russian behest, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Serbia and 
Montenegro rebelled against Istanbul. This paved the way for the 
overthrow of Abdul Aziz by Midhat Pasha, the leader of the 
Young Ottomans, a powerful group formed in 1859 with the main 
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objectives of securing an elected assembly for the believers. The 
causes of troubles faced by Ottoman empire were complex, and 
decline did not proceed at the same pace in all institutions. 
Alterations in military technology that reduced the importance of 
sipahi cavalry, a severe dislocation of the financial and economic 
position of the empire after the European discovery of America, 
and shifts in land holding arrangements to adapt to these changed 
circumstances all combined to undermine the classical system of 
first sultans. The break down of law and order in the countryside, 
the emergence of quasi-autonomous local gentry, and the marked 
unruliness and disaffection of the Janissary troops demonstrated 
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the breadth of internal disarray. The increasing success of the 
European military forces against the Turks illustrated the external 
dimension of the debilitation. 
With these structural problems came alterations in the 
conduct of monarchy. Failure to resolve the procedures for 
succession hastened the immersion of the ruler in the harem 
politics, to the detriment of national issues. But even when the 
sultans and the advisers sought to understand why the empire was 
being left behind, their traditional approach of trying to restore 
the institutions of the golden age of the past could not address the 
dynamic changes that were in fact responsible for the decline. 
Attempts to increase military strength by borrowing technology 
from the West encountered stiff opposition from the more 
conservative elements of the ruling elite.'^ The sultan was the 
supreme ruler in Ottoman empire and as such presided over the 
meeting of Divan and personally lead the campaigns. Suleiman, 
however delegated this duty to grand vazir who ruled in the name 
of sultan became corrupted by the system. Having brought his way 
up to that position, the grand vazir was not a free agent. He was 
usually indebted to the women of the harem, or eunuchs, or the 
army or the ulama, or the combination of these, who wanted him 
to exploit the population for their own benefit. °^ 
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In late nineteenth century Midhat Pasha produced a 
constitution, which formalized the religious status of Ottoman 
Sultan, and included a bill of rights and a provision for an elected 
chamber. It was promulgated by Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-
1909) in December 1876.^' 
In April 1877 the Russian army crossed the Ottoman borders 
with the objective of winning freedom for Slvas and reached 
Istanbul. The Sultan had to sign the humiliating Treaty of San 
Stefno in March 1878. It was revised in July 1878 by the Treaty 
of Berlin under its terms Cyprus was handed over to Britain, and 
Tunis to France, and Russia was left in control of districts of 
kars, Batum and Ardahan. 
The continued loss of territory, coupled with growing 
interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire by the 
Europeans, convinced Abdul Hamid II that the fifty year old 
Tanzimat programme had failed to reassure either European 
powers or his Christian subjects. It was therefore time to change 
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the direction. In February 1878 he suspended the constitution 
and dissolved parliament. He arrested Midhat Pasha and banished 
the Young Ottomans to different parts of the empire. He 
repudiated Islamic modernism and turned to traditional Islamic 
values and thought. He tried to regenerate cohesion in Ottoman 
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society by activating the masses on a religious platform around 
the Islamic banner and harnessing their energies. In order to 
succeed in the venture he activated sufi brotherhoods and used 
them as channels for communication to reach the masses. His 
strategy succeeded since there had all along been a wide spread 
current of Islamic feeling among the humbler Muslim subjects of 
Ottoman empire.^'' 
However, by the early twentieth century Abdul Hamid II's 
populist approach to Islam at home and espousal of pan Islamism 
abroad proved inadequate to revitalize the disintegrating empire. 
In 1908 the army officers of the empire's European territories and 
a group of young intellectuals, later to be called the 'Young 
Turks', compelled the Sultan to reinstate the 1876 constitution. 
They were having idea of pan Ottomanism, rather than pan 
Turkism, or pan Islamism.^^ 
Soon after the 1908 coup, Crete announced its union with 
Greece, Bulgaria proclaimed its independence, and Austria 
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1909 an unsuccessful 
attempt was made to overthrow young Turks. They in turn deposed 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II, hoping that would improve the health of 
the empire. It did not.^^ 
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The Balkan war of 1912-13, which resulted in the Ottoman 
empire's loss of its remaining European territories as well as 
Libya, once again underlined its weakness. The latest conflict 
destroyed the concept of pan Ottomanism; and by reducing the 
empire it made it religiously more homogeneous. This encouraged 
the young Turk triumvirat of Enver Pasha Jamal Pasha and 
Talat Beg— which assumed effective power in Istanbul in 1913 to 
highlight pan Islamism and pan Turkism. It was therefore 
receptive to the suggestion by the Kaiser of Germany in 1914 to 
liberate fellow Turks and fellow Muslims from Russian bondage 
in central Asia, and thus compensate the Ottoman's loss of empire 
in Europe and North Africa. Hence Ottoman Turkey joined 
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Germany in the First World War October in 1914. The young 
Turks wanted to unite the empire on the basis of Turkish 
language. They started the programme, of Turkification with the 
help of writers like, Ziya Gokpal and Helide Edib who highlighted 
the virtues of the Turks in their speeches and writings. This 
programme was oppressive unacceptable to non-Turks and was 
doomed to failure. The non-Turkish elements, mainly Arabic 
speaking, who as Muslim still had some sympathy with the 
empire, lost it altogether in the face of the pressure to give up 
their language in favour of Turkish. 
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Encouraged by Enver Pasha, the Ottoman war minister. 
Sultan Caliph Mehmet VI (1909-23) urged Muslims worldwide to 
mount a Jihad against their imperial masters-Britain, France and 
29 
Russia. 
Elsewhere, though, the Ottoman forces found themselves 
pounded by Allies. The Young Turk ministers resigned, and the 
Sultan appointed a new cabinet. It signed an armistice with the 
victorious Allies on 30 October 1918, twelve days before the 
surrender of Germany.•'° 
B. The Arab Revolt of 1915 
(i) Ottoman Empire and the World War I 
The first Balkan war (1912-13) marked the beginning of the 
ten-year period of war, which was to shake the traditional 
structures of the Islamic world. In 1913 the Ottoman empire could 
give up all its Rumelian provinces with out Jeopardizing its 
existence; the First World War, however, was to lead to the 
destruction not only of the empire, but also the centuries old 
political and cultural alliance between Turks and Arabs.^' 
The covert German interventions against Odessa in 1914, the 
bloody fights for the Dardanells in 1915-16, the last Ottoman 
military tirumph in Qut al-Amara in 1916, the Suez offensive in 
1916, the gradual conquest of Iraq and Palestine by allied troops 
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in 1917-18, and finally the armistice of Mudros in 1918, caused 
such sufferings among the civilian and military populations that 
they are widely remembered even today On the Ottoman side the 
war caused about 325,000 casualties The number of people died 
from starvation or were killed is still unknown, but probably 
amounted to the three million ^^  
The Islamic countries could not remain neutral in the 1914-
18 war, they either had to follow the policy of their colonial 
masters or Join the small group of those loyal to central powers 
Ottoman empire tried its best to act against the division of Islamic 
world Ottoman tried to check the division through intensive 
Islamic propagation An Islamic war (Jihad) was proclaimed by 
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Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam on 15 November 1914 Aside from 
some local expressions of the sympathy among a few small 
intellectual circles. Islamic propaganda was unable to check the 
military and political division of Islamic world 
(ii) The Arab Revolt 
In the latter years of the nineteenth and the first years of the 
twentieth century, Arab nationalists began to articulate their 
vision of a polity that would eventually replace the Ottoman 
framework By the time Sharif Husayn Ibn al-Hashimi assumed 
the mantle of the Sharifate in Mecca in 1908, three ideas were in 
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circulation which would have an impact on Husayn's vision of the 
post Ottoman order These were the idea of a spiritual Sharifian 
or Arabian Caliphate, the importance of Arabs, and of the Arabs 
of the Arabian Peninsula in particular in an Islamic revival, and 
the important role the Hijaz could play m a post-Ottoman polity 
While the polity that Husayn envisaged borrowed from previous 
formulation, it included ideas developed from his own experience 
as the leader of an Arabian chiefiancy The out break of world 
war put the Decentralization party and the Syrian Reform 
Committee in the shade The British, seeking allies against 
Ottomans, tempted Husyn, to join their side 
The Sharif of Mecca, Husayn, who like Ibn Sa'ud had been 
able to build up his local power with British support, had since 
the height of the Turkification policy of the Ottoman empire 
(From about 1912/13) entertained hopes of founding of soverign 
Arab empire with British military support For both Husayn and 
Ibn Sa'ud the nation was only conceivable in the form of an 
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empire 
The diplomacy of letters with the British authorities in the 
form of the British high commissioner in Egypt, Henry Mc 
Muhon, so keenly pursued by Husayn and his son Abdallah, was 
aimed mainly at international recognition This correspondence 
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between Husayn and Mc Mohan raised the hope both among Arab 
politicians especially in Syria, and in Husayn himself, that great 
Britain would no longer stand m the way of founding an Arab 
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empire. 
The correspondence has been a subject of controversy ever 
since, particularly in connection with the Palestine Mandate, the 
Arab having taken the view, later challenged by the British 
government, that Palestine was included in the area of Arab 
independence. In 1915-16 a savage campaign of repression by the 
Turkish governor of Syria precipitated the revolt, and Arab 
independene was proclaimed by Amir Ali and Amir Faisal at 
Medina on 5 June 1916 to a body of Arab recruits who had 
nominally been enlisted for the Turkish army. With artillery 
assistance from the Sudan the Turkish garrison in Mecca was 
overcome and the other towns of the Hejaz, except Medina, 
quickly fell to the Sharif and the British Navy, 
The Arab national movement did not offer Husayn much 
backup, as it was evident from early 1913 that, for Arabs the real 
issue was not the establishment of one Arab nation state, but the 
independence of Arab regions as nation states. Even Husayn did 
not see himself as the political leader of the entire Arab world. 
What he was really striving for was the political confirmation of 
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' h i s ' territory by the international public. The British authorities 
confirmed him King of Hijaz in 1916. But the Borders of his 
territory were, however, unclear. Husayn made demands of more 
area at least districts upto Ma'an in todays Southern Jordan, and 
even the inclusion of Damscus in its territory.^^ 
In the summer of year 1917, a real race began between 
Mecca powers and Great Britain for supremacy in Palestine and 
Syria, The British army commander entered with troops in to 
Palestine, while Arab troops, sent by Husayn entered there on 15* 
June 1916. On 9 December British troops finally conquered 
Jerusalem, and Haifa fell as late as 23 September 1918. The new 
advance of British and Arab troops encouraged notables and 
politicians of Damascus to rise openly against the Ottoman 
empire. On October 1918 Arab troops and British troops, marched 
in to Syria capital. For the Arab nationalists Syria was liberated 
by the Arab army and political power belonged to the liberators, 
who immediately tried to establish an Arab civil administration in 
Syria. With the establishment of the National Assembly in 
Ankara, Arab nationalists in Damascus organized an Arab 
National Congress, which was led by Faisal, in it meeting from 
June 19 upto July 1920, this congress, of Arab Nationalists, was 
to look after Arab interests. The National congress included a 
good number of former Ottoman deputies. 
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Faisals appearance at the Pairs Peace conference encouraged 
the Congress to great extent, and soon they proclaimed the 
independence of 'Arabia' as Kingdom in 1920. Faisal was 
appointed king of the Arabs; his father Husayn remained king of 
Hijaz. The 'new Arab government' which had nominated Husayn as 
'Sharif of Mecca' in 1916, no longer played any part in Damascus 
because the citizens of Hijaz who had supported this government 
were unwanted on Syrian territory. At the same time, the Congress 
had also acknowledged the independence of Iraq, although Iraq 
and Syria were to form a kind of economic community. Lebanon 
and Palestine were considered as inalienable parts of Syria. 
The intervention of French troops, the devastating defeat of 
the quickly organized 'Regular Syrian Army' near Maisalun (24* 
July, 1920) and the bombing of Damascus put on end to the dream 
of a Syrian nation state. 
In 1920 great Britain separated its new 'Mandated Territory' 
of Palestine from eastern Jordan for strategic reasons, and the 
latter was renamed Trans Jordan. Iraq and Trans Jordan were put 
under the formal regency of Husayn's two sons Faisal and 
Abdullah in 1921 and 1922 respectively.''^ 
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CHAPTER III 
ARAB NATIONALISM AT THE ADVENT OF 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
(A) JAMAL AL-DIN AL-AFGHANI 
(i) Life and his political activities: 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din (1839-1897), commonly known as 
'Afghani'; used to say, that he was born in Afghanistan. But 
evidences, in support of his Iranian origin are much more 
stronger than his claim to be an Afghani. Some writers from 
Sunni Islamic background insist, that Jamal al-Din was an 
Afghan and a Sunni by origin, while as Iranian and some 
Western scholars support his birth in Iran and his Shia origin. 
Despite the weight of evidence in favour of his Iranian 
origin this has not yet found universal acknowledgement. 
Further evidence may come to light on Afghani's birth and 
early years and indeed, on all other periods of his life. Turkish 
sources, for instance, as Nikki Keddie has noted in her 
biography of Afghani, have not been fully examined. ' 
Jamal al-Din was successful in reviving and strengthening 
in the Muslim intelligentsia reverence for Islam and a living 
faith in the soundness and universality of its message. He 
belongs to category of those men who have wielded the greatest 
41 
influence on the rising Muslim generations in the modern time. 
Carl Brocklemann says: 
"The spiritual life of Egypt was ruled over by Islam in the 
past, and so it is up to now. This is due largely to an Iranian, Jamal 
al-Din Afghani, who for political reasons, preferred to associate 
himself with Afghanistan where he had spent his youth and to 
describe himself as a native of it." 
His famous pupil Muhammad Abduh, has summed up his 
struggle in these words: 
"So far as his political objective is concerned, which became 
a passion with him and in the pursuit of which he spent the whole 
of his life and bore immeasurable suffering and made gallant 
scarifies, it lay in the resuscitation of the Muslim empire so that it 
could take its stand against the most advanced nations of the world 
and be source of real strength and glory to Islam. The breaking of 
the British hold over the East formed an important plank of this 
programme."'' 
The great poet of East Sir Mohammad Iqbal held Afghani 
in the highest esteem. In the lecture series on the 
reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam Iqbal said: 
"The task of a modern Muslim is immense. He had to rethink 
the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with past. 
Perhaps the first Muslim who felt the urge of a new spirit was Shah 
Wall Ullah of Delhi. The man however, who fully realised the 
importance and immensity of the task, and whose deep insight in to 
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the inner meaning of the history of Muslim thought and life, 
combined with a broad vision engineered by his wide experience of 
men and manners, would have made him a living link between the 
past and future, was Jamal al uddin Afghani"/ 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani is known today as a defender 
and reformer of modern Islam. He is commonly known as 
Hakimal Sharq (The sage of the East) in Arabic literary 
circles.^ He is the most famous Pan-Islamist of nineteenth 
century. His circle was not confined to the Ottoman empire but 
included the whole Ummah of Islam.^ 
All his life he was looking for a strong Muslim ruler, who 
could revive and unify Muslims. He wrote against British 
imperialism and considered Britain to be the main enemy of 
Muslims. He was a political activist rather than a theoretician. 
He was also a staunch believer in Transcedentalism. 
Jamal al Din Afghani was the founder and inspiration of 
pan-Islamic movement, which sought to unite Muslim people 
under Ottoman Caliphate.^ Al-Afghani's activities and 
teachings contributed to the spread of revolutionary temper and 
a new attitude towards politics all over the Islamic lands. He 
involved himself in politics of different Muslim countries. He 
was deeply involved in Afghan politics, he lived among Indian 
Muslims, he went to Egypt and his stay there ended in 
expulsion because of his subversive activities. In Paris, where 
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he lived for a time, he edited an influential newspaper nl-arwat 
al-wuthqa and preached Muslim unity in the face of European 
encroachments. From Paris he went to Iran, to Russia, then 
back to Iran. From Iran he was finally expelled because of his 
anti-Shah propaganda. He spent last few years of his life in 
Istanbul as a pensioner of Ottoman Sultan.^ 
He was one of the few leaders who tried to reinterpret 
traditional Islamic ideas in light of the problems brought in to 
Islamic lands by the increasing incursion by the West. 
Rejecting either pure traditionalism or uncritical imitation of 
the Christian West, he began trends of emphasizing pragmatic 
values needed for life in the modern world, which has attracted 
Muslim modernists even up to the present time. These trends 
included political activism, the free use of human reason and 
efforts to build up the political and military power of Islamic 
states.'° 
Jamal al-Din Afghani is unique among the Muslim 
thinkers of the modern Muslim world who continues to serve as 
the source of inspiration for Muslim intellectuals, both 
conservative and modern, as well as the Muslim political elite 
of present day in general.'^ He is considered to be father of 
modern Muslim Nationalism, proponent of Pan-Islam, and head 
of reformist movement in Islam.'^ 
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All aspects of Afghani's thought finally merge into his 
quest for the unity of Muslims. He made anxious appeals to the 
Muslims, to the ruling Muslim elite, and ulama to strive for 
this unity. The Quranic verse "Innamd al-Muminun Jkhwatun" 
(all Muslims are brothers) was, for the first time, used by him 
for the practical political aims. Taking in view the growing 
political penetration of European powers, especially Britain, 
Afghani called the Muslim to forget their internal political 
rivalries and to unite them against outside danger. Declaring 
that 'there is no nationality of Muslims except Islam', he 
reminded Muslims that unity and power are two main pillars of 
Islam.'^ 
Jamal al-Din though, accepted that unity of language is 
more durable than religion, as religion changes (in course of 
time) without changing the language or nationality of people, 
still he deals Islam and Muslim with a different doctrine.'" 
Jamal al Din considered religion as an effective medium for the 
establishment of a balanced society. To him Islam possesses all 
necessary qualities for the smooth functioning of society and it 
does not recognize any union based on tribe, colour or race.'^ 
He considered that Muslims prefer the bond of faith than 
the narrow bond of ethnic origin. At one place he writes 
"Muslims are different from the adherents to other religions 
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because of emotion and regret they feel if one piece of Muslim 
territory is cut off from an Islamic government, what ever may 
be the ethnic origin of the inhabitants of this territory or the 
group which has taken over."'^ 
During his stay in India, he appealed to Indian Muslims to 
take pride in the Hindu past, as he had appealed to Egyptian 
Muslims previously to take inspiration from pre-Islamic 
Egyptian greatness. In both cases he was advocating the 
solidarity against the foreign interventions. 
The encouragement of non-religious nationalism in his 
Indian articles is an important element, which sheds light on 
his thought different from that coming from his better-known 
Arabic writings. 
Afghani remains a shadowy figure in the pages of history. 
Politically and intellectually he is a vivid force. Rashid Ridha 
used to call Afghani as 'Awakener of the East' and the struggle 
he did enables him to deserve this crown. In many respects, 
Jamal al-Din Afghani was quite a different personality with 
whom begins the true beginning of Islamic political resurgence 
and activism. His political ideas and activities culminated in 
rise of the fundamentalist movement like Ikhawan al-Muslimun 
and his reinterpretation of Islam led to the formation of 
Salaffiyah movement in Egypt.'^ 
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(B) Muhammad Abduh 
(i) Birth, education and early life 
Shaikh Muhammad Abduh was born in 1849 in a village in 
Egypt. His parents were devout and pious people although 
entirely uneducated. He received his early education at a local 
school. By the age of twelve he completely memorized the 
Quran. In the following year he was enrolled in the mosque 
school at Tanta but he was disgusted with the teaching methods 
of the school. For some time he left his education and returned 
to his native village. One of his relatives introduced him to 
sufism. Invigorated with this new interest, he decided to go 
back to Tanta and continue his studies. Within a short period he 
received a scholarship to study at al-Azhar. 
(ii) Abduh as a social reformer and political activist 
In 1877 Abduh graduated from al-Azhar, the centre of 
higher Islamic studies in the Muslim world. The major events 
that shaped Abduh's social and political thought consisted of 
those developments which brought European in to the heart of 
Muslim lands and with it its culture and technology oriented 
civilization. Like Afghani he was aware of Europe as a political 
force to be resisted and a social ideal to be imitated. In later 
years of his life, Abduh abandoned the political struggle, he 
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devoted his all efforts in interpreting Islam in terms of 
modernity.^^ 
One of the turning points in Abduh's life was his first 
meet with al-Afghani in 1869. In the year 1869 al-Afghani on 
his way to Constantinople, broke his journey in Cairo and 
stayed there for a brief period. He contacted some Egyptian 
intellectuals among whom 'Abduh' was perhaps the most 
important. After returning from Constantinople to Cairo in 
1871 al Afghani and Abduh came more near to each other, as 
al-Afghani found him extraordinary person, and a good 
disciple. Abduh attended al- Afghani's lectures with a great 
interest and under his influence began to study philosophy 
especially the Isharat of Ibn-Sina and other classical Arabic 
texts, which were neglected in al-Azhar. 
Ethics were at the core of Abduh's thought, and because 
of that he was an active person who could not retire from the 
world and view it in a detached, intellectualist manner.^"* 
Abduh most of his life had to defend himself against 
attacks from orthodox Muslims because of his rational approach 
towards Islam. 
What sort of a Shaykh is he," they complained, "who speaks 
French, translates Western books, quotes from Western 
philosophers, holds discussions with their scholars, issues Fatwas 
on things that not one of ancients would have known about, takes 
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part in benevolent organizations and collects money for the poor 
and unfortunate? let him spend his life between his home and a 
mosque, if he is a doctor. If he belongs to the secular world, we are 
of the opinion that he is more active in that sphere than all the rest 
of the Muslims."^' 
Abduh's political thought was a reflection of the 
circumstances of his environment. In his early days like his 
teacher and friend Afghani, he took part in Egyptian politics 
and even after al- Afghani's departure he continued to express 
his political idea through editing the official magazine al waqi-
al Misriyya. He looked up on the problems of Egypt in terms of 
national interest transcending religious and racial boundaries. 
He was of the opinion that World politics is a struggle between 
an aggressive West and victim East. In an article, which he 
published in al-Ahram in December 1876, he says, "This 
antagonism (between East and West) is hereditary and worthy 
of consideration but as power has become western centred and 
East has become defence less the West marched in attack and 
the East could offer no resistance." He continued in the tune of 
al- Afgani, 'what made the East reach this low ebb was nothing 
but the disunity to the extent that some people derive pleasure 
from having other Orientals beset with misfortune through 
enemy conquest'. He then goes on to say 
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They do this instead of discarding these times all religious 
fanaticism and sectarian differences for the defence of their 
homeland and its protection from invasion of their enemies. Those 
enemies wish only to expand their domain at our expense, we 
Orientals, and to be able to enslave us so that they may enrich 
themselves and use us as a shield to protect their countries and 
fellowmen.^^ And then he significantly declares. 'You Orientals 
are the children of one country and the partners in its good and 
ill and every thing else. If one of you is fortune, will be a 
fortune for others'.^^ 
After expulsion of al- Afghani, Abduh, was recalled from 
his village, where he was confined to edit the official Journal, 
found himself in a strong position to influence events through 
the use of his pen. Abduh criticized those hot heads that were 
anxious for implementation of a^  constitutional government at 
once. He supported long-term reforms of Ridah Pasha's 
ministry. He continued, however, to speak as a nationalist who 
regarded the authority of the state to be underlined by political 
and geographical boundaries rather than religious allegiance. 
In an article published in November 1881 dealing with 
political life, he suggested that the idea of 'Watan' country is 
the best unifying factor. He defined the meaning of 'watan' in 
political terminology: 'Your place to which you belong and in 
which you have rights and towards which your duties are known 
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and in which you have security for yourself and yours and your 
property.' 
According to Abduh loyalty to watan is based on three 
things. First, that it is the place of residence; second, that it is 
the place of performing rights and duties upon which political 
life revolves; and third it is the place to which the person 
belongs and from which the individual derives glory and 
shame.^^ 
These writings of Muhmmad Abduh written on the eve of 
Urabi's revolt played a considerable role in arousing the 
consciousness of Egyptian people. 
As Abduh played an important role in Urabi's revolt 
Abduh was sentenced to exile. After receiving an invitation 
from al Afghani Abduh left Syria which he had adopted as a 
temporary abode and joined al- Afghani in Paris. Abduh's 
exile ended the nationalist phase of his political thought. 
(iii) Abduh as a pan- Islamist 
In 1883 Abduh joined al- Afghani in Paris. He assisted al-
Afghani in publication of al arwat al wuthqa, whose positive 
aim was to unite Muslim under caliphate and to pen down the 
root causes of decline of Muslim ummah. Watan as a bond was 
now suppressed by religion. The religious bond between 
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Muslims was considered stronger than that of race of 
Language. 
In al-arwat both Afghani and Abduh attempted to unite 
Muslims and to rise them against imperial powers. The ummah 
was addressed in the most flattering terms and was told that it's 
consensus was sanctioned by God. Its unity therefore was vital 
not simply for the defeat of its enemies but for its own 
salvation also.^^ 
Muhammad Abduh during this phase of life was voicing 
the political pan-Islamic ideal of al-Afghani who strove all his 
energies to achieve his goal. The writings of both Abduh and 
Afghani, in arwat aroused the religious feelings of the 
Muslims. In their attempt to unite Muslims through a universal 
union and to free Islamic lands from foreign penetration, 
Abduh and al-Afghani, appealed the Muslims to reject their 
local Nationalism, which made them forgetful of the pan-
Islamic union. It was Islamic unity, which was kept above 
every thing. Abduh during this phase of his political carrier 
believed that brotherhood of Islam rejects and obliterates racial 
and national boundaries and constitutes a single bond, which 
united all Muslims as one community. Thus, in one of his 
articles 'Nationality and the religion of Islam' Abduh 
vigorously condemned the idea of Nationalism. To him 
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Nationalism was not a natural feeling but only an acquired state 
of feeling and the Islamic feeling transcends the feeling of 
nationality. At one place he says: 
Since Islam never recognised any 'asabiyah' except the 
religious one, Muslims throughout their history till today never 
gave up this bond of religious unity. It is due to this that an Arab 
does not hate the Turkish domination, a Persian accepts the 
leadership of an Arab and an Indian submits to Afghan rule. 
Thus in pan-Islamic phase of life Abduh placed religious 
feelings of solidarity higher than national solidarity. 
(iv) End of Exi le: 
After the failure of al arwat Abduh returned to Egypt. In 
Egypt he expressed his anger over those nationalists who used 
to talk of freedom, patriotism, Nationalism etc. He reaffirmed 
the idea that there was no room for Nationalism in Islam. 
Muhammad Abduh by expressing and fostering a policy of 
reconciliation towards the British, led himself to head long 
clash with the Nationalist party of Mustafa Kamal.^'' 
It must be said, that in spite of Abduh's differences with 
nationalists his patriotism cannot be doubted. He always loved 
welfare of his country and hated foreign rule over it. 
In his autobiography Abduh said. " The matter of the ruler 
and the ruled, left for the fate to decide and the hand of God after 
that to manage. For I find that nations reap the fruit from the trees 
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[of education], which they themselves plant and undertake to 
nourish for years together. So it is this plant which they ought to be 
concerned now." 
(v) Last few years of life: 
Before few years of his death he expressed his disgust 
with politics and concentrated fully on social upliftment of 
Egyptian people through education and morality. 
He expresses his disgust with politics in following way: 
"I seek the protection of God against politics (al-siyasah), the 
word politics itself, the meaning of politics, every letter which 
forms the word politics, every notion of politics which occurs in 
mind, every land where one talks of politics, every one who speaks, 
learns, embellishes, or understands politics, every thing that is 
derived from politics; for politics has not entered any place but that 
it has corrupted it." 
(c) Rashid Ridha 
(i) Political ideas and writings 
Al-Afghani was the inspirer of the salaffiyah school, 
Abduh was its brain, but Rashid Ridha was its spokesman. 
Rashid Ridha was born in Syria, educated in the traditional 
manner of ulama, and was awarded a certificate of Alim in 
1 8 9 7 . " Ridha's main contribution to Islamic political thought 
was his dissemination of the ideas of al-Afghani and Abduh, 
the two foremost modernization reformers.^^ 
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Rashid Ridha was dt^'ciple of al-Afghattf'and Abduh. But 
he took a different path, arguing that reason for the 
backwardness was that Muslims had permitted the debilitation 
and pollution of their religion, and needed to strive for the 
dynamicism that existed in Europe. He was much influenced by 
the strictly Hanbali school of Islamic law and by the works of 
Ibn-Taymiyya (1262-1328), as well as by the contemporary 
renascent wahhabi purism in Arabia. 
Ridha was of the opinion that laws should be made after 
consultation, but in a deliberative, modern and organized 
fashion. By this Ridha was introducing the Islamic concept of 
Ijma (consensus) in a modern form, and as a legislative rather 
than a judicial principle working by a kind of parliamentary 
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process. 
The struggle for the purification of Islam initiated by 
Abduh remained unabated. The salaffiyah movement under the 
leadership of Rashid Ridha took a sharper line on this question. 
It was this emphasis on the purification of religion and identity 
of programme that they were optly called Neo-wahhabis. The 
influence of great mystic and conciliator al-Ghazali was rapidly 
replaced by Ibn Taymiyya and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim.'" 
The writings, which largely influenced Ridha's life, were 
that of al-arwat al wuthqa, which changed his outlook 
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completely. Before reading these writings his concern was with 
ordinary aspects of social life and local reforms. After reading 
al-arwat he started looking for the writings of al-Afghani and 
Abduh, and all the writings about them. In 1893 he wrote to al-
Afghani requesting to be accepted as a student. This letter was 
full of praises for al-Afghani. The letter contained such praise 
of al-Afghani that he proudly showed it to many of his visitors. 
Ridha's intention of joining al-Afghani was frustrated by the 
latter's death in 1897, up on which he decided to join Abduh."^^ 
(ii) Ridha in Egypt 
Ridha finally left Syria and travelled to Egypt to join 
Abudh. Before and after publication of al-manar (a periodical 
which he disseminated, interpreted and elaborated on the ideas 
of Abduh and others), Ridha frequently visited Abduh's 
residence and discussed so many aspects about the Muslim 
reforms with him.''^ 
When Rashid Ridha thought to publish al-manar in Egypt 
he consulted Abduh about it. Abduh, after a discussion, agreed 
with him and suggested that paper should not indulge in 
arguments with other papers and should be free from influence 
of so-called great personalities. Although Abduh agreed with 
contents of al-manar, when it was published for first time he 
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was critical of its arguments, difficult language and its 
involvement in Ottoman politics/ ' ' 
For first few years al-manar was circulated in a very 
small circle and it was only in the fifth year of its publication 
that it became widely read. The aim of al-manar was to 
continue the work of al-arwat al-wuthqa in the fields other than 
'Egyptian' political field. It republished a number of articles by 
al-Afghani and Abduh, which accorded with its policy on 
upliftment of Ummah. From the third year onwards it started 
publishing the Tafsir al-manar the encyclopedic work of 
reformism. In addition it started a section for Fatwas, or legal 
opinion, to guide its readers on questions regarding Sharia or 
doctrines. This section was utilized by Ridha to disseminate his 
idea of legal reform.''^ 
During 37 years of its publication, manar was involved in 
the affairs of Muslim world. It touched almost every field such 
as politics, religion and society so much that it has become a 
record in the development of Muslim community in a crucial 
time.''' 
Rashid Ridha was a very bold leader of the Salaffiyah 
movement. Under his leadership, the Salaffiyah movement at 
first reasserted the pan-Islamic programme of al-Afghani; but 
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when the secular rulers of Turkey turned their backs on the 
Islamic tradition Ridha unreservedly condemned their policy/^ 
(iii) Ridha and Arab Nationalism 
As a direct disciple of Abduh, Ridha has exercised great 
influence in shaping the activist ideology of Muslim brothers in 
Egypt and elsewhere in Sunni Muslim world/* 
Rashid Ridha's important treatise on the caliphate (al-
Khilafh aw' al-imamat' al-uzma, the caliphate or the supreme 
imamate, 1923) was published on the eve of abolition of 
caliphate. Nevertheless, it gives vivid expression both to this 
caution, and the tension between the demands of Arab 
Nationalism, and the religious loyalty to caliphate/^ 
Ridha belonged to that group of Syrian emigres who came 
to settle down in Egypt for their intellectual activities and were 
therefore able to take a broader view of things. Ridha 
condemned ethnic and racial prejudice and criticised Ibn 
Khaldun for glorifying 'asabiyyah' or group solidarity and clan 
partisanship, as the motivating force of politics, dynasties and 
even the prophetic mission. Not with standing all this, he was 
an active spokesman of Syrian Arab Nationalism. In 1920 he 
became President of Syrian National Congress that elected 
Faysal as King of Syria.^° 
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It will not be out of place to pendown the fatwa (legal 
opinion) given by Ridha in response to an inquiry about 
Patriotism, Nationalism and group spirit in Islam, by an 
Indonesian Muslim: 
'"Group feeling' among the Arabs is related to 'the group', i.e. 
a man's people who take sides with him; that is, they protect and 
defend him whenever he needs help or is wronged. The word 'group' 
originally signifies the relatives of a man who are his heirs; then it 
becomes used in a wider sense. The word derived from 'Isb, an ivy 
plant which winds itself around a tree or the like. It is well known 
that one of the imperatives of Islam is its prohibition of 
partisanship in wrong for the sake of relatives, people of 
fatherland. It prohibits enmity and divisions among Muslims arising 
from the partisanship of any group, country, or region against their 
brothers and against others except those against whom war should 
be waged. 
The Prophet made this clear in his word 'group spirit in man's 
supporting his people is wrong'. The Imam Ahamd Hanbal related 
this. 
It is also well known that another imperative of Islam obliges 
its people to attack and combat the foreigners who attack them. All 
the Jurisprudents have declared that holy war is a duty incumbent 
on all individuals when an enemy commits aggression against 
Muslims or occupies any of their lands. This is warding off wrong, 
so it is shameful ignorance to prohibit it and to deduce the 
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prohibition from the group feeling of the Jahiliyya, such as that 
which existed between the 'Aws and the Khazraj among the Ansar, 
which was prohibited by some hadiths," 
In the same fatwa Ridha answers a question regarding the 
patriotism of youth in following way: 
" The type of patriotism that should adorn Muslim youth is 
that he be a good example for the people of the homeland, no matter 
what their religious affiliation, cooperating with them in every 
legitimate action for independence, for developing science, virtue, 
force, and resources on the basis of Islamic law of preferring the 
closest relations in rights and duties. In his service of this 
homeland and his people he must not, however, neglect Islam which 
has honoured him raised him up by making him a brother to 
hundreds of millions of Muslims in the world. He is a member of a 
body greater than his people, and his personal homeland is part of 
the homeland of his religious community. He must be intent on 
making the progress of the part a means of the progress of the 
whole.'^ 
AI-Afghani, Abduh, Ridha 
Al-Afghani injected a sense of urgency and the liberal 
ideology, while as Abduh tried to interpret Islam in light of 
modernity. All of their life these three thinkers tried to unite 
Muslims against foreign powers. Sometimes they adopted 
different ways of working but their only goal was upliftment of 
Muslims in every field of life. They worked hard to purify 
Islam from the superstitions and ignorance created by mystics 
and greedy ulamas. Though each one in them rejected any sort 
of Nationalism in their writings still they fought for the cause 
of Orientals and to free Oriental lands from the strong clutches 
of foreign powers. Al-Afghani's, Abduh's and Ridha's writing 
became the core of the discussion in modern Islamic political 
thought. They have been a constant source of inspiration for the 
present Muslim resurgence. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC POLITICL 
ACTIVISM 
(A) HASAN A L - B A N N A 
(i) Hasan al Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood 
It was in an atmosphere of intellectual ferment about the 
role and the future of Islam in contemporary society that Hasan 
Al-Banna—the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood—was born. 
Exposed, due to the intellectual/religious orientation of his 
family, to the most "Traditional" of Islamic legal doctrines (the 
Hanbli), he nevertheless became acquainted with several 
alternative orientations towards Islam, including the Sufi and 
more modern views of several contemporaries. ' 
Al-Banna received a religious education and teacher 
training, the latter at Dar al-ulum in Cairo. Early in his life, he 
became a member of various religious organizations and took 
part in anti-British activities; and his dedication to Islam, to 
teaching, and to missionary work was evident. His nationalist 
feelings were probably aroused by the British occupation of 
Egypt.^ Al-Banna, at the age of twenty, went to Ismallia on the 
nineteenth of September 1927, immediately after his graduation 
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from the Dar al-ulum, in order to take over his new Job of 
teaching in the government preparatory school. ' 
While teaching in Ismallia, the administrative centre of 
Suez Canal, he was aware of the relatively easy life enjoyed by 
the British and French officials, whose standard of living was 
far better than that of the average Egypt ian / In that city, in the 
month of March 1928, he founded Association of the Muslim 
Brethren, supported by six of his followers and loyal students. 
Hasan al-Banna had a propensity for joining and 
organizing societies. During his school days he was elected 
president of the literary society, Jam'iyat al-lkhwan al-Adab-
iyah. With other students he formed the Jam'iyat Man'al-
Muharramt (society of prevention of sin). Then he founded a 
reform society, Al-Jam'iyat al-Hasafi-yat al-Khairiyah (The 
Benevolent Hasa fiyah society) and became its secretary. With 
a group of religious men, he formed a circle, which brought out 
the newspaper, Al-Fath (the conquest) and formed the young 
Men's Muslim Association {Jam'iyat al-Shubban al Muslimin). 
These societies were strong links in the chain, which lead 
naturally to the establishment of the Association of Muslim 
Brethren.^ 
Al-Banna was a regular reader of Rashid Ridha's Al-
Manar. He grew up during turbulent times. Following the First 
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World War (during which Britain declared Egypt to be its 
protectorate) Egyptian people revolted on a massive scale and 
won semi-independence in 1922. The first parliamentary 
elections of 1923 saw the Nationalist Wafd Party beat the 
liberal constitutionalists. In Turkey secular republican forces, 
led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, abolished the caliphate in 1924, 
an event that caused great crisis in the whole Islamic world. 
Al-Banna attributed the upheaval to the discord between the 
Wafd and liberal constitutionalists, and 'the vociferous political 
debating' which had erupted after the 1919 revolution; 'the 
orientations to apostasy and nihilism' then engulfing the 
Muslim world; the attacks on traditional orthodoxy, 
emboldened by 'the Kemalist revolt' in Turkey, which has 
graduated into movement for the intellectual and the social 
emancipation of Egypt; and the non-Islamic, secularist and 
libertarian trends which had pervaded the academic and 
intellectual circles of Egypt. As a result of this turbulence, 
Banna argued, Egyptian youths were inheriting a 'corrupted 
religion'; and imbued with 'doubt and perplexity' they were 
temped by apostasy.^ 
Al-Banna responded to the prevailing conditions in 
moralistic terms. He sponsored discussions in public places, 
and went on to establish in 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
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youth club with its main stress on social and moral reforms 
through communication, information and propaganda. In 
retrospect the birth of Muslim Brotherhood in Ismallia seems 
logical. As the headquarters of Suez Canal Company and the 
British troops in Egypt, Ismallia was a strong out-post of the 
West as well as a multi dimensional threat to Egypt's political, 
economic and cultural identity. In his memories Hasan al-
Banna portrayed the effects of the British military occupation 
on him, describing it as 
"Some thing that brings grief and regret to the heart of every 
zealous patriot. It forces one to contemplate the grave disaster 
brought about by the hateful occupation of Egypt and the material 
and other opportunities which the country lost on account of it. 
Contemplation will reveal how this occupation remains the only 
barrier obstructing the progress and advancement of the country, 
and the principal obstacle preventing the unity of Arabs and the 
Muslims there for the last sixty years."^ 
Al-Banna continued his mission in Ismallia from 1928 
until 1933 spreading his movement in accordance with a special 
programme that he had created through experiment and study. 
This he carried out not openly but in a manner least calculated 
to attract at tention. '° 
As a means of spreading his message and movement he 
used pamphlets, newspapers, letters, speeches, public lectures, 
69 
and personal visits. His possession of a strong insight aided 
him in the selection of members and supporters. The house of 
the Brethren in Ismallia became the headquarters of the 
movement and branches were tied to it by a bond of fraternity 
without any one branch working through another or the function 
of one branch attracting the attention of another . " 
The association between Muslim Brotherhood and al-
Banna was very close, so close that one can almost say that 
Hasan al-Banna himself personified the attributes and 
characteristics associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. His 
colleagues and friends recognized his great ability to influence 
men and to unite their divided councils; his followers identified 
the society completely with his personality and gave him credit 
for its strength and success. His face was inspiration for 
society's literature, Philosophy and principles and as its main 
moving spirit. '^ 
Al-Banna was the "Supreme Guide" (The Murshid-e-Aam) 
of Muslim Brotherhood. Being the head he sent missionaries to 
preach in the mosques and other public places all over the 
Egypt. The Brothers under his guidance undertook large-scale 
educational, social, charitable, and the religious work in 
villages and towns, and even engaged in some economic 
enterprises. '^ 
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Hasan al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood was but one of 
many organizations which provided an Islamic interpretation 
for the retreat from the colonial society by comparing it with 
the departure of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) from Mecca in 
622. Departure and separation were from now on to be the main 
themes of Islamic discussions in small circles. The aim of 
Islamic discourse was no longer integration, but to prove that it 
was subjectively right to be excluded. Because of their 
conceptual affinity with salaffiyah, these groups were called by 
the collective name of neo-salaffiyah}'^ Al-Banna himself 
defined the Muslim Brotherhood as a Salafi movement, an 
orthodox way, a Sufi reality, a political body, an athletic 
group, a scientific and cultural society, and a social idea.'^ 
The zeal and fervor with which the Muslim Brotherhood 
carried out its mission entrenched it in urban and rural areas 
and its strongest support base was among the masses. When Al-
Banna moved Muslim Brotherhood's head quarters from 
Ismallia to Cairo in 1933, old and young people flocked to the 
mosques, to hear the speeches of members of Muslim 
Brotherhood. Wherever there were people, even in the coffee 
houses and clubs, ikhwan members spoke about Islam and 
inspired the people. Such attentive audiences however, were 
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indicative not only of Muslim Brotherhood's popularity but 
also of its rapid growth.'^ 
(ii) The Second decade of Muslim Brotherhood (1939-1949) 
The late 1930s saw the fully-fledged entrance of Muslim 
Brotherhood on to the political stage, in Egypt as well as in 
other Islamic countries. It was the issue and circumstances in 
Palestine, which facilitated this entrance and geographical 
expansion. When the Palestine Arab revolt against British 
colonial rule and Zionist immigration broke out in 1936, the 
Muslim Brotherhood seized upon the occasion to carry out 
active anti-British propaganda through out Egypt. During the 
three years of the revolt (1936-39), Brotherhood came into 
contact with the Mufti of Jerusalem, and raised funds for the 
Palestine cause. They were also able to contact a number of 
Egyptian political leaders, notable AH Maher (Prime Minister) 
and Abdul-Rahman Azzam, both of whom were trying to 
formulate an Egyptian Pan-Arab policy.'^ 
The Palestine issue further stimulated the expansion and 
growth of Muslim Brotherhood. The total number of its 
branches grew from 15 in 1932 to 500 in 1940.'^ In Syria a 
branch was established in 1937, based in Aleppo and covering 
Syria and Lebanon.'^ Brotherhood membership was drawn from 
most social classes, and was predominantly rural or urban 
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working-class in composition. Despite this, the leadership and 
the most active cadre of Muslim Brotherhood were from urban 
middle class backgrounds of Egypt. 
The Muslim Brotherhood's success also brought 
challenges with its achievements. It was a period of tribulation 
for the movement. This was not unforeseen, for even as the 
Brotherhood had embarked on the path of active politics, al-
Banna had warned his followers of the challenges ahead: 
I would like to avow to you frankly that your mission is still 
unknown to many people, and that on the day they find out about it 
and grasp its import and its aims, you will encounter violent 
antagonism and sharp hostility. You will find many hardships ahead 
of you, and many obstacles will rise up before you you will find 
among the clerical classes and the religious establishment those 
who will regard your understanding of Islam as outlandish, and 
censure your campaign on that account. Chiefs, leaders, and men of 
rank and authority will hate you, all governments will rise as one 
against you, and every government will try to set limits to your 
activities and to put impediments in your way without a doubt, 
you will then experience trials and tribulations, you will be 
imprisoned, arrested, transported and persecuted and your goods 
will be confiscated, your employments suspended, and your homes 
searched.^' 
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Muslim Brotherhood continued its anti British and the 
Pan-Islamic propaganda during the outbreak of World War 
Second.^^ During the war Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Banna 
wanted Egypt to stay neutral and not involve itself and 
sacrifice its young for the wars of the West. But when they saw 
that war was unavoidable, they joined the struggle.^^ Al-Banna 
secretly contacted the anti-British elements within the Egyptian 
army, notable Egyptian ex-commander-in-chief Aziz Al-Misri 
and a young Junior army officer named Anwar al-Sadat. These 
developments led to increasing British pressure on Egyptian 
governments to deal with Muslim Brotherhood and other anti-
British elements. In October 1941, the government of Prime 
Minister Sirri Pasha took major steps against the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Al-Banna and other prominent leaders of Muslim 
Brotherhood were arrested and weekly Brotherhood magazines 
al-ta'aruf and al-Shua and the monthly al-Manar were 
suppressed. Press references to the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
meetings of Muslim Brethren were also banned.^'' 
Al-Banna and his colleagues were realized soon, due to 
the palace intervention on Brotherhood's behalf. But Muslim 
Brotherhood was not allowed to resume its previous activities 
until 1942. Wafdist government lifted this ban and also 
imposed restrictions on the sale of alcohol, and flesh trade, in 
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order to placate the Muslim Brotherhood and forestall their 
participation in the forthcoming Egyptian elections. Thereafter, 
relations between the Brotherhood and Wafdist government of 
al-Nahhas varied between cordiality and hostility.^^ 
In October 1944 Al-Nahhas government was dismissed 
and a new government under Ahmad Mahir Pasha was formed. 
The new government re-imposed many restrictions on the 
Brotherhood. Mahir favoured Egypt declaring war on Germany 
and Italy a move that was strongly and vehemently opposed by 
Muslim Brotherhood. Mahir Pasha was assassinated while 
reading a declaration in favour of his decision of war on 
Germany and Italy in the Chamber of Deputies. Muslim 
Brotherhood was briefly suspected of the deed. Restrictions on 
the movement continued after the war under the government of 
Mahir's successor, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha.^^ 
Crisis in Palestine were responsible for the rapid growth 
of militant anti-British sentiment within Muslim Brotherhood. 
Arms were acquired; Paramilitary training missions were 
dispatched to Palestine; and Brethren were trained and 
mobilized for future military service in the country, with the 
first Ikhwan 'Battalion' ready for action by October 1947. 
Brotherhood send its men to Palestine and they fought 
alongside Palestinian forces, several weeks before the official 
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outbreak of Palestine war and the formal intervention of Arab 
armies on 15 May 1948.^^ 
Considerable expansion of Muslim Brotherhood took 
place between 1945-48. Muslim Brotherhood's anti-British 
activities and their clear commitment to Palestinian cause, as 
well as their social ideology, were well received by the 
Egyptian masses. They also managed to avoid the stigmas 
attached to their major political competitors. Due to these 
factors, the Brotherhood's support reached new heights during 
this period, with some estimates putting the figure at 600,000 
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members, organized into some two thousand branches. 
The failure of Arab military intervention to crush the 
Israel caused more civil unrest in Egypt in the second half of 
1948. In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood's political 
success-coupled with their military and increasing use of 
violent measures-ultimately led Egyptian governments to take 
harsh actions against organization of Muslim Brotherhood. On 
8 December 1948, government banned Muslim-Brotherhood and 
ordered the closing of its centers and the seizure of 
Brotherhood papers, documents and properties and all other 
assets. Al-Banna tried his best to tackle with this situation but 
despite of his best efforts, relation between Brothers and 
government deteriorated further. On December 1948, a member 
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of Muslim Brotherhood 'jSpcret apparatus' k^Jed prime minister 
al-Nuquashi. As a result, Al-Nuqu"ashi's successor, Ibrahim Abd 
al-Hadi Pasha, started a ruthless campaign of arrests and 
property seizure against Muslim Brotherhood.^^ 
Al-Banna deeply regretted the assassination and 
government reaction to it. But it was however, too late. On 12 
February 1949 Hasan Al-Banna- founder, director general, and 
the supreme guide of Muslim Brotherhood—was assassinated 
out side the head quarters of the young Men's Muslim 
Association by members of Egyptian secret police. 
Before his death, al-Banna had already established some 
links with the army. These links continued and the Muslim 
Brotherhood played prominent role in the armies successful 
overthrow of the monarchy in 1952.^' 
(iii) Political ideology of Hasan al-Banna: 
When al-Banna started his movement in 1920's Islamic 
Political thought was divided among three schools: (1) The 
conservative elements of al-Azhar, other traditionalists, who 
were theoretically against any compromise with secularization 
and modernization, but who pragmatically, dealt and 
compromised with the Egyptian crown and British authorities; 
(2) the modernizers, or the followers and students of 
Muhammad Abduh, who tried to understand the tenets of Islam 
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in light of modernization and tried to modify them according to 
the requirements of western "modernizing" norms. Their logical 
goal was secularization of Islamic society; and, (3) the 
conservative reformers (the students of Rashid Ridha), who 
agreed with the second "school" on the necessity of purifying 
Islam from innovations (Bid'a) which made Muslims depart 
from the "true" Islam, on opposition to taqlid (accepting 
previous scholarly opinion as binding), and on following the 
path of ijtihad (personal interpretation of the basic elements of 
the faith). However, they disagreed completely on the value of 
western political ideas, and argued the necessity of returning 
back to the roots (ideas and practices of the first generation of 
Islam). ^^  
Hasan al-Banna was attracted to this latter school; his 
ideology was a response to the failure of liberal institutions to 
free the country from the British imperialism. 
Al-Banna was intellectually a combination of Muhammad 
Abduh's reformism, Rashid Ridha's conservatism and al-
Afghani's activism.^'' Ideologically al-Banna was firmly in line 
with their Salaffiyah reformism. But it was Banna who was able 
to establish a mass political party. Banna argued that the goal 
of re-creating the Islamic State could be achieved within the 
existing constitutional framework. What the present regime had 
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to do was to recognize the Shariah as the supreme source of 
law and replace the imported codes, which, by their rejection of 
the Shariah, had undermined the very foundation of Islamic 
order.^^ 
Ishaq Musa Husaini, in his book the 'Moslem Brethren' 
argued that the Brotherhood has six principles. The first is 
scientific: to provide an exact and correct explanation of the 
Qur'an and defend it against misinterpretation. The second is 
pragmatic; to unify Islamic nations around these Qur'anic 
principles, and to renew their noble and perfound influence. 
The third is economic: the growth and protection of national 
wealth, raising the standard of living, the realization of social 
justice for individuals and classes, social security for all 
citizens, and a guarantee of equal opportunity for all. The 
fourth is philanthropic: the struggle against ignorance, disease 
and poverty. The fifth is patriotic and nationalistic: the 
liberation of Nile valley, all Arab countries, and all parts of the 
Islamic fatherland from foreigners. The sixth is humanitarian 
and universal: the promotion of universal peace and a 
humanitarian civilization on a new basis, both materially and 
spiritually, through the medium of principles of Islam." 
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To achieve these principles, Banna emphasized on the 
political nature of Islam. In his message to the fifth conference 
of brotherhood, he stated: 
We believe the rules and teachings of Islam to be 
comprehensive, to include the people's affairs in the world and the 
hereafter. Those who believe that these teachings deal only with the 
spiritual side of life are mistaken. Islam is an ideology and 
worship, a home and a nationality, a religion and a state, sprite and 
work, and a book and sword.^' 
The method to achieve these goals is to spread the call of 
Holy war (Jihad) as one of the fundamental duties of the true 
Muslim. Jihad has two aspects power and argument. Banna 
stated explicitly: Allah Almighty commanded the Muslim to do 
Jihad for his sake....only if the people refuse to listen to this 
call and resort to defiance, oppression and revolt, then, as a 
last resort, recourse should be had to the word to spread widely 
the call.^* 
No survey of the principles and political ideology of 
Hasan al-Banna would be complete without a brief outline of 
his attitude towards other contemporary ideologies. It is 
important to examine Al-Banna's view of Communism, Fascism 
and western liberal democracy; his relationship with 
Nationalism and national patriotism. 
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Al-Banna understood a number of positive features within 
the western ideologies of Fascism, Communism and Liberal 
Democracy. Fascism inspired martial 'strength and military 
preparedness'; Communist doctrine displayed concern of poor, 
for equality and for social justice; the Liberal Democracies 
stood for representative government. These positive aspects 
were, however, more than outweighed by the dysfunctions of 
each system. The Communist nations suffered from tyranny and 
the domestic oppression. The Western democracies were prone 
to an excess of individualism, moral decay and capitalist 
economic exploitation. Both communism and capitalism were 
based on the inherently corrupting concepts of materialism and 
socialism.^^ 
As for as nationalism and national patriotism is 
concerned, the Muslim Brotherhood strongly supported 
nationalist issues. The struggle against western political, 
economic and cultural domination over the Islamic world was 
one of the Muslim Brother's two 'fundamental goals'. Their 
reformist ideas and proposals reflected a concern for strong 
national defence, for nationalization of foreign enterprises, and 
the elimination of western socio-cultural influences. The 
national patriotism of Muslim brotherhood cannot be doubted 
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as they actively fought against Zionsim in Palestine and against 
the British in the Canal Zone.''° 
Nonetheless, the brotherhood's ideological relationship 
with nationalism is more complex than appearances first 
suggest, essentially revolving around their anti-imperialism and 
their Pan-Islamic aspirations. Al-Banna did argue that distinct 
nationals existed, with its 'own distinct qualities and particular 
moral characteristics', with Arab nations enjoying the 'fullest 
and most abundant share' of such qualities. He also louded 
patriotism, in that it implied attachment to the land, love of 
freedom, and commitment to community. He condemned, 
however, all conceptions of patriotism, which implied 
factionalism, and all conceptions of nationalism, which were 
based on 'aggression', 'victimization' and 'racial self 
aggrandizement'. Instead of the patriotism, of territorial 
boundaries and nationalism of racism, Muslim Brotherhood was 
said to stand for patriotism to the Islamic community, and 
nationalism based on the glorification of past piety and 
bravery, with the national standing as a focus of individual 
strivings. To al-Banna, " The bonds of creedal doctrine |are| 
...holier than those of blood or soil"."' 
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(B) Sayyid Qutb 
(i) Sayyid Qutbs and his emergence as a Muslim Brother's 
ideologue 
Qutb (1906-1966), was an Egyptian poet, educator, 
Journalist, literary critic and leading intellectual of 
contemporary Islamic movement in Egypt and the Arab world. 
Qutb was born in 1906 in Assiut district of Egypt. His 
parents were very religious and Qutb received his early 
religious training from them. Later when the family moved to 
Halwan—a satellite town of Cairo—Qutb's education started at 
Tajhizia Darul uloom, a secondary school in Cairo. After 
completing his education at Darul uloom he joined Cairo 
University in 1929 from where he obtained the Bachelor of Arts 
degree in education in 1933. After sometime he was appointed 
inspector of schools in the Ministry of education and training. 
The exact dates and circumstances of Qutb's formal 
affiliation with the organization of Muslim Brotherhood are 
unclear, especially since Qutb himself did not leave written 
accounts of them. However, it is clear from all available 
sources that his affiliation grew in stages: First as a 
contributing writer to Muslim Brotherhood's publications, 
second as an admirer and a friend of movement in the aftermath 
of the Brothers guerrilla war against the British in Suez canal 
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area, in late 1951; and the third as a member and then a leading 
ideologue of the Brother's in the aftermath of the 1952 free 
officers coup/^ 
Qutb's visit to USA and his observation of a totally 
materialist civilization had a profound influence on him. 
Following a two-year stay in the United States, when Qutb 
returned to Cairo in August 1950, a delegation of Muslim 
Brotherhood welcomed him at the airport. Furthermore these 
members often visited his house to discuss his book al-'Adalah 
al-iftima' iyah fil-al-Islam (social justice in Islam), which had 
appeared earlier in, Cairo in 1949 while Qutb was still in the 
United States."^"^ 
The circumstances of late 1940s played an important role 
in transformation of Sayyid Qutb. This came as a result of 
British war policies during World War II and as aftermath of 
creation of the state of Israel. The latter he perceived as a 
rejection of rights of the Arabs to self-determination and a 
rejection of their equality to western man. In 1949 during his 
stay in USA, Qutb witnessed the wide and unquestioning 
support of the American press for Israel. This along what he 
felt to be the denigration of the Arabs left Qutb with a 
bitterness he was never able to shed.''^ 
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Upon his return to Egypt, Sayyid Qutb started writing 
regularly on Islamic topics and this brought him close to the 
leadership of Muslim Brotherhood. In his books he proposed an 
Islamic ideology as an alternative to those systems competing 
for Egyptian allegiance, dedicating the rest of his life 
articulating the content, scope, and method of his ideology. 
This in his early books on Islamic subjects, the Islamic 
ideology is proposed as an alternative to those of Communism, 
Capitalism, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Secularism. These 
writings, along with those of later periods of his life, continue 
to provide contemporary Muslims with the ideological and 
emotional content presently under girding the Islamic revival. 
Qutb's work has had extensive dissemination throughout the 
Muslim world, and his ideas have become the accepted 
definition of Islam and its role in shaping the social, political, 
economic, intellectual, cultural, and ethical aspects of society. 
At the time, however, the content of the ideology was tentative 
in his mind. His writings were careful crafting of a variable 
synthesis of ideas that he felt might replace all others in the 
market place of ideologies. Writing in almost in the spirit of 
dialogue, he wrote in 1959: 
'If it becomes evident that Islam possesses or is capable of 
solving our basic problems of granting us a comprehensive social 
justice, of restoring for us justice in government, in economics, in 
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opportunities and in Punishment....tiien without doubt it will be 
more capable, than any other system we may seek to borrow or 
imitate, to work in our nations.'''^ 
After death of Hasan al-Banna Brotherhood faced an 
uncertain future both ideologically and existentially, Mawdudi 
(1903-1979) and his ideology pertaining to society and state 
came as a Godsend. Among those most impressed by Mawdudi's 
interpretation of the political aspects of Islam appears to have 
been Sayyid Qutb. Qutb frequently quoted Mawdudi in his work 
// Zilal-al-Qur'an.'^'' 
Qutb's relation and contacts were deepened when a 
monthly Islamic review, Al-Muslimun (The Muslim) of Sa'id 
Ramdan, a Brotherhood leader, made its appearance in 
November 1951.Qutb became a regular contributor, writing on 
many subjects including Islamic history, the Qur'an and Islamic 
society, up until his arrest in late 1954. Qutb's popular 
commentary Fi Zilal-al-Qur'an (in the shades of the Qur'an) 
originated in his review. A series of the articles carrying the 
same title appeared between January and July of 1952.'^^ In the 
revised section of his Qur'anic interpretation Qutb tended to 
sharpen the distinction between those who strive for the 
establishment of God's order in the world and those who oppose 
them. 49 
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Al-Banna's goal of an Islamic nation was to be built up 
on the reform of individual hearts and souls. This would be 
followed by the organization of "society to be fit for the 
virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evil 
doing, then the community will arise the good state". Qutb, who 
called for the establishment of a nation whose foundation is 
Islam, also pursued this fundamental goal of the Brotherhood. 
Ahmad S. Moursali in his book, Sayyid Qutb: The ideologist of 
Islamic Fundamentalism, defines Qutb's goal as an Islamic 
system "where Islamic law is executed, where the Islam rules, 
and where its principles and regulations define the kind of 
government and the form of society."^° 
Qutb contributed regularly to al-Da'wah (The call), of 
Salih Ashmawi, a Muslim Brotherhood activist. Qutb's writings 
and articles were highly critical of conditions then existing in 
Egypt.His criticism intensified in aftermath of the unilateral 
abrogation of the Anglo Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan 
condominium of 1899 by the wafd cabinet on October 1951. 
Qutb joined other nationalist forces in demanding the full 
mobilization of the people "for armed struggle against 
occupation, including the formation of "Kata'ib al-fida" 
(Sacrifice battalions) to serve as guerrilla forces against the 
British. Qutb's inclination towards the Muslim-Brothers was 
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clarified in November 1951 when he counted them as the only 
group in Egypt who were actually carrying arms and fighting 
the British. In his view the spirit of Islam and Islamic system 
of belief were the prime movers behind the Brother's willing to 
sacrifice.^' 
In December 1951 Qutb accused the Wafdist government 
of improvising the abrogation of the treaty and of hampering 
the efforts of the liberation battalions, despite the people to 
fight. He charged the cabinet with having the mentality of the 
"feudalists, capitalist and the vested interests in the export and 
the import business". By January 1952 Qutb publicly referred 
to himself as a "friend" of the Islamic movement when he 
demanded that the general guide of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan 
Hudaybi, should clarify in precise Islamic terms and 
programmes of society's official stand in regard to the fighting 
in the Canal Zone. 
The rank and file of the Brothers, including Salih 
Ashmawi and his mouthpiece al-Da'wah, had joined the call for 
armed struggle and, indeed, the Brothers were spearheading 
guerrilla warfare against the British. Confusion had arisen, 
however, as to the official position of the leadership in light of 
General Guide Hudaybi's apparent indifference toward the 
Brothers participation in the fighting." Therefore some 
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activists, like Qutb, were demanding that General Guide should 
take a clear stand in regards to the fighting. 
Qutb began to merge gradually into the Muslim Brother's 
Orbit. In commemoration of death of al-Banna, in February 
1952, Qutb wrote the call for resumption of an Islamic way of 
life derived its values from the Shari'ah. In March and April 
1952 Qutb heavily attacked those Egyptian intellectuals who 
were advocating nationalism and communism, branding them 
faqaqi (bubbles). Qutb was a longtime supporter of 1919 
popular uprising and its leadership but now he began to take a 
different view of the nationalist uprising and its leadership. He 
termed the leaders of the revolt as "miserable" and bubble-
like", accusing them of having narrow horizons because they 
isolated themselves from the Islamic ideas and the international 
trend towards the emerging Islamic bloc. The Muslim world 
was suffering, he said, because imperialism managed to implant 
the narrow ideology of nationalism in order to serve its own 
purpose. These attacks were in conjunction with Qutb's and 
Brotherhood's campaign for Pan-Islamic unity and the creation 
of a viable Islamic bloc which they had initiated in 1951 and 
which continued until the 1952 revolution. The strengthening of 
the bond between the brotherhood and Qutb, furthermore, 
became clear by April 1952 when the publishing house 
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connected to Brotherhood, Dar al-Ikhwan lil-Sihafah w-al-
Tiba'ah, sponsored the publication of Qutb's second printing of 
the Battle of Islam and Capitalism.^'' 
(ii) Sayyid Qutb and the Free officers 
Abd al Hakim 'Abdin, former secretary general of Muslim 
Brotherhood is of the opinion that Qutb's relationship with the 
free officers and the revolutionary command council (RCC) was 
excellent from the first hours of the revolution. Hakim reported 
that, Qutb was only civilian to attend the RCC's meetings, eat 
and sleep in the officer's quarters, and participate in the 
decision making process. Qutb became a cultural advisor to the 
leaders of the revolution.^^ 
Partisan sources also claim that there were contacts 
between the free-officers, including Nasser, and Sayyid Qutb at 
the latter's home on July 19, 1952, that is four days before the 
free officers coup. Qutb's role in free officers coup was that of 
a leader who coordinated the Brothers contingency plans for the 
protection of the revolution. Qutb himself also confirmed his 
close relationship with the free officers.^^ 
Kamal al-Din Husayn, a leading member of the military 
coup, who was in charge of education, selected Qutb for the 
post of the minister of education and encouraged the 
distribution of Qutb's books and instructional pamphlets for use 
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in public schools. And when Qutb organized a conference on 
the freedom of thought in Islam, a month after coup, the two 
leaders of the free officers Nasser and Naguib were quick to 
send messages of support to Qutb and the conference. Qutb also 
gave a lecture on intellectual and spiritual liberation in Islam 
in the officers club in August 1952, which was attended by 
leading Egyptian intellectuals and visitors from Arab countries, 
was received with much enthusiasm. Qutb supported General 
Naguib's demand for setting up of "a just dictatorship" for the 
period of six months in order to rid the country from 
corruption. According to Qutb the people had withstood unjust 
dictatorship for more than fifteen years and surely, they could 
withstand " a just dictatorship" for the period of six months, 
(iii) The Muslim Brotherhood from 1952 to Qutb's death 
After the July 1952 revolution Qutb emerged as one of the 
important leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood Qutb's common 
cause with the Muslim Brothers on a variety of subjects and his 
stature as a highly respected independent and progressive 
Muslim intellectual undoubtedly contributed greatly to his 
recruitment to the Brothers ranks. 
When Nasser and the "Free officers" overthrew the 
Egyptian monarchy on July 23, 1952, the Muslim Brothers were 
initially delighted since they believed their troubles were now 
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over. The officers shared the Brotherhood's goal of freeing 
Egypt from British domination and were, by and large, devout 
Muslims. But personal piety is one thing and ideological 
commitment to the goal of a strictly Islamic state is another. 
Nasser and the most free officers definitely lacked the latter, 
so that conflict was inevitable.^^ 
The first serious challenge to the government's authority 
came on 12 January 1954 when the Brethren gathered at the 
University of Cairo to commemorate their martyrs. While the 
rally was gathering force they openly denounced the 'Free 
officer' regime. The active participation of the leader of 
fidaiyan-1 Islam, the extremist Iranian Islamic organization 
that had been involved in the assassination of Iranian General 
Ramzara, helped to convince the RCC (Revolutionary command 
council) that it was a high time to act. On the same day the 
Muslim Brethren were declared illegal and their leaders were 
imprisoned. The Brethren were allowed later an additional 
though brief period of legal activities as the result of the split 
within the RCC in February 1954, when the officers led by 
Nasser attempted to depose Neguib from the presidency. After a 
near insurrection and a popular uprising in support of Neguib, 
Nasser and his colleagues were forced to give in temporarily 
and Neguib was reinstated. On 25 October 1954 one of the 
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fidaiyun of the 'secret apparatus' attempted to assassinate 
Nasser while he was addressing some 10,000 workers in 
Alexandria.' it was then', wrote Sadat, 'that Muslim 
Brotherhood openly declared war on us with the obvious aim of 
overthrowing us and taking over the rule of Egypt ' 
However, Nasser and his colleagues, exploiting the extent of 
their intimate knowledge of the Muslim Brother's 'secret 
apparatus' to the full, acted swiftly and efficiently, over 1,000 
Brethren were tried by a special court, consisting of three RCC 
members, including Sadat. Many of them were sentenced to 
long terms in prison while six, who were found to have been 
implicated in the attempted assassination, were later executed. 
To avoid popular support, the council of Ulama of Al-Azhar 
denounced the Brethren for '....deviating from the teachings of 
Islam.,..' and declared that any Muslim plotting against the 
legitimate rulers of the Egyptian people, namely the 'Free 
officers,' was guilty of heresy.^^ 
Thus ended the Muslim Brethren's first and the most 
daring challenge to Nasser's regime. Indeed, following the 
emergence of Nasser as the most venerated Arab leader after 
1955, many of the Brethren and even more extremist Muslim 
movements reconciled themselves to Nasserist ideology and 
refrained from militant opposition. But the decline in Nasser's 
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fortunes following first the break-up of the Egyptian-Syrian 
unit in 1961, to be followed by the hopeless Egyptian 
involvement in the war in Yemen since 1962, which brought 
Nasser into direct conflict with his conservative Muslim 
neighbours in Saudi Arabia, pitched the Brethren once more 
against the regime. Sayyid Qutb, the leading ideologue of 
Muslim Brethren, openly challenged some of the most basic 
notions of Nasser's regime and the very foundations of its 
ideology, which he classified as Jahiliyya. This Jahiliyya 
included, according to Qutb, both Arab Socialism and any 
solidarity based on clan, tribe, nation, race, colour and land, 
which prophet Muhammad had described 'rotten'. This then 
provided the background for the second major clash between 
Nasser's government and the Muslim Brethren, in August 1965 
official reports at the time accused the Brethren of once again 
plotting to assassinate Nasser and over-throw the regime. More 
recent reports put the number of those arrested at 27,000. 
Furthermore, of the hundreds, which were tried and sentenced 
by a special court, twenty-six were tortured to death and three, 
including Sayyid Qutb, were executed in 1966.^° 
(iv) The revolutionary thought of Sayyid Qutb 
Central to the political thought of Sayyid Qutb (as 
expressed in his major political work, Ma'lim fi al-Tariq) was 
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the concept of Jahiliyya (Ignorance of divine guidance). This 
term, usually used refer to the faithlessness of pre-Islamic 
Arabia, was employed by Qutb to refer to those aspects of 
modern social and political life which do not strictly confirm to 
the teachings and principles of Islam. In particular Qutb 
condemned secularism and what he saw man's attempt to usurp 
God's exclusive right to define humanity's values and social 
system: 
The Jahiliyya is based on rebellion against God's sovereignty 
on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, 
namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is 
now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyya, 
but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to 
legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of 
life, rest with men, without regard to what God has prescribed. The 
result of this rebellion against the authority of God is the 
oppression of his creatures. Thus the humiliation of the common 
man under the Communist system and the exploitation of 
individuals and nations due to the greed for wealth and the 
imperialism under the capitalist system are but a coUary rebellion 
against God's authority and the denial of the dignity of man given 
to him by God.^' 
Qutb saw Jahiliyya as extending into almost all aspects of 
modern life, including people's belief and ideas, habits, arts, 
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rules and law, to the extent that even what we consider to 
Islamic culture, Islamic sources. Islamic philosophy, and 
Islamic thought are constructs of Jihiliyya.^^ Thus, Qutb 
condemned even supposedly 'Muslim' societies as being steeped 
in the godlessness of Jahiliyya. 
Qutb's rejection and condemnation of Jahili society was 
necessarily coupled with an advocacy of society based on 
Islam. Islam alone provides the totality of social guidance and 
teaching, required for righteousness and freedom from human 
oppression: 
Islam's way of life is unique, for in the systems other than 
Islam, some people worship other's in some form or another. Only 
in the Islamic way of life do all the men become free from the 
servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the 
worship of God alone, and bowing before Him alone.^^ 
Qutb therefore calls for Islam to assume a position of 
world leadership. This can not occur if Islam is understood 
merely, as a theory; rather, it must find concrete expression in 
the form of an Islamic nation within which faith-rather than 
race, nationality, colour etc.-represents the criterion of 
membership.^'* The Shariah, as laws given to man by God, 
represent the exclusive moral-Juridical basis of such an Islamic 
state, and are a necessary condition for its existence. According 
to Qutb, adherence to the Shariah is not only a matter of 
religious devotion, but also a practical imperative. Man, unable 
to comprehend the complexity and totality of the universe, is 
incapable of making rules of a harmonious life. Only God has 
this capacity, and has done so inform of Shariah.^^ 
In his writings, Qutb placed particular emphasis on the 
dichotomy between Islam and Jahiliyya, between Dar al-Islam 
(the land of Islam) and Dar-al-Harb (the land of war, i.e. the 
non Islamic world). In the struggle for righteousness there is no 
place for blurred views regarding good and evil: 
In the world there is only one party, all others are parties of 
Satan and rebellion... .^ ^ 
There is only one way to reach God; all other ways do not 
lead to him...^' 
There is only one law which ought to be followed, and that is 
Shari'ah from God....^* 
Qutb argues that Islam, as a truth, is indivisible. It cannot 
be mixed or moulded with non-Islamic Jahili ideas. " 
Furthermore, his dichotomous world view leads him to warn of 
the 'ultimate aim of the Jews and Christians against 
Muslims.'"'^ 
The third revolutionary aspect of Qutb's thought is his 
call for Jihad (holy war) against modern Jahiliyya. This aspect 
had the most significant impact on neo-activist Islam in Egypt. 
According to Qutb, 'the foremost duty of Islam in this 
world is to depose Jahiliyya from the leadership of man, and to 
take leadership into its own hands and enforce the way of life 
which is its permanent f e a t u r e / ' Since Muslim leaders who do 
not implement Islamic-laws are to be considered illegitimate 
rulers ruling by the laws of Jahiliyya, they too were to be 
opposed and deposed uncompromisingly. Qutb stressed that the 
Jihad of a true Muslim against the Jihiliyya was not an attempt 
to impose (Islamic) belief by force. Rather, it was the struggle 
to destroy those Jahili structures, which interfered with the 
individuals ability to embrace God through path of Islam.^^ 
Qutb envisaged the struggle against the Jahiliyya being 
led by a small but expanding core of believers: 
it is necessary that there should be a vanguard which sets out 
with....determination and then keeps walking the path, marching 
through the vast ocean of Jahiliyya which has encomposed the 
entire world. During its course, it should keep itself somewhat 
aloof from this allencompassing Jahiliyya and should also keep 
some ties with it. It is important that this vanguard should know the 
landmarks and milestones of the road toward this goal so that they 
may recognize the starting place, the nature the responsibilities, 
and the ultimate purpose of this long Journey. Not only this, but 
they also ought to be aware of their position vis-a-vis this Jahiliyya 
which has struck it stakes throughout the earth-when to cooperate 
98 
with the others and when to separate from them; what 
characteristics and qualities they should cultivate, and with what 
characteristics and qualities the Jihiliyya, immediately surrounding 
them, is armed; how to address the people of Jahiliyya in the 
language of Islam, and what topics and problems ought to be 
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discussed, and when and how to obtain guidance in these matters. 
In other words Qutb totally rejected modern 'JahilV 
society and called for complete understanding of its 
foundations in order to combat it. 
(V) Qutb and Arab Nationalism 
The Muslim Brothers, until their clash with Nasser, and 
well beyond, they would continue to profess allegiance to Pan-
Arabism. Even a purist like Sayyid-Qutb would write in 
January 1953: 
Some of us prefer to assemble around the banner of Arabism. 
I do not object to this being a middle-range, transitional goal for 
unification, on the road to unity in wider scope. There is, then no 
serious difference between Arab nationalism and Pan-Islam as long 
as we understand Arabism as a mere stage. The whole land of the 
Arabs falls within the scope of the Abode of Islam. And whenever 
we liberate an Arab territory, we set free a patch of an Islamic 
homeland, an organic part of the Islamic body; we would use it 
eventually to liberate the rest of this one and indivisible Abode.'''* 
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Less than a decade later, in one of the letters from prison, 
further developed in milestones, he has to say something 
completely different 
The prophet Muhammad was no doubt capable of setting 
forth a movement of Pan-Arab nationalism in order to unify the 
strife-riven tribes of Arabia He was well neigh able of endowing 
his movement with a nationalist orientation in order to liberate 
|Arab| lands usurped by the Byzantines in the North and the 
Persians in the South 
Yet Allah, the omnipotent and omniscient, did not instruct his 
messenger to go in that direction He only told him to preach that 
three is no God but Allah, why*^  Because Allah knew that there was 
no sense in liberating the land from a Byzantine or a Persian tyrant 
in order to put it in the hands of an Arab tyrant any tyrant is still a 
tyrant The land is to God and should be liberated to serve him 
alone Men should become his servants and none other All 
domination (hakimiya) should be in the hands of Allah, all law 
(Shari'ah) His only The sole collective identity Islam offers is that 
of the faith, where Arabs, Byzantines, Persians, and other nations 
and colors are equal under God's banner ^^  
Pan-Arabism is, thence, clearly rejected by Qutb and is in 
his opinion incompatible with Islam. Qutb at this point said: 
The homeland \watan\ a Muslim should cherish and defend is 
not a mere piece of land, the collective identity he is known by is 
not that of a regime Neither is the banner he should glory in and 
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die for that nation (qawm) His Jihad is solely geared to protect 
the religion of Allah and his Shariah and to save the Abode of 
Islam and no other territory Any land that combats the faith, 
hampers Muslim from practicing their religion, or does not apply 
the Shari'ah, becomes Ipso facto part of the Abode of war {Dar al-
Harb). It should be combated even if one's own kith and kin, 
national group, capital and commerce are to be found there . . . A 
Muslim's homeland is any land governed by the laws of Islam. 
Islam is the only identity worthy of man.... Any other group 
identity... .is a Jahili identity of the type humanity has known 
during its periods of spiritual decadence.^^ 
Taking Qutb's view under consideration, the divorce with 
Pan-Arabism is thus definite, all bonds and ties to be revered, 
all formers alliances between it and Islam null and void. No 
wonder that Egyptian government made these and other similar 
passages the centrepiece of its case against Qutb. For it was 
one of the major ideas, with the help of which he conferred 
upon the reestablished Muslim Brotherhood under ground a 
sense of purpose it had lacked. The report of secret police on 
the case dissects the Mile stones in order to prove the accuser 's 
"rejection of Pan-Arab nationalism". So does the special report 
of the legislative commission of the people's Assembly and the 
Act of Accusation. The government of Nasser understood only 
too well Qutb's direct swipe at Pan-Arabism's claim that the 
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Arabs are God's Chosen people {Khayr ummah), a claim 
supposedly predicated up on the Quran (11,110). Qutb as an 
authority on Quranic-exegesis pointedly quotes this verse to 
prove that "Allah's real chosen people are the Muslim 
community {ummah) regardless of ethnic, racial, or territorial 
bond of its members. For did not the first group of Muslim 
consist of an Arab, Abu Bakr, an Ethopian, Bilal, a Byzantine, 
Suhayb and a Persian, Salman?"^^ 
Qutb himself did not evade the issue during his 
interrogation by police in prison: 
Q. What is your opinion of patriotism? 
A. Patriotism should consist in bonds of faith, not to a piece of 
land. The present, territorial, sense given to this term should 
thus be greatly stretched. 
Q. What do you think of Pan-Arab qawmiyya? 
A. To my mind, this type of ideology that had exhausted its role 
in Universal history. The whole world coalesces today in large 
ideological formations predicated upon doctrines and beliefs. 
Striving towards Islamic unity is, hence much more in tune with the 
spirit of the times we live in.^^ 
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(C) Abul Al'a Mawdudi 
(i) Abul Al'a Mawdudi and foundation of the Jama'at-i-
Islami 
The advent of the British rule following the collapse of 
Muslim rule in India gave birth to various political and social 
movements among the Muslims in India. These movements were 
defensive and reformist in character. The latter accepted the 
reality of British rule and tried to explore the possibilities of 
progress-social, political and economic-by remaining loyal 
subjects of British Empire. The former type of the movement 
asserted the spiritual and cultural superiority of Islam over the 
west and suggested a crusade for establishing Muslim 
supremacy in India. The reform movements offered a new and 
radial interpretation of the old principles of Islamic polity. The 
leaders of the defensive movement regarded any deviation from 
the traditional interpretation of Islam as un-lslamic and upheld 
the strictly traditional approach of Islam. Politically these 
defensive movements were at once militant, revivalist and 
reactionary. The consolidation of the British power made the 
employment of violent methods futile. But the spirit of the 
movements, however, survived. Shah Ismail Shaheed, Syed 
Ahmad Barelvi and Muhmmad Kasim Nanotvi represent the 
revivalist aspect of the defensive movement. In the twentieth 
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century the most notable expression of the political ideas of the 
defensive movement is found in the writings of Abul Al'a 
Mawdudi. He came out with a great burning zeal for revivalism 
and awakening of the Muslims. 
Abul Al'a Mawdudi was born on 25 of September 1903 
in Aurangabad, a well-known town in former princely state of 
Hyderabad (Deccan), presently Andhra Pradesh, India.**" 
Mawdudi's father, Saiyyad Ahmad Hasan Mawdudi, was an 
advocate and had practiced at Meerut before he shifted to 
Hyderabad (Deccan). Ahmad Hasan, though himself educated at 
Aligarh, did not send his son to modern school and 
arrangements were made for him to be taught at home. He was 
taught English language and literature, modern disciplines and 
of course, all classical subjects and Arabic, Persian and Urdu 
languages at his home. According to Mawdudi himself, he had 
to leave the course of Mawlvi Alim in order to earn a living 
after his father's death.*' 
After the interruption of his formal education and his 
father's death, Mawdudi turned to Journalism in order to make 
his living. In 1918, he started contributing to a leading Urdu 
newspaper, Muslim and in 1920, at the age of seventeen, he was 
appointed editor of Taj, which was being published from 
Jabalpore. Late in 1920 Mawdudi came to Delhi and first 
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assumed the editorship of the newspaper Muslim (1921-1923) 
and later of the Al-Jam'iyat (1925-28), both of which were 
organs of the Jam'iyat -I-'ulama'-I Hind, an organization of 
Muslim religious scholars. Under his editorship, al-Jam'iyat 
became the leading newspaper of the Muslims of India.^^ The 
al-Jami'at was one of the most popular anti-British Urdu 
dailies of those times. 
A significant turning point came for Mawdudi in 
connection with the murder of a certain Swami Shradhanand by 
a fanatic Muslim in 1925. Shradhanand had been a leading 
figure of the Shuddhi movements, an effort among Hindus to 
reconvert to Hinduism members of the depressed classes of 
India who had become, at least nominally, Muslim. The murder 
provoked a great public outcry, and criticisms of Islam and the 
Muslims began to appear in the public press. There were 
accusations that Islam relies upon the sword for its 
propagation, charges of bloodthirstiness, and repetitions of the 
old slender that Islam promises paradise to those who kill an 
unbeliever. Mawdudi undertook to answer these charges in the 
columns of newspaper al-Jami'at, and the articles, which he 
wrote were later, collected into a book and published by the 
title of al-Jihad fil Islam. These essays were his first serious 
full-scale attempt to write about an Islamic issue, and the effort 
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of composing them apparently brought an insight of great 
vividness and intensity into the nature of Islam. Many years 
later he said that the composition of this book was the decisive 
factor in bringing him to a full understanding of the Islamic 
way of life.^^ Virtually all of the themes and emphases that 
characterize his later activity and more mature thought are 
discussed there. Indeed, the entirety of his subsequent career 
might be viewed as a working out of the implications of this 
seminal document. 
In al-Jihad fil Islam Mawdudi followed the line of the 
traditional ulama who defined Jihad as a warfare for the 
defence of Islam, its honour and the Muslims as a whole. A 
willingness to perform Jihad at the risk of one's life was the 
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test of true belief. According to Mawdudi, the real object of 
Jihad was that Islam should depose 'Kufr' (disbelief) from the 
seat of the authority. Islam advocates war only defence of truth 
and, against oppression and it was true Jihad {Fi Sabi I Allah) 
only if the war was for truth.^^ 
In 1928, Mawdudi left the Job of the al-Jami'at and went 
to Hyderabad. There he totally devoted himself to writing and 
research. It was in this connection that he took up the 
editorship of monthly Tarjuman al-Qur'an in 1933, which 
became the main source for the expression of Mawdudi's 
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ideas.^^ Mawdudi wrote a lot of articles in the Tarjuman al 
Qur'an some of which were later collected and published in the 
form of a book under various titles. The most important of 
these is Musalman Aur Mawjuda siyasi Kashmakash because in 
this collection Mawdudi expressed his political philosophy 
"what was upper-most in my mind was to keep alive in Muslims 
a sense of their separate entity and prevent their absorption 
into a non Muslim community."^^ The third volume of this 
collection exposed what an Islamic state really was and what 
kind of action were required for the establishment of Islamic 
state. 
Sir Muhmmad Iqbal was impressed by Mawdudi's writings 
whom he met in 1937 at Lahore. Iqbal advised Mawdudi to shift 
from Hyderabad to Punjab because he thought in course of time 
Mawdudi would have less opportunity for carrying on his work 
in south-India and Punjab offered a fertile ground. Mawdudi 
followed Iqbal's advice and left Hyderabad in 1938. He settled 
in Gurdaspur on an endowment of eight acres containing a 
mosque and few buildings which were to become the Darul-
Islam Academy.^^ Mawdudi's intention was to gather sensible 
young representatives of both the old and the new systems of 
education and train them for providing a new intellectual and 
moral Islamic leadership.^^ In 1938 when Iqbal died, Mawdudi 
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moved to Lahore, where he joined the Islamia college as Dean 
of the faculty of theology. After one year he left the college as 
he felt that he was losing his freedom. He came to Pathankot 
(Punjab) and continued for Tarjuman al-Quran.^^ 
In August 1940, the Muslim league passed its now famous 
Lahore Resolution, which called for the establishment of 
autonomous states in the Muslim majority areas of the 
subcontinent. From that point on, the great weight of Muslim 
opinion rallied behind the demand for Pakistan, using the same 
argument Mawdudi had employed, that the Muslims of India 
were a distinct nation, but claiming also that their nationhood 
gave them the right to a state and territory of their own. In 
Mawdudi's opinion the new thrust for Indian Muslim political 
agitation, like what had gone before it, did not meet the needs 
of the Muslims but posed a new threat to them, for its ultimate 
result was only to substitute Muslim nationalism for the Indian 
nationalism and nationalism in whatever form was bad. Both 
were basically secularist conceptions of the Muslim density, 
and both were concerned with the mundane interests of the 
people, not their ultimate orientation.^' 
Around the year 1940 Mawdudi developed ideas regarding 
the founding of a more ambitious and comprehensive 
movement. These ideas led him to establish a new organization 
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under the name of Jama'at-i-Islami. Mawdudi, who founded 
this Jam'at, was elected its chief and remained so till 1972 
when he withdrew the post on health grounds. 
The foundation of the Jam'at-i-Islami was not a chance of 
occurrence. Maw^dudi had been stressing for a party, which 
would be totally committed to Islam and would be different 
from other Muslim parties. He had pointed out that the 'present 
civilization' was fastly moving towards its doom. And the 
causes of this doom were the ideologies such as Capitalism, 
Socialism, Nationalism, and Fascism. Mawdudi felt that 
destruction of the civilization would either bring about a group 
of people who would advocate the qualities of Jihad and 
Ijtihad. Mawdudi also felt that an ideology of that kind could 
not be other than Islam. Therefore, he claimed that the future 
of humanity depended upon Islam even though he strongly felt 
that ideology was not enough. A right and strong ideology 
needed a righteous and strong party.^^ 
Under Mawdudi's one man show leadership the Jama't-i-
Islami became one of the leading Islamic movements of the 20"" 
century in the Muslim world. He traveled to many countries 
(Egypt, Syria, Jordan, England, U.S.A. and Canada) to spread 
his ideas. Mawdudi wrote 120 books and pamphlets and has 
over a 1000 speeches and press statements to his credit. He 
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openly criticized any un-Islamic practice and his movement 
attempted to bring change through political control. For 
holding revolutionary views he was often imprisoned in 
Pakistan and in 1953 he was even sentenced to death on charge 
of sedition. The sentence was later commuted because of the 
pressure from leader of Muslim world.^'' 
Due to the partition in 1947 two independent states were 
carved out of the sub-continent—Pakistan and India—the 
jami'at was divided in two sections the jama'at-i-silami India 
and the Jam'at-i-Islami Pakistan. After the creation of Pakistan 
Mawdudi migrated from Pathankot in India to Lahore and 
denounced the struggle for Kashmir as un-lslamic for which he 
was sent to jail in 1950, though later, in 1965, he endorsed the 
Kashmir war as Jihad (it is worth to note that between 1937 
and 1947 Mawdudi opposed first the Indian nationalists stand 
of the Deoband 'ulama', and later Pakistan movement, 
denouncing its secular-minded leadership). In 1952-3 he 
aligned himself with the former anti-Pakistan group, the Ahrar, 
and the orthodox 'ulama' in their agitation demanding 
discriminative legislation and executive action against the 
heterodox messianistic Ahmadi sect. During the military regime 
from 1958, the Jama'at was banned, like other political parties, 
and like them it was revived in 1962. As usual the party and its 
leadership aligned themselves with the other opposition groups, 
infiltrating their ranks and influencing their political 
programme in the direction of Islamic orthodoxy. After the 
brief imprisonment in 1964, Mawdudi emerged to support the 
candidacy of Miss Fatima Jinnah (sister of Ali Muhammad 
Jinnah) for election to the office of president of republic in 
opposition to Ayub Khan, though in his writings he had 
persistently asserted that a woman could not legally be 
appointed as the head of the Islamic state.^^ 
Upto the present time Jamaat-I-Islami is the only 
organization, which has kept up a steady pressure on all the 
government of Pakistan for bringing about the Nizam-I-Mustafa 
(the Islamic system). Even after the death of Mawdudi in 1979 
Jama'at-I-Islami has acted both as an Islamic movement and 
political party. However, its effectiveness had been thwarted at 
every step and it has not been very successful. 
(ii) Political ideology of Mawdudi 
The political ideology of Mawdudi starts with the notion 
that Islam is not a Jumble of unrelated and incoherent mode of 
conduct. It is rather a well-ordered system, a consistent whole, 
resting on a definite set of clear-cut postulates. The entire life 
scheme of a truly Islamic life flows from its basic postulates. 
I l l 
The unity and sovereignty of God is the starting point of 
Islamic political philosophy.^^ 
To Mawdudi, the distinguishing mark of Islamic state is its 
complete freedom from all traces of nationalism and its influence. 
It is a state build completely on principles. Four conditions were 
laid by him for such state to exist: 
I. Affirmation of sovereignty of Allah. 
II. Acceptance of government of the limitations that it will 
discharge its functions and exercise its power within the 
bounds laid down by Allah. 
III. All existing laws which were contrary to Sharia would be 
changed, and that. 
IV. All new laws would be based on the teachings of Islam.^^ 
Mawdudi was of the opinion that the state according to Islam, 
is nothing more than the combination of men working together as 
servants of Allah to carryout his will and purposes. Such a state 
however, does not exist anywhere because man's rule over man has 
created ignoble governments that allow all kinds of evil practices 
and corruption to flourish in the whole political system. For 
a man of ordinary sense can understand this point that where 
people are quite free to commit adultery, no amount of sermons can 
put a stop to this. But if after getting hold of the power of 
government adultery is stopped by force, people will themselves 
give up this illicit course and take to the illicit one. It will be 
impossible to succeed if you want to stop by the means of sermons 
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the evil of gambling, usury, drinking, bribery, obscene shows, 
indecent dress, unethical dress and such other things So this is 
an obvious matter requiring no great thinking that no scheme of the 
reform of the people can be implemented without acquiring control 
of the government machinery. Whoever really wants to root out 
mischief and chaos from God's earth and is genuinely anxious to 
ameliorate the condition of God's creation, it is useless for him to 
work as a mere preacher. He should stand up to finish the 
government run on wrong principles, snatch power from wrongdoers 
and establish a government based on correct principles and 
following a proper system.^^ 
Mawdudi's state is a monolithic state of an authoritarian type. 
Mawdudi's concept of an Islamic state was that of "an all powerful, 
monolithic state, upholding a definite religious ideology and using 
the full weight of police and judicial powers to unsure that all 
aspect of its life will reflect the character of its Islamic 
ideology."'"^ 
According to Mawdudi to change the status quo of a 
secular Muslim state into an Islamic state is not easy because 
of threat to the vested interests of the elite would lead to 
conflict. For this reason an Islamic revolution is very essential 
which 'can be brought about only when a mass movement is started 
based on the theories and conceptions of the Qur'an and practice of 
prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) which would, by a powerful struggle. 
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effect a total change in the intellectual, moral, cultural and 
Psychological foundation of social life.' 
Mawdudi then talks about the people who can take up 
such a difficult task of leading the Islamic revolutions: 
requires a group of workers who are fearful of God and 
implicitly follow the law of God without consideration of loss or 
gain, no matter where they come from, whether from this 
community which is now called Muslim or from outside. A handful 
of such men are more valuable for this purpose than the huge 
crowd Islam does not stand in need of a treasure of copper coins 
which passed for gold mohurs. Before examining the stamp on 
coins, Islam seeks to find out whether or not pure gold lies beneath. 
One such coin is more valuable to Islam than a whole heap of 
spurious gold coins. Then, again the leadership, which God requires 
for the glory of His name, is the type of leadership, which should 
not budge an inch from the principles, which Islam seeks to uphold 
no matter what the outcome may be, whether all the Muslims perish 
by hunger or go down before the sword.'"^ 
Mawdudis interpretation of Islam pertaining particularly 
to its social and political outlook, as presented in his Arabic 
translations, is very rigid and narrow. In his monograph Islam 
aur Jahiliyat (Islam and Jahiliyya), for example, he bifurcates 
the otherwise complex societies into Islamic and Jahili. His 
interpretation of a Jahili a society as the one, which does not 
believe in, revealed law and one God, and Islamic as the one 
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which believes in one God and upholds the revelation is 
passable, though his use of term Jahili is inapt. But Mawdudi 
goes further and propagates absolutism to explain the essentials 
of the prophetic message suggesting that, in Islamic perception, 
the universe in an 'organized state' and a "totalitarian system" 
in which all powers are vested in Allah who is the only ruler. 
He refutes even the concept of people's sovereignty, and 
suggest it to be a characteristics of Jahili society. According to 
him, in the Islamic method, opinions are formed on the basis of 
solutions presented by the prophets regarding the basic human 
problems.^^^ 
However, in a speech delivered at Macca on occasion of 
hajj at a gathering of Arab young in 1963,'°^* Mawdudi advised 
the "activists of the Islamic movements to avoid indulging in 
clandestine activity" and not to try " to bring revolution 
through the use of force". He rather stressed change of mind 
and true Islamization at the popular level.'°^ 
(iii) Mawdudi's stand on Nationalism 
Mawdudi's political thought is based on the medieval 
tradition of Islam that aims at the establishment of the Gods 
rule on earth. It is a process of revolution, which requires 
propagation, organization, and acquisition of political power by 
the righteous leaders of the movement. The political 
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philosophy, which is the basis of this revolution, is presented 
as the only acceptable way of life. In the contemporary world, 
however, the most inadequate system is that of the West, which 
stands as a great challenge to the Islamic society. According to 
him, western influence, has led to the degeneration and de-
Islamization of the Muslims. The western civilization has 
forcibly severed religion from society and created a slavish 
mentality among the subject people and has deprived them the 
will and ability to protest and resist. Mawdudi maintained that 
western education in India has done permanent harm to the 
Muslim mind and culture by spreading rationalism, irreligion 
and atheism.'°^ The impact of the West has made the Muslims 
ignorant of the vitality and virility of Islamic culture. Islam is 
opposed to all the values, which are dear to the western mind. 
In the political sphere the west has created the false Gods of 
nationalism and democracy. Religion is alienated from the state 
and latter had become a toll in the hands of the opportunists 
and has ceased to be an instrument for the promotion of the 
moral life of man.'°^ 
Mawdudi regarded nationalism a sentiment or a subjective 
feeling that produces disunity. According to him the theory and 
practice of nationalism is not only defective but also dangerous 
Wf, 
and fatal to the interests of mankind as it is based on " what is 
i n s 
selfishness in individual life is nationalism of social life." 
The word Qawm (nation) has been used in different ways 
and senses in Urdu language. Even Mawdudi has used word 
Qawm in its various meanings. Mawdudi defined it in a manner, 
which means that all those who had accepted Islam were one 
nation, and those who had rejected Islam were another. Those 
two nations differed from each other not on basis of their race 
but on the basis of faith and practice. Father and son might 
well belong to the different nations because of different faiths 
and two strangers might belong to same nation because of their 
identity of their faith.*°^ To prove himself right Mawdudi 
launched attacks on any other definition of nation and 
nationalism. He was of the opinion that territorial or racial 
nationalism would kill all the feelings of Islamic nationalism 
and two could not co-exist. According to him, all other nations, 
except the Islamic, had been built on the basis of race, 
territory, language, colour, economic needs or organization of 
government. These factors while innocent in themselves foster 
the growth of nationalism which gives rise to national 
prejudices and produce national exclusiveness. Therefore 
Mawdudi propagated that nationalism and national objectives as 
commonly understood were not worth propagation.''° He was 
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not in favour of the concept of composite nationalism in India 
and believed attempts to unite the different nationalities could 
have two alternative results. First, the attempt could result in 
all the nations arriving at clear defence agreements between 
them for common aims and objectives. The second alternative 
was the all the nations would become one nation. The second 
one he believed that would lead to Muslims giving first priority 
to their motherland. Therefore Mawdudi advised the Muslims of 
India to forget separate electorate, fixation of seats, reservation 
of posts etc. and to concentrate on the demolishing the concept 
of one nation and not to move one step forward until their 
separate nationhood was accepted.' ' ' 
Between 1937 and 1940 two groups of nationalists were 
present among the Muslims of India. The first group was the 
nationalist Muslim group. This group accepted the common 
Indian nationhood. The second group was full of those who 
advocated the political and economic upliftment of Indian 
Muslims. They were hardly interested in principles and 
objectives of Islam. For Mawdudi, both groups were equally 
wrong because, in his opinion, Islam did not allow any 
nationalism and believed only the truth. Both these groups of 
nationalists were unaware of their un-Islamic positions. The 
second group of nationalists, in other words the Muslim 
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leagues, came in for serious and harsh condemnation at the 
hands of Mawdudi. To Mawdudi, they were not different from 
Hindu nationalists, though they considered themselves to be the 
flag bearers and representatives of Islam. They would be 
satisfied only by the capture of power by the Muslim, however 
un-Islamic their government might be.'^^ 
Mawdudi was against the creation of Pakistan by Muslim 
Nationalists . To him, the term "Muslim" and "nationalism" 
were contradictory. In a speech shortly before partition he had 
asked: 
"Why should we foolishly waste our time in expanding the so 
called Muslim nationalist state and fritter away our energies in 
setting it up, when we know that it will not only be useless for our 
purposes, but will rather prove on obstacle in our path."'^^ 
(IV) The Jama'at-I-Islami and the Ikhwan al Muslimun 
There are a lot of similarities between the Jama'at-i-Islami 
and the Ikhwan al-Muslimun of Egypt, although there were no 
contacts between them prior to the partition of India. It was after 
the creation of Pakistan that some literature of Jama'at was 
translated into Arabic and reached Egypt. ' ' ' ' Mawdudi's major 
works (Jihad in Islam, Islam and Jahiliyya, the principles of Islamic 
government) were translated from Urdu and English into Arabic in 
1950s."^ 
The political programme and the way of thinking of both 
Hasan al-Banna and the Abul Al'a Mawdudi have striking 
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resemblances. Both were of the opinion that Islam was all-
comprehensive and deals all aspects of life. That Islam 
demolishes the geographical, racial and national differences 
was the common assertation of both al-Banna and Mawdudi. 
Both of them opposed the multiplicity of parties in the 
legislature both Ikhwan and Jama'at organized large-scale 
public welfare and social service activities like free education 
and free hospital etc."^ 
The ideologue of Ikhwan and the father of presently 
Islamic fundamentalism Sayyid Qutb was a great admirer of 
Mawdudi. In the Quranic exegesis Qutb quoted Mawdudi at a 
length. The term Jahiliyya was borrowed by Qutb from 
Mawdudi. 
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Chapter V 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAN AND ITS 
IMPACT ON WEST ASIA 
(A) Ayatullah RuhuUah Musavi Khomeini 
(i) Ayatullah Khomeini: from early life to revolution 
The names of Hasan al-Banna, Syed-Qutb, and Abul Al'a 
Mawdudi are well known in the Islamic circles in the Muslim 
world. However, Ayatullah Khomeini's name, it can be safely 
asserted, is well known in all parts of the world. Khomeini's 
fame does not rest on his merely being a prominent religious 
leader but on his leading a successful revolution in Iran. The 
revolution of 1979 in Iran caused a dramatic development in 
the international affairs and its motion was seen throughout the 
Muslim world, from North Africa to South East Asia. This 
revolution was the victory of Khomeini. 
Ayatullah Khomeini was born in the provincial town of 
Khomein in Iran in 1902. Khomeini's father, Sayyid Mustafa, 
was killed shortly after he was born, in 1902. Khomeini lost his 
mother also when he was only sixteen. At the age of seventeen, 
Khomeini went to study in Arak. In Arak, he attached himself 
to the circle around Shaikh-Abdol Karim Haeri-Yazdi and 
followed the latter to Qum in 1920. Haeri-Yazdi was the 
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modern founder of the theological centre in Qum. In 1927 
Khomeini started teaching philosophy at Qum. When Reza Shah 
started to limit the role of clergy, Khomeini retaliated without 
fear of the pahlavi and soon came to the notice of state 
authorities. But Khomeini's opposition to the pahlavi rule was 
not restricted to the vocal articulations for in 1941 he wrote a 
book Kashf al-Asrar. (Discovery of Secrets) which openly 
attacked the Pahlavi dynasty and called for an end to 
imperialist influences in Iran.' 
In his attack on Reza Shah, Khomeini always referred to 
the monarch with his pre-royal title "Reza Khan". There are 
some claims that Khomeini had participated in the 1924 anti-
Reza Shah March led by Nurullah Isfahni, that he had 
befriended Mirza Sadiq Aqa after the latter helped to lead an 
anti-Reza Shah March in Tabriz in 1927, and that his classes on 
morals were full with anti-Pahlavi statements so that Reza Shah 
had them first harassed (by sending secret police among the 
students) and then closed. However, in 1940's and 1950s 
although part of the sullen opposition of the Pahlavis, 
Khomeini politically followed Borujerdi. Borujerdi was a 
leading figure among the clerics of Iran. He in 1949 convened a 
meeting of clerics and argued withdrawal from the political 
arena. Fearing anarchism and leftists in the recovery period 
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after the World War II, Borujerdi cooperated with the monarchy 
to preserve law and order. Both Khomeini and Borujerdi were 
critical of the day today involvement in politics of Ayatullah 
Abul-Qassim Kashni, a major figure in the National Front led 
by Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq.^ 
In 1953, when Dr. Mosaddeq rose to curtail the power of 
the Shah, Khomeini maintained distance from the nationalist 
forces. He did not show any enthusiasm for Mosaddeq's 
nationalization of oil. To him the policy of condemning 
despotism and welcoming reforms initiated by the National 
Front in 1959 was meaningless, for no reforms were possible 
without independence and independence was an illusion as long 
as the Pahlavi regime survived.^ 
After the coup of 1953, Reza Khan banned the political 
parties that had flourished since the British and Russians had 
installed him on throne in 1941. Many political activists were 
imprisoned or executed, and others escaped to Europe. With the 
assistance of the CIA, and the FBI, and Israel's Mossad, the 
Shah established the secret police force SAVAK, the primary 
purpose of which was to suppress all domestic oppositions. But 
Shah made every effort to please the ulama, with whom he 
maintained good relations at least until 1959, when a number of 
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ayatullahs protested government proposals concerning women's 
enfranchisement and land reform/ 
In the summer 1960, serious domestic opposition to the 
Shah's post-coup regime surfaced for the first time when 
secular intellectuals with ties to the national front protested the 
patently rigged election of Majlis (National-Assembly). The 
Shah was anxious to avoid antagonizing the new Kennedy 
administration, which was known to favour the liberalization of 
authoritarian regimes. So he announced that "free" elections 
would be held in January 1961. But national front as well as 
Tudeh candidates were generally excluded from these elections, 
which therefore further outraged the professional, student, and 
bazarri supporters of the Front. Then in the spring 1961, the 
regime was shaken by the teacher's strike in Tehran, which was 
the most dramatic of a series of strikes triggered by prolonged 
inflation and government's subsequent austerity measures.^ 
The Shah responded to all this, as he did in crisis of late 
seventies, with a combination of carrot and stick on the one 
hand, he instituted a series of reforms designed to please the 
National Front's largely middle-class supporters. In the other 
hand, he had the National front's leaders Jailed and their 
protests (usually at the University of Tehran) broken up by 
military forces. These tactics succeeded. By 1963, the Shah's 
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liberal democratic opposition had decreased. But then came 
Ayatullah Khomeini.^ Khomeini had emerged as a leader after 
the death of Borujerdi in 1962. Majority of the ulama had not 
participated in the demonstrations of 1961-62, although some 
of them had criticized the government's land reform bill as well 
as the idea of women's suffrage. When the shah announced in 
February 1963 that women would be allowed to vote, the ulama 
organized demonstrations bazarris (merchants) closed their 
shops in all Iranian major cities. The Shah's government 
responded by an attack on the Fayziyya Madrasa (Seminary) in 
Qum, which soon became the centre of Islamic opposition to 
the Shah.^ 
On June 3, 1963, which was Ashura (Tenth day of 
Muharam), Iman Khomeini linked the attack on the Fayziyya 
Madrasa to the slaughter at Karbala and warned the Shah that 
unless he stopped trying to eradicate Islam and the ulama from 
the Iranian society, he would die in exile like father. Before 
dawn next morning, Khomeini was arrested at his home in Qum, 
as were many other active ulama and religious students. 
Khomeini's arrest sparked demonstration that soon turned into 
riots in Qum, Tehran, Shiraz and Isfhan.* 
The Shah used troops to suppress these riots and 
demonstrations, with orders to shoot at sight if necessary. 
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Marvin Zoins a political scientist, who saw military open fire 
in Tehran bazaar on the very first day of violence said that the 
total number of people wounded or killed during June 1963 was 
thousand.^ In less than a week all protests were stamped out by 
army's tactics. 
In April 1964, Khomeini was allowed to return to Qum, 
where he got a hero's welcome. The head of the Shah's secret 
police (SAVAK) at that time claimed that Khomeini had agreed 
not to participate in political activities anymore, but the 
Khomeini was soon criticizing the Shah as vehemently as ever. 
In October 1964, the Majlis passed a bill giving diplomatic 
immunity to American military and civilian personal in Iran 
and another bill approving a $200 million loan from United 
States. Khomeini saw the latter as a payment for former and 
condemned both: 
Do you know that this agreement reduces the Iranian people 
to a rank lower than that of American dog? if some one runs over an 
American dog with is car, he is subject to investigation and 
prosecution even if he is "the Shah" himself. But if an American 
cook runs over " the Shah of Iran" himself, or any other important 
person, will not be subject to prosecution.'" 
Khomeini also asserted that the authorities were trying to 
reduce the authority of the ulama because they had understood 
that so long as the men of religion had extensive influence on 
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the people, the government "would not be able to enslave the 
people and sell them to the English one day and the American 
another."' ' 
The Shah then decided to exile Khomeini and on 
November 4, 1964 Khomeini was flown to Turkey. In October 
1965, the Shah allowed him to move from Suuni Turkey to the 
Shi'i shrine city of Najaf in Iraq, which was to be Khomeinis 
home for thirteen years.'^ 
Ayatullah Khomeini established himself as a major 
presence in Najaf. More importantly, he maintained his 
influence and fame in Iran. He issued periodic proclamations 
concerning developments in Iran, which were smuggled into the 
country and circulated secretly at the great risk. In addition, 
his messages addressed to the Muslim world at large were 
distributed several times in Mecca during the annual pilgrimage 
season. In Najaf Khomeini was visited by a number of 
important Iranian and other Muslim personalities. Khomeini 
during these years of exile, had a tremendous impact on the 
Iranian students of religious studies who returned to Iran armed 
with his analyses of the countries problems.'^ Khomeini's 
students in Najaf were very active in maintaining contact with 
the movement in Iran and distributing propaganda for it in 
other countries. Their organization became fully fledged with 
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the establishment of the combative clerics outside the country 
group in 1972, which set out a detailed programme for the 
movement. The transcripts of lectures by Khomeini were 
dispatched to Islamic societies in the USA, Europe, India and 
Pakistan as well as Iran. The most important points from the 
speeches and announcements of Khomeini were arranged in a 
manner common to political treaties as a work entitled 
'Pronouncements of the Islamic movement' (Manshur-I-Nazhat-
Islami)}^ 
The publication discussed the principles and goals of the 
Islamic struggle, and included such topics opposition to the 
regime, anti-imperialism and views on Zionism, the Islamic 
unity and leadership, the economic ideas of the movement, 
foreign policy and internal policy. In 1970 a text based on the 
government of Jurists was compiled in Beirut, using money 
send from Najaf, and was then secretly send to Iran. Khomeini 
was very anxious that his ideas should reach to the youth of 
Iran, who where greatly impressed by Marxist ideas. After 
sometime the Arabic version of the text was published in Beirut 
and distributed to the Arabic-speaking countries.^^ 
When Khomeini began to discuss and preach the message 
of the government of Jurists, the ulama of Najaf were very 
much against it, though the number of students doubled. In 
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1970s Khomeini attacked the regime in Saudi Arabia and 
pamphlets giving his views were distributed there by 1975, 
although it had become difficult for the Iraqi Shi'a to see 
Khomeini close to the Syrian, Lebanese and Afghanis. After the 
death of Ayatullah Hakim most of the Shi'a in the other 
countries followed Khomeini. Khomeini's stand on Palestine 
was to win sympathy in Sunni Muslim world, and he issued a 
fatwa saying that the Palestinian could use their canonical 
taxes in Palestine to fight Israel.'^ 
Khomeini aroused hopes of deliverance and improvement 
in every class of the Iranian society. The traditional middle 
class of artisans, merchants and well-off farmers saw Khomeini 
an upholder of private property, a partisan of the market 
(bazaar), and a true believer in Islamic values. The modern 
middle class of professionals, industrialists and businessmen 
regarded him a radical nationalist weeded to the programme of 
ending Shah's dictatorship and foreign influence in Iran. The 
urban working class backed Khomeini because of his repeated 
commitment to social justice. Finally the rural poor saw him as 
their saviour: the one to provide them with arable land, roads, 
schools and irrigation facilities. It was, then natural that 
Khomeini should swiftly emerge as a leader and guide of 
Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. Notwithstanding his physical 
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absence from the country, he was deeply present in the hearts 
of Iranian people. 
The sudden death of Ayatullah Khomeini's son Mustafa 
Khomeini in Najaf on 23 October 1977 was a bolt from blue for 
the Iranian masses. The mysterious death convinced the masses 
that Mustafa was poisoned by SAVAK. Khomeini himself, 
however, made no accusations and bore the loss of his son who 
had already established a name for his scholarship and 
radicalism with equanimity and composure. The condolence 
meeting organized in Qum and elsewhere in Iran openly 
condemned SAVAK atrocities and Shah's injustice. It became 
evident that the repressions of Shah's regime had failed to 
alienate the Iranians from Ayatullah Khomeini.'* 
Soon after the death of Mustafa a memorial service was 
held in Tehran. At this service, which was reportedly attended 
by over 3,000 people, the Ayatullah Tahiri Isfahni urged all 
those present to pray for the good health and "speedy return" of 
"our one and only leader, the defender of the faith and great 
combatant of Islam, Grand Ayatullah Khomeini." The 
congregation responded to the mention of Khomeini's name by 
chsinting Allahu-akbar, "God is great." ' ' 
On January 8, 1978, one week after president Carter had 
been in Tehran branding the Shah as a wise statesman and 
138 
beloved of his people, the government- controlled press printed 
an article against Khomeini and labeled him as an agent of 
foreign powers. The public reaction was immediate outrage. 
The following day in Qum, demonstrations broke out that were 
suppressed with heavy loss of life. Throughout the summer and 
spring of 1978, Khomeini issued a series of proclamations and 
directives congratulating the people on their steadfastness and 
encouraging them to persist until the attainment of final 
objective-overthrow of the monarchy and founding of an 
Islamic republic. 
The centrality of the Khomeini in the revolutionary 
movement of Iran was obvious from beginning. His name was 
constantly repeated in the slogans that were devised and 
chanted in the demonstrations; his portrait served as a 
revolutionary banner; and his return from exile to supervise the 
installation of an Islamic government was insistently 
demanded. Acting under erroneous assumptions, the Shah's 
regime requested the Ba'athist government of Iraq, to expel 
Khomeini from its territory, in the hope of depriving him of his 
base of operations and robbing the Revolution of its leadership. 
Khomeini left Iraq and went to France in early October in 1978, 
when Iraqi government issued the order of his expulsion.^' 
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The move to France proved beneficial for Khomeini 
because communication from France with Iran was easier than 
it had been from Iraq. The directives and declarations were 
directly telephoned to Tehran. The world's media also started 
paying attention to the Khomeini, and his words began to reach 
to different parts of world.^^ 
The month of Muharram that coincided with December 
1978 witnessed vast and repeated demonstrations in Tehran and 
other Iranian cities demanding the abolition of Shah's regime. 
Despite all the energy Shah had used, including the killing of 
demonstrators, the torture of Prisoners and despite the 
unstinting support he had received from United States, the Shah 
failed to control the people. Hundreds of thousands of people 
joined the March against Shah in the heart of Tehran on 10 
December 1978. On December 11, the Ashura (Tenth of 
Muharram and the day when Imam Hussain son of Iman Ali was 
killed in battle at Karbala) day dawned with huge mobs filling 
the major streets of all towns in Iran. In Tehran foreign observe 
estimated the number of demonstrators as more than half a 
million. Area of human heads filled more than five miles of 
road. The demonstrators condemned Shah, crying: 
Shah Jenayat mi Konad, Carter hemayat me Konad (The Shah 
commits tyranny, Carter supports him): 
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Nehzat-e ma Hussain ast, rahbar-I ma Khomeini ast (our 
movement is guided by Imam Russian's martydom, our leader is 
Khomeini). 
Marg bar Shah (Death to the Shah). Khoda, Qor'an, Khomeini 
(God, Qur'an and Khomeini).^^ 
Khomeini during this time played an important role to 
neutralize the shah's 440, OOO-strong military. He came up with 
idea of 'moral attack' on army. 'We must fight from within the 
soldier 's heart 's; he said, 'face the solider with a flower, fight 
through Martyrdom, because the martyr is the essence of history. 
Let the army kill as many as it wants until the soldiers are shaken 
to their hearts by the massacres they have committed. Then the 
army will collapse, and you will have disarmed army'. At the same 
time Khomeini warned the soldiers that if they shot their 
brothers and sisters ' it is just as though you are firing the 
Qur'an'.2^ 
By the January 1979 it became certain that Shahpur 
Bakhtiar was prime Minister designate. Shah with his queen 
Farah also left Iran on January 16, 1979, in his Boeing 707. As 
soon as the news of Shah's departure broke on Tehran radio, 
thousands of people came out of their homes shouting "Shah 
raft" (Shah is gone). Once the Shah left Iran, Khomeini 
prepared to return to Iran. When he did (although Bakhtiar tried 
his best to stop him), on Feb. 1, 1979, he was met with a very 
141 
warm welcome. With his presence Bakhtiar could not save his 
prime Minister ship. Finally on Feb. 10 and 11, the government 
collapsed and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born.^^ 
(ii) Khomeini's Political views 
Before discussing Khomeini's political views it will be 
better to give a brief history about the stand of Shia.-ulama 
regarding state. 
Throughout the middle ages the Shia ulama, unlike their 
Sunni counter parts, failed to develop a consistent theory of 
state. The Sunnis accept the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs as 
the Muhammad's legitimate successors and their clergy 
associated political obedience with the religious duty, and 
disobedience with religious heresy. The Shia ulama, however, 
kept a distance from this belief and they believed that prophets 
true successors were not the elected and then the hereditary 
caliphs, but the twelve imams-beginning with Ali, the prophets 
son-in-law, going through Hussain, the third Imam and younger 
son of Ali; and ending with the last of Hussain's direct male 
descendants, the twelfth Imam, also known as Mahdi (Messiah), 
and the Saheb-e Zaman (Lord of ages) who had supposedly 
gone into occulation some 200 years after Hussain's martyrdom 
at kerbala and would come to this world again at some future 
time-to prepare the way for Judgement Day.^^ 
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Every ulama in the Shia community agreed in the full 
legitimacy of Hidden Imam, however, they sharply disagreed on 
the nature of the existing states, even when these states were 
ruled by Shias. Some were of the opinion that since all 
temporal rulers were usurpers, true believer should reject the 
state like plague. They also argued that a true believer should 
decline government offices and favours, treat rulers with 
suspicion, shun Friday prayers where monarch will be thanked, 
take disputes to their own experts rather than to the state 
Judge. Other Shia clerics, however, argued that one should 
accept the state, but halfheartedly. They reminded their 
followers that Imam Ali, in Nahjal-Balagah, had warned of the 
dangers of 'social chaos' that bad government was better than 
'no government.' Yet other ulamas wholeheartedly accepted the 
state, especially the Shia dynasty set up in Iran by Safavids in 
1501. They argued that the monarch was shadow of God on 
earth, obedience was their divine right, political dissent led 
directly to external domination. They further instructed their 
followers to serve the state and monarchy. They believed that 
monarchy and the clerical hierarchy were complementary 
pillars of the state since both were equal heirs to the Imam's 
inheritance and authority. In other words this form of the Shia 
143 
concept of state was almost equal that of the conservative 
sunni's.^* 
For the eleven centuries, not a single Shia writer talked 
about the unacceptability of monarchy, and the role of Grand 
Ayatuallahs as an authority to control the state. Majority of the 
ulama agreed that the clergy's main responsibilities referred as 
the Velayat-e-faqih were largely apolitical. They were only to 
study the law ifiqh) based on the Quran, the sayings of prophet 
(hadiihs), and the teachings of Imams. A few argued that if 
rulers violated the Islamic law, the senior clerics had the added 
responsibility of temporarily entering the political arena to 
protect the Muslim community. For example, when Muhammad 
Hasan Shirazi-one of the first Ayatullahs to be commonly 
recognized as the single most important faqih, the marja-e-
taqlid (source of imitation) of his time-led tobacco protest in 
1891 against the Qajar Shah, he stressed throughout the crisis 
that he was merely opposed to "bad adviser' and that he would 
pull out his leg from politics once the Shah cancelled the 
concession. In the same way, the Ayatuallahs who participated 
in the constitutional movement of 1905-9 sought neither to 
overthrow the monarchy nor to establish a theocracy, but at 
most to setup a supervisory committee of senior clerics to 
144 
ensure that law passed by the parliament were not against 
Shari'ah.'^^ 
Ayatullah Khomeini as a traditionalist scholar and 
pragmatic political activist rejected secularism. In Khomeini's 
view, Islam is the religion of politics, and as such everything in 
Islam is political. Khomeini paid foremost attention to the 
political dimensions of Islam by stating that "the issues of 
Islam are political issues, and thus the politics of Islam gains 
primacy over other issues."^° 
To understand Khomeini's view of political life, it is 
critically important to know his conception of politics. Central 
to this conception is leadership of community. Khomeini 
observed that " politics means running a state". Running the 
state involves " a relationship between the governor and the 
people, between governments and masses, between the 
governors and other governments; and the prevention of 
corruption." Khomeini's typology includes satanic politics, 
which has its base on corrupt leadership, unjust rule over 
people and their properties, and lies; and Islamic politics that 
guides the society towards all individual and societal needs.^' 
Ayatuallah Khomeini was of the opinion that a non-
Islamic government necessarily would not allow the 
implementation of Islamic laws (Shariah). It is obligatory on 
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every Muslim to defy the non-Islamic government. And when 
the system is corrupt, the citizens have two choices, one is 
joining the corrupt system and fully cooperating with it, the 
second is of fighting against it in order to establish an Islamic 
government. It is indeed duty of every true Muslim to fight the 
corrupt political system. Khomeini believed that Islam consists 
of a set of laws, which are meant for the administration of the 
state and implementation of the laws of the sacred path. The 
administration of state should be entrusted in a walayat-e faqih. 
He maintains that the prophet Muhammad was not a mere 
legislator, but also an executive authority. Mere legislation of 
laws would not guarantee the salvation and welfare of the 
mankind. It is indeed, the creation and administration of 
Islamic state, which would facilitate the salvation of man. The 
need for creating an Islamic state was not limited to era of 
prophet. It should be continued after his departure. Since the 
implementation of Islamic rules and regulations are an eternal 
necessity on the part of Muslims, the formation of government 
is also its perpetual requirement. Khomeini argues that the 
quality and nature of shari'ah (Islamic law) indicate that they 
were designed for the creation of government and 
administration of the state. Khomeini believed that Islam 
encompassed all aspects of human life: personal affairs, social 
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economic as well as political aspects. In order to depose a 
corrupt political system, Khomeini advocates "Political 
revolution." Although Khomeini does not give systematic 
details of "Islamic revolution", it is clear from his remarks and 
statements, that he considered Islamic revolution as a radical 
uprising against non-Islamic governments in an Islamic 
country. It can be a violent or a peaceful process while its final 
goal is the spiritual regeneration of man. To achieve this, the 
Islamic government should come under Jurists (fuqah) only. 
Khomeini maintained that only Fuqah could provide sound 
leadership for an Islamic state.^^ 
The Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic jurists) according to 
Khomeini must have two credentials for the leadership of 
community; first, they must have thorough knowledge of 
Islamic law and secondly, they must be just as well versed in 
Islamic Jurisprudence. The Jurists have the same power and 
authority with respect to governance that the prophet or the 
Imam had, with one exception: since all Jurists are equal, in the 
absence of hidden Imam, no one Jurist can legitimately have 
power over other Jurists. The role of parliament, although not 
discussed by Ayatuallah Khomeini directly, appears to be as 
forum for management of doctrinal conflict among Jurists in 
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the interpretation and application of Divine law in the 
development of contemporary policies: 
The Jurists must work separately or collectively to set up a 
legitimate government that establishes the structures, protects the 
borders and establishes order. If cometence for this task is confined 
to one person then this would be his duty to do so corporeally, 
otherwise the duty, is shared equally. In case of difficulty in 
forming that government the (attribution) to rule does not 
disappear. The Jurists have been appointed by God to rule and the 
Jurists must act as much as possible in accordance with their 
assignments ....The temporary inability to form a strong and 
complete government does not at all mean that we should retreat. 
Dealing with the needs of Muslims and implementing among them 
whatever laws are possible to implement is a duty as much as 
possible.^'' 
While Khomeini advocated a political revolution on the 
part of individual Muslims in Muslim countries, he was very 
critical of the Muslim rulers who by abandoning Islam can not 
be united 'had the current Muslim rulers tried to implement the 
laws of Islam, abandoning all their differences, putting aside their 
disputes and their divisions and uniting in one hand in the face of 
others, the hands of the Jews and puppets of Americans and Britain 
would have not been able to reach what they have reached.... '^' For 
the 'only means that we possess to unite the Muslim nation, to 
liberate its land from the grip of colonialists and to topple the 
148 
agent governments of colonialism is to seek to establish our 
Islamic government.'^^ 
If the rulers and Muslim community fail to understand 
there by Islamic means, Khomeini then asserted: 
How can we stand nowadays to keep silent on handful of 
exploiters and foreigners who dominate with the force of arms when 
these people have denied hundreds and millions of others the Joy of 
enjoying the smallest degree of life's pleasures and blessings? The 
duty of the Ulama and of all the Muslims is to part an end to this 
injustice and to seek to bring happiness to millions of peoples 
through destroying and eliminating the unjust governments and 
through establishing a sincere and active government.^^ 
Khomeini considered Jihad (holywar) as an essential part 
of true faith. He mentioned about Jihad in following way: 
a. "If an enemy attacks an Islamic country, it is obligatory for 
Muslims to defend it by all possible means, even by 
scarifying their lives and their properties. No permission is 
needed from the leading Mujithahid (authority) in this affair". 
b. "A financial or commercial agreement which will lead to 
foreign control, in any way of a Muslim countries resources is 
haram (prohibited) and Muslims must avoid it."^^ 
As for as Zionism is concerned Ayatullah Khomeini 
considered it as an ideological threat to the very foundation of 
Islam. He wrote about this: "..... the Islamic movement in its 
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embryonic stages faced the Jewish anti-Islamic propaganda. 
The Jews first began their intellectual conspiracy against Islam 
and latter on launched an ant-Islamic propagation which had 
continued through the ages."^' 
Regarding the genesis and formation of Israel, Khomeini 
believed that: "Israel was given birth with the collusion and 
coalition of the Eastern and Western colonial powers in order 
to suppress and colonize Muslim nations."'*° 
In an interview with Middle East Magazine inl978, before 
the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Khomeini declared 
that: "we reject Israel and will not establish relations with it. 
Israel is a usurping government and is our enemy. If we come 
to power, it will no longer receive any oil from Iran.""*' 
Shortly after Islamic revolution in Iran Ayatullah 
Khomeini, in a meeting with the leaders of P.L.O. (Palestine 
liberation organization) announced: "The victory of the 
Palestine nation is possible through the unity of word and the 
power of faith. We condemn Israel. Israel is a usurper and the 
Arab governments must unite in order to cut Israels hand off 
from their countries.""*^ 
As for as Arabism, is concerned Khomeini was against it. 
In an interview with Dr. Algar in Paris Khomeini replied a 
question in this manner: 
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" unfortunately, true Islam lasted for only a brief period 
after the inception. First the Ummayyads and then the Abassids 
inflicted all kind of damage on Islam. Later the monarchs ruling 
Iran continued on the same path; they completely distorted Islam 
and established something different in its place. The process was 
begun by the Umayyads, who changed the nature of government 
from divine and spiritual to worldly. Their true rule was based on 
Arabism, the principle of promoting the Arabs over all other 
peoples, which was an aim fundamentally opposed to Islam and its 
desire to abolish nationality and unite all mankind in a single 
community, under the aegis of a state in different to the matter of 
race and color. It was the aim of the Umayyads to distort Islam 
completely by reviving the Arabism of the pre-Islamic age of 
ignorance, and the same aim is still pursued by the leaders of 
certain Arab countries, who openly declare their desire to revive 
the Arabism of Umayyds, which is noting but the Arabism of the 
Jahiliyyah" .^^ 
Khomeini considered Nationalism an as conspiracy 
against Muslims and their unity. In a message to the Pilgrims of 
Hajj of September 12, 1980 Khomeini gave a call for Muslim 
unity. The third part of this message reads: 
"One of the themes that the planner of disunion among the 
Muslims have put forward, and their agents are engaged in 
promoting, is that of race and nationalism. For years the 
government of Iraq has been busy in promoting nationalism, and 
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certain other groups have followed the same path, setting the 
Muslim against each other as enemies. To love one's fatherland and 
its people and to protect its frontiers are both quite 
unobjectionable, but nationalism involving hostility to other 
Muslims nations, is something quite different. It is contrary to the 
noble Qur'an and the orders of most noble messenger. Nationalism 
that results in the creation of enmity between Muslims and splits 
the ranks of the believers is against Islam and the interest of 
Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are 
disturbed by the spread of Islam."'*'* 
Thus it may be said that Khomeini believed in Islam as a 
complete code of conduct. His political ideas are reflection of 
his Islamic zeal. He advocated nothing short of a revolution in 
Muslim world. 
(B) Dr. All Shariati 
(i) Dr. Alt Shariati: Life and Activities: 
No study of the Islamic movement in Iran would be 
complete without an understanding of Shariati 's message 
because it was he who through his radical interpretations of 
Islam, inspired the people of Iran to take up arms against the 
Shah. 
Ali Shariati was born in the traditional village of 
Mazinan, a suburb of Mashad in 1933. He grew up in 
circumstances, which were physically humble but rich with the 
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intellectual life of ancient culture of Iran. His earliest teacher 
was his father, Muhammad-Taqi Shariati, cofounder of the 
centre for the publication of Islamic Truths and the trainer and 
the inspirer of hundreds of revolutionaries in the name of 
Islam. Muhammad-Taqi and his circle was great admirer and 
supporter of Mosaddeq. Sent to Mashad, the provincial capital, 
for his schooling, Shariati attended the Ibn-Zamin elementary 
school and Ferdowsi High School in that city, after which he 
completed a two-year teacher training course and began his 
teaching carrier in the villages around Mashad, while at the 
same time, undertaking a University programme. Combining 
work-study and political, activity, he succeeded in obtaining 
his bachelor's degree after a five years period. As a teacher he 
became actively involved in Many Islamic movements and anti 
monarchical secret societies. The leading one was the Islamic 
socialist group founded in 1944-45. After the fall of Masaddeq 
he and his father were arrested for their Pro-Masadeq activities. 
Eight months latter they were released. Ali Shariati rejoined 
Mashad University and qualified for scholarship for foreign 
studies. The efforts of internal security to stop him from going 
abroad failed and in 1960 he left for further study in France. As 
soon as he arrived in France Shariati joined the confederation 
of Iranian students, a revolutionary organization opposed to the 
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Pahalvi regime. Later on, he was one of the founders of the 
Iranian National front in America (established 25 February 
1962) and, shortly after, the Iranian National front in Europe 
(formed in May in the same year). The first Congress of the 
latter was convened in August 1962 in the city of Wiesbaden, 
Germany, in the course of which Shariati was chosen as editor 
of the organ of the front, Iran Aazad (free Iran), a monthly 
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paper. 
Shariati was closely involved with the Algerian liberation 
front and that nations freedom fighting organization, El-
Mojahid, committing his pen to the cause of the struggle 
against French colonial domination. Sharaiti completed his 
graduate work with a doctoral dissertation entitled: Fadail al-
Balkh {Lesmerites de Balkh), an edition and translation of a 
medieval Persian text. His sojourn in France at a mature age 
gave him a rare opportunity to perceive that Islam did have the 
socio-political frame work to offer the Iranian Muslims, 
provided a new intellectual dynamism could be applied to 
elaborate this frame work. It is precisely in this field that 
Shariati demonstrated his originality and creativity, 
disregarding the nuances of official western sociology, and 
clinging instead to his own observation and discernment of the 
social trends in modern Iran.'*^ 
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After obtaining a doctorate degree in sociology, Sharaiti 
returned to Iran in 1964 and was immediately arrested and 
imprisoned for six months for having taken part in anti-Shah 
activities in Franc. On his release, he applied for a teaching 
post at the University of Tehran in the faculty of letters, but 
was turned down. Thereafter, he joined various colleges of 
Agriculture, until a teaching position in history became 
available at the University of Meshad. Shariati within a short 
period became the most popular teacher in the University, and 
started giving speeches at the function held by the University 
community. He had a style that could best be described as 
innovative in the Iranian context, both in method and in 
substance. The latter element was bound to bring trouble and 
distress for him, since the religious clergy took him to task for 
his radicalism in expounding Islamic doctrines, or more 
particularly, the Shite interpretation of them. Shariati did not 
know well about the Islamic sciences and errors were present 
even in his citation of some famous historical events. The 
incisive criticism of his work by some sympathetic members of 
the religious class helped him to revise the content of his 
extremely influential lectures. At the same time, his father 
helped him in polishing the rough edges of his Islamic material. 
Nevertheless, Shariatis sociological approach to the Islam, on 
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one hand, and his free methods of teaching, on the other, 
combined to bring him in conflict with the University 
authorities and administration. At that time University of 
Meshad was headed by pro-monarchy and conservative 
elements, and conflict between shariati and them was 
inevitable/^ 
Tehran University students founded an educational and 
religious centre called Hoseiniyah Irshad in 1965. Shariati gave 
a series of lectures at this centre. His lectures were attended by 
a huge mob of students and teachers. Within a short time he had 
produced a huge corpus of literature relating to the 
revolutionary aspects of Islam.''^ In a paper entitled Red 
Shiaism, Shariati differentiated the Shiaism as based on the 
traditions of Imam Ali and Shiaism as developed under Safavid 
rule. The paper is designed to remind the Muslims in general, 
and Shias in particular, that Imam All's teachings inculcated 
liberty, revolution, and dynamism, whereas the Safavid 
monarchical teachings were designed to make Moslems blind 
imitators, back-word and greedy.''^ 
Shariati devoted most of his time in teaching and 
preaching his interpretation of Islam. His call did not went 
unheard his lectures had a great political impact on Iranian 
society and youth. For preaching radical ideas of Islam, and 
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seeing their political impact, the regime arrested him in 
summer 1973. The activities of Hoseiniyeh Irshad were 
suspended and although Shariati was released in 1975, he was 
not free to move about and remained in exile in Mazinan, his 
hometown. In early June 1977 he was permitted to leaves Iran 
to travel to Europe. On 19 June 1977, he died in England under 
mysterious circumstances that suggest the almost certain 
involvement of SAVAK. He was buried in Damascus, next to 
the Shrine of Zaynab, sister of Imam Husein and the Heroine of 
Karbala.^° 
(ii) Socio Political ideas of Dr. Ali Shariati 
Shariati's interpretation of Islam sought to bring out the 
revolutionary spirit of Islam, which would be a continuation of 
prophet Muhammad's mission. Shariati regarded this in two 
ways. On one hand Islam was a religion (man's relationship to 
God) and on the other hand it was an ideology for the Muslims. 
As an ideology it was the Islam of Justice and leadership, the 
Islam of Imamat and not the Islam of caliphate, class and 
aristocracy. It was Islam of freedom, motion and awareness, 
and not the Islam of captivity, ignorance and stagnation, the 
Islam of the Mujtahid and not Islam of official clergy.^' 
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Shariati was very much disappointed with the Muslim 
intellectuals and considered them responsible for Muslim 
intellectual decay: 
'When we Muslims had wealth and power, when Spanish and 
Italian professors, Philosophers and scholars got up to lecture in 
their Universities, they put on Islamic robes. They made themselves 
look like Avicenna, Razi and Ghazali. Nowadays, when our 
professors put on the academic robe, they think they are doing what 
European do! They think imitating kant and Descartes when they 
make themselves look like professors of Spain, Italy, France and 
England!.... some of us have gotten smart and gotten to know what 
world is all about. We sit down and like monkeys in the zoo, watch 
people. And whatever people do, we monkeys just imitate them. In 
the eyes of these smarties, only foreigners are people. They are the 
people to reckon with because foreigners have money and power. 
The rest of us have become poverty stricken. The good in us is 
looked down upon, while those who have become wealthy, force 
others to see their defects as a r t . ' " Shariati believed that 
colonialists are responsible for the division among Muslims. He 
said: 
When the crusades took place, they came fight us, we fought 
back. Eventually Christians colonialists and Zionists got together 
and Muslim became divided. Sunnis fought with Shi'ites, shi'ites 
with Sunnis, Turks with Iranians, Iranians with Arabs, Arabs with 
Berbers whereas Islam taught oneness, Muslims themselves fell into 
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different groups and ways of thinking. Foreigners have become the 
instruments by which we have been destroyed. They have reduced 
us into playing in sand boxes playing with blood, forming sects, 
competing with hardware, distracting our minds with irrelevant 
thoughts, trapping us in fascination with bread and circuses we 
have become numb and useless." 
For Shariati the most important question which a Muslim 
'should ask himself today is not whether each religious concept 
is rational or irrational, compatible or incompatible with 
science but rather what is its usefulness and its worth to the 
society in which he lives.^"^ Sharati's writings are full with the 
Islamic concept such as Ummah, Imamate, Adl. Shahada, 
Taqiya, Tag I id, Sabr, Hijra, Shirk, Tawhid, Hajj etc. and all 
these concepts have been radicalized to become meaningful to 
the common man. 
The type of believer that Shariati was seeking to inspire 
through his message was the Raushanfikr. Popularly the term 
refers to an intellectual but Shariati was not seeking a sterile, 
westernized intellectual who was alienated from his own 
culture. On the contrary, the Raushanfikr was a 'man endowed 
with an enlightened mind' and would act as the 'torchbearer' 
and 'Scout' and as the 'antithesis of oppression and darkness'. 
Like the scientist or educated man he does not only know the 
facts, but also discovered the truth, is close to the masses and 
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through Islam guides them to progress with 'sense of self 
awareness and responsible leadership.'^^ 
Shariati was of the opinion that the ideal society of Islam 
is ummah. For him 'taking the place of all the similar concepts 
which in different languages and cultures designate a human 
agglomeration or society, such as "society", "nation", "race", 
"people", "tribe", "clan" etc., is the single word ummah, a word 
imbued with progressive spirit and implying a dynamic, committed 
and ideological social vision.''^ 
Shariati further more defines the ummah in this way: 'The word 
ummah derive from the umm, which has the sense of path and 
intention. The ummah, is therefore, a society in which a number of 
individuals, possessing a common faith and goal, come together in 
harmony with the intention of advancing and moving towards their 
common goal.'^^ 
Shariati believed that such an ummat 'can not exist 
C D 
without imamate'. Thus while 'ummat is a society in eternal 
motion.. . . the imamate is a regime which leads it'^^ within this 
ummat, a muslim should try, 'not to be but to become, not to 
live well, but to lead a good life ' because freedom is 'not an 
ideal, but a necessary means to attain the ideal. '^° 
To shariati the political philosophy and the form of the 
regime of Ummah 'is not democracy of heads, not irresponsible 
and directionless liberalism which is a play thing of contesting 
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social forces, not putrid aristocracy, not anti-popular dictatorship, 
not a self imposing oligarchy. It consists rather of "purity of 
leadership" (not the leader, for that would be fascism), committed 
and revolutionary leadership, responsible for the movement and 
growth of society on the basis of its world view and ideology, and 
for the realization of the divine destiny of man in the plan of 
creation. This is true meaning oiImamatV^^ 
Shariati has analysed the Muslim societies in sociological 
perspective very brilliantly. He said that the conflict within 
these societies is not because of the conflict between modern 
and traditional forces, nor between the rich and the proletariat. 
For shariati, this conflict is between the forces of Tawhid and 
those of Shirk. Tawhid brings harmony between God, man, 
nature and existence. Tawhid also does not accept legal, class, 
social, political, racial, national, territorial, genetic or 
economic contradictions. Consequently, when contradictions 
enter this world between "Nature and meta-nature, matter and 
meaning, this world and hereafter, intellect and illumination, 
science and religion, metaphysics and nature, working for men and 
working for God, politics and religion; logic and love, bread and 
worship, piety and commitment, life and eternity, land and peasant, 
ruler and ruled, black and white, noble and evil, clergy and laity. 
Eastern and Western, blessed and wretched, light and darkness, 
inherent virtues and inherent evil, Greek and barbarian, Arab and 
non-Arab, Persian and non-Persian, capitalist and proletarian, elite 
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and mass, learned and illiterate ^^  These form the world view of 
Shirk It is essential duty of those who believe in the contradictions 
of Tawhid to struggle for and destroy the world view of Shirk until 
it is in harmony. This can be accomplished through various 
processes The people can play a greater role because Quran directs 
the people to be instrumental in changing the world of shirk into 
that of Tawhid Thus Muslims are vested with responsibilities to 
change their destines But such changes can only be brought about 
through a normative design which leads to the path derived from 
Islam and Quran. Personalities have to understand these divine 
norms if they want truly to lead their societies to the Tawhid 
structure While there are no accidents in Tawhidian structures of 
society, life and nature, they do happen in human societies due to 
the failure of people, personalities and the Shirkian norms they try 
to follow Thus the 'proportional influence of each of 
these factors on given society depends on the circumstances of 
that society In certain societies it may be people, in others the 
personality '^ ^ In early days of Islam 'the personality of the prophet 
had a fundamental and constructive role in bringing about change, 
development and the progress, in building a future civilization and 
in changing the course of history "^ "^  
Ali Shariati believed that in the struggle for a Tawhidian 
world the quality of a man's belief in Tawhid should be of such 
type: ' . . man fears only one power and is answerable before 
only one Judge. He turns to only one Qibla and direct his hopes 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCEPT OF TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM, POLITICAL 
ISLAM AND CONTEMPORARY ACTIVITIES OF ARAB 
MUSLIM MILITANTS 
A. Transnational Islam 
(i) Meaning and concept of Transnational Islam 
The transnational facet of Islam manifests itself in the 
total rejection of Privileges given to nationality, race, land or 
language. It also calls to worship one God, brotherhood 
amongst all, belief in all prophets, divine books and the day of 
judgment.' The transnational aspect of Islam corresponds to its 
comprehensiveness. In this way, Islam is a religion that 
regulates all aspects of life and has a complete system of laws 
and values. These laws regulate the life of individuals, family, 
society and state. The Islamists such as al-Banna, Mawdudi, 
Qutb and Khomeini claim the right and duty of every Muslim to 
bring the real image of Islam to the worlds notice. This call 
necessitates the transfer of world's leadership from the West to 
the Muslim world. 
The transnationalism of Islam is underpinned by the 
doctrine of God's (hakimiyyah), which postulates absolute 
authority of God in the Universe. The universe is considered to 
be one single unit that mirrors the absolute oneness of God. 
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Thus, Islam manifests a harmonious cosmic order, which 
conveys its fixed order in holy messages handed down with a 
group of messengers and prophets extending from Adam to 
Muhammad (PBUH). The ideas of Tawhid (oneness of God) was 
interpreted by some Islamists as a call to fight any political 
system that deviates from this principle.^ 
(ii) Fundamentalism 
Islam is the fastest growing religion of the world, its 
ideology is well defined and it has more than one billion 
followers around the world. Muslims are in majority in more 
than forty-five countries and are in the significant minority in 
more than ten countries. Islam seeks to build transnational 
society in which loyalties of colour, race and so on are 
neglected and in which complete submission to the will of God 
(Allah) is displayed.^ 
Fredrick Denny defines Islam as a forceful, complex 
amalgam of peoples, movements and goals and not the 
monolithic, centrally coordinated, hostile enterprise that some 
people assume it to be." To Denny, the Muslim society is 
capable to resolve any change, new situations or problems 
faced by Muslims through application of ijtihad (exertion of 
independent reasoning by a competent religious authority). 
With ijtihad Islam has got capacity to address and respond to 
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various changes while still following the directions of Quran 
and prophet. Thus, the term fundamentalism with its non-
Muslim roots and origin in early twentieth century's protestant 
Christian movement has no room in the "Islamic scheme". This 
is not because of its Christian roots and the nature of the term, 
but also because of the derogatory connotations that have been 
attached to it. Many think that the term 'Islamic 
Fundamentalism' has been used in a dishonest way to distort 
misrepresent and reflect a wrong picture of the contemporary, 
'Islamic resurgence'. During the recent past Islamic political 
activism or Islamic fundamentalism became synonymous to the 
scholars of West, policy makers and media with political 
extremism, terrorism, and suicide bombings, assassinations and 
tourist killings.^ 
Denny is totally against the use of term fundamentalism 
in Islamic context because it is "an oxymoron and 
controversial" due to this reality that one can not be a Muslim 
unless he adheres to the fundamentals of Islam. He further 
argues: 
"The term fundamentalism has been widely used since the 1970s 
to characterize various forms of Islamic revivalism. The term originated 
in America in early ZO"" century, where it was applied to ultra 
conservative protestant Christian literalists and interadentists who 
propounded a list of fundamentals that all true Christians should follow. 
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Because of the American protestant origins of the term many observers, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, believe that it should not be applied to 
Islam".' 
Richard Mitchell, the famous American expert and historian of 
the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is of the opinion that there is 
no real equivalent term for fundamentalism in Arabic, implying 
the illegitimacy of applying it to Islam.^ Ninian Smart a 
specialist argues that "it is unwise to bring preconceived 
categories to bear on the phenomenon of the Islamic movements 
especially when one examines non western religious traditions 
such as Islam."^ The famous British theologian James Barr 
states that "fundamentalism is a bad word, the people to whom 
it is applied do not like to be so called. It is often felt to be a 
hostile and opprobrious term, suggesting narrowness, bigotry 
obscurantism and sectarianism".' Moreover, some writers and 
religious experts prefer to use the terms 'revivalism', 
'reawakening', 'resurgence' and 'renaissance' to describe the 
Islamic movements that call for greater role of political Islam. 
These people are keen to revive and regenerate Islam in its full 
original form to their own conceptions and understanding.'° 
Ervand Abrahamian an Iranian expert argues against 
transferring the term 'Fundamentalism' from twentieth century 
Protestantism to contemporary Muslim world. But he further 
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argues how Khomeini's followers use term fundamentalist for 
Khomeini as they find no such terms in Persian or Arabic. 
As noted earlier, fundamentalism is often confused with 
political activism, extremism, terrorism and fanaticism. The 
term has been also used to describe some governments in Arab 
world such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran. Saudi Arabia is 
labelled as fundamentalist state because they preach and follow 
a conservative (but peaceful) brand of Islam. The Royal family 
has used religion to legitimize the conservative monarchy. 
However, Saudi has been against militant brand of Islam and 
does not want clash of its foreign relations particularly with the 
West and US. In Iran Khomeini was highly critical of West. 
Iran used to call US as the number one enemy of Islam and as a 
reaction to that Iran was dubbed by as 'Fundamentalist', 
'terrorist' and 'rogue state.''^ 
(iii) Jihad 
Islam's rapid spread between seventh to fourteenth 
century caused a threat to the Christian world, both at the 
religious and political level. Islam as a religion was used to 
mobilize and inspire the tribes as well as to provide rational for 
the expansion of Islamic empire. The Quranic notion of Jihad 
means striving of self-exertion in the path of God, and it was of 
the central significance of Muslim mobilization and self-
174 
understanding. The term Jihad is multifaceted and has a number 
of connotations which include the effort to lead a good life, to 
make society moral, and spread Islam through preaching, 
teaching and armed struggle. Jurists distinguish four ways 
through which the duty of Jihad can be fulfilled: "by heart, by 
tongue, by hands and by sword."'^ Jihad also means the battle 
against evil and devil and the struggle to be virtuous, to be true 
in the path of God. Finally, Jihad also means the struggle to 
spread and defend Islam. 
To the Islamists, the change from contemporary paganist 
state to a virtuous one Jihad is a must. They consider Islam as 
a religion of revolution in diverse aspects of life; metaphysics, 
ethics, politics and economics. The prophets of God were 
advocates of revolution to provide justice and equality for all. 
This belief in Islamic revolution leads to adopt a more radical 
means such as violence, Jihad and da'wah (call). Jihad is 
launched to establish God's lordship, divinity and rule. Any 
person, state or system that stands against God's divinity or 
rule is an aggressor and its removal becomes a duty. The role 
of Islamic revolution is to free mankind from the governments, 
systems or social structures built on man made laws as 
alternative to God's legislation.''' 
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According to Islamic legal theory, the world is divided 
into two abodes: dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-Harb 
(abode of war). The first category includes the community of 
believers as well as those who entered into alliance with them. 
The inhabitants of these territories are either Muslims who 
form the community of believers and non-Muslims of tolerated 
religions (Christianity and Judaism) who are allowed to keep 
their own religion and law by paying a poll tax (Jizyah) to the 
Muslim ruler. To transform the abode of war into abode of 
Islam Jihad is a must. However, Jihad does not necessarily 
mean war and violence because the expansion of Islamic abode 
might be gained through peaceful and non-violent means. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, Jihad means an exertion of one's 
own power to make the word of God supreme in world and the 
individuals participating in Jihad and it is a proper way of 
salvation and Allah's direct way to heaven.'^ 
B. Political Islam 
(i) The Rise of Political Islam: Factors and Issues 
In the past 20 years or so, the rise of political Islam has 
drawn great attention from the mass media and academic 
societies. Even though it is variously dubbed, like Islamic 
fundamentalism, militant Islam, or political Islam, it all refers 
to the fact that a certain trend in Islamic movement has been 
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increasingly concerned in politics and security matters in 
global dimension. According to Ankie Hoogvelt, the defining 
movement in this trend was no doubt the over throw, in 1979, 
of the Shah's pro-American monarchy in Iran, and the 
establishment of the modern world's first theocratic Islamic 
Republic there.'^ Since then, the world has seen the ascendancy 
of variety of new political Islamic-groups in various countries 
of the Muslim world; HizboUah in Lebanon, Hamas in 
Palestine, FIS in Algeria, NIF in Sudan, Al-Qaida in 
Afghanistan, etc. Besides these new groups of Muslim militants 
other moderate Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, have also been expanding their influences newly 
through rather peaceful, legal or popular movement approach. 
Samuel Huntington believes that this trend is mainstream not 
extremist, pervasive not isolated. He contends that in the 
coming year "the great division among human kind and the 
dominating source of conflict will be cultural", and predicts 
this resurgence of Islam will be a major counterpart of what he 
calls as "civilization Clash" with the West.^'' 
In the western countries, it seems that political Islam is 
especially associated with terrorism and consequently is 
regarded as a serious threat to the security of the people there. 
The rise of political Islam can be ascribed to a host of political, 
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social and economic factors in domestic, regional and 
international arenas. 
(ii) Origin and tenets of the political Islam: 
Islam was a political religion from very beginning. The 
Prophet Muhammad preached messages threatening the interest 
of the establishment of Mecca at that time. So he came to fight 
the holy wars with the ruling aristocracy, and finally won over 
them and setup a religious community, or ummah. The prophet 
himself was a political leader as well as a religious leader, and 
all his successors, or the caliphs, took the same positions in the 
Islamic community. So Islam is essentially a religion that 
combines political and religious architecture in itself. Then, 
how come we mention the Resurgence of Political Islam? This 
has to do with the modern history of the Muslim world, which 
is characterized by the western influences and Muslim 
responses. In 1924, the newly born Turkish Republic, a 
successor of the Ottoman empire, abolished the caliphate 
formally and adopted the policy of secularization. The Ottoman 
empire was a universal state of the Muslim world at that time, 
but was collapsed in the wake of the First World War against 
the western alliance. Almost all the leaders of West Asian 
states, newly born in the territory of the former Ottoman 
empire, have tried to modernize their countries by imitating the 
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model of western countries. They have to follow the secular 
state model, and have tried to confine Islam purely in their 
religious sphere.'* 
Political Islamic groups in these days defy the 
secularization policies of their governments, and advocate 
restoring the pure form of Islamic governance. They criticize 
their ruling elites as deviants from the pure path of Islam, and 
criticize the modernization efforts as puppet mimicry of 
western imperialism. Even further, they contended that beneath 
such modernization efforts lay the basis of social decay and 
economic retard of Muslim states.'^ 
All the political Islamic groups today share more or less 
similar basic ideas, even though their expression and means of 
applying those ideas in reality show many differences. These 
basic ideas are derived from the thoughts of some prominent 
Islamic figures in modern times, such as Hasan al-Banna, 
Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. They can be summarized as follows: 
1. Islam constitutes an all-embracing ideology for individual 
and social life for state and society. 
2. The Quran, God's revelation, and the example {Sunnah) of 
the Prophet Muhammad are the foundations of Muslim 
life. 
3. Islamic law (The Shariah, the "Path" of God), based upon 
the Quran and the Prophet's model behaviour, is the 
sacred blue print for Muslim life. 
4. Faithfulness to the Muslim's vocation to reestablish God's 
sovereignty through implementation of God's law will 
bring success, power, and wealth to the Islamic 
community {ummah) in this life as well. 
5. The weakness and subservience of Muslim societies must 
be due to the faithlessness of Muslims, who have strayed 
from God's divinely revealed path and instead followed 
the secular, materialistic ideologies and values of the 
west or the western capitalism and Marxism. 
6. Restoration of Muslim pride, power, and rule (the past 
glory of Islamic empires and civilization) requires a 
return to Islam, the re-implementation of God's law and 
guidance for state and society. 
7. Science and technology must be harnessed and used 
within Islamic oriented and guided context in order to 
avoid the Westernization of Muslim society. 
According to Xiaodong Zhang, political Islamic 
movements in modern times can be grouped in three categories. 
The first is the radical fundamentalists. They launch fierce war 
against established authority by violent terrorist means, such as 
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kidnapping, assassination and bombing, etc. Their targets 
include their own government authorities but also foreign 
travelers, aliens, journalists, and diplomats. In their opinion 
the western influences backup their decadent governments, so 
there can be no reason to differentiate the two. The second is 
moderate fundamentalist. They prefer to go down to the poor, 
backward villages and streets to mobilize the mass through 
mosques. In addition, they establish schools, hospitals, 
charities, and other social infrastructures to display and 
remodel Islamic spirit and morality. In practice, the moderate 
is so successful that some of the governmental functions have 
been replaced. The third is the legal fundamentalism. The hope 
to enter the parliament and local bodies legally, and realize the 
social reform and Islamic ideal under the established system. In 
Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would have come to 
power if the military backed by western powers had not 
canceled the elections of 1992. In Lebanon, Hizbollah, the 
party of God, made a great success in 1992 parliamentary 
elections.^° 
However, it is not always that each group takes only 
specific approach. Rather, all the groups can take the three 
approaches together responding to the changes of situation in 
which they are located. 
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(iii) Factors affecting the Rise of political Islam 
In the modern times, a lot of writers and authors have 
tried to point out the factors that can explain the rise and 
growth of political Islam. Bernard Lewis an expert of 
contemporary Islamic politics advocated the presence of an 
inherent disposition to militant opposition in Islam, and some 
scholars tried to link the resurgence of political Islam with this 
disposition.^' It seems true that the modern political Islamic 
notions are inspired by the traditions of the past. Concepts like 
holy war (Jihad) and advocating of going back to roots (Salf) 
derive their justification from the religion and historical 
tradition. 
However, it seems that the political Islam nowadays is 
growing in a quite different political and social economic 
context. It might be said that political Islam is a direct product 
of recent historical development rather than the remote past. So 
in this sense, Nikki Keddie argues that there in hardly any link 
or connection between pre-colonial Islamic trends and militant 
groups today.^^ Many scholars are of the opinion that recent 
trend of world politics and economy, in addition with the 
failure of Muslim states in socio-economic and political 
development are contributing to make the environment in which 
political Islam grows smoothly. Ankie Hoogvelt put it simply 
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like this: "It is the failure of national development strategies in the 
neocolonial period coupled with the present episode of 
globalizations, that drives the contemporary Islamic crescent. 
Islamic resurgence is best understood as a politics of identity in 
response to exclusion, rather than as a subordinated 
incorporation".^^ Hilal Kashan contends that "Islamic 
fundamentalism is the product of cultural and intellectual 
stagnation, western colonialism, and the failure of the secular 
nationalist model of government."^"* The failure of Arab ruling 
elites to modernize their countries created an institutional 
vacuum and enabled the radicals to present themselves as 
serious contenders for political authority.^^ Xiaodong Zhang 
asserts that "the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism is a 
direct response to the external pressure and internal crisis of 
Muslim society, and the change indicates that the pressure and 
crisis have become stronger than ever before. To some extent, 
it is a social movement of introspection and self salvation."^^ 
The key point of these scholars is that the failure of 
governments and rulers of Muslim world in modernization and 
certain trends of world politics and economy have caused the 
retrospective movement in the Islamic world. This view seems 
to be more accurate than pointing to the inherent militant 
nature of Islam. 
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After more than half century from the end of formal 
colonialism, the failure of the ruling elites of the Muslim world 
to develop and modernize their countries is quite clear in 
almost all spheres of life. Most of the Muslim counties are still 
underdeveloped and are under dictatorial rule politically. 
Failure and defeats in wars with Israel has left Arab countries 
frustrated and humiliated. Hilal Khashan summarized this 
situation clearly: 
" The Arab's ineffective handling of the conflict with Israel Jolted the 
masses who expected the use of a forthright military approach to recover 
Palestine. Instead of concentrating on Israel, Arab elites focused 
attention on other issues that included eliminating domestic opposition, 
violating the basic human rights of their populations, and involvement in 
inter-Arab disputes. The Arab leaders record on the development front 
was equally dismal. Some regimes toyed with socialism and adopted the 
single-party apparatus to propel modernization. Others, such as the Gulf 
States adopted the welfare state approach. In the second, apparently 
more successful approach, only a veneer of modernity was accomplished. 
Resources were squandered on weapons and grandiose projects of little 
economic utility. Corruption and nepotism prevailed, and the concept of 
the state, never fully understood in the modern Wes.t Asia as a guardian 
and representative of individual and community interests, soon lost its 
lusture."" 
Hilal Khashan concludes, "it is in this atmosphere of 
ideological and developmental failure that radical Islamic 
groups emerged, who sought to transform the ailing political 
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systems into ones of their own creation."" Olivier Roy writer 
of a famous book on political Islam shows why even well 
educated intellectuals join radical Islamic groups. He refers to 
these intellectuals as "Lumpen intelligentisa".^^ They are young 
people with school and even university education who can not 
find positions or professions that corresponds to their 
expectations or vision of themselves, either in the saturated 
state administrative sector or in industry. Roy seems to under 
evaluate the motives of this group too much. However, despite 
this over-simplification, his analysis still provides an insight to 
understand an important aspect of political Islam. 
Various Indian and Western scholars indicate a lot of 
factors which have added to the unrest in Arab masses and 
which have caused the rise of political Islam. Among these 
factors, the impact of Gulf war comes in the first place. The 
Gulf war, precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 
August 1990, was considered by a large portion of Muslims as a 
conformation of Aral!) Muslims with the imperial West. And 
since many Arab cojintries including Egypt and GCC states 
stood on the side of |western alliance, it showed explicitly to 
the Arab masses the | decadence of the Arab ruling elites and 
their role as agencie^ of western imperialism. The impact of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina also helps to explain the rise of political 
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Islam. Serb atrocities and ethnic cleansing of the Muslims did 
not seem to move western governments to take sufficient action 
to check and deter the increasingly aggressive Serbs. As a 
result, the entrenched notion that the West is irreconcilably 
hostile towards Muslim world received a tremendous boost 
among the Arab Muslims.^° Hence, combating them is not just 
to be tolerated, to be argued as well. 
Besides above mentioned Psychological factors, Ankie 
Hoogvelt tries to explain the factors in context of neo-
colonialism and globalisation.^^ It seems certain that recent 
trend of globalization and regionalisation in the world 
economy, and relative marginalization of West Asian Muslim 
states from this trend, is boosting the rise of political Islam. 
The sources of funding and weaponry are also important 
factors, since they back up the political Islamic groups 
materially. Hilal Khashan provides a significant insight on this 
matter. As per his view, the so called "state sponsor's" role 
such as Iran and Sudan, which is so frequently indicated by 
western strategists and media, is in fact very limited. Sunni 
Muslims viewed sceptically the generous offers of material aid 
made by Iran's Shiite leadership. Except in the case of 
HizboUah, and to a lesser extent, the two Palestinian radical 
Islamic groups. Jihad and Hamas, Iran had little influence on 
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militants in the Arab East. Iran's ability to influence these 
groups derived legitimacy to the extent that it concentrated on 
promoting anti-Israeli operations. Radical Islamic groups, 
Khashan contends, receive, no doubt, limited logistic support 
from a few West Asian countries.^^ But there is a tendency to 
magnify unduly the implications of this aid on the rhythm of 
regional violence. On the contrary, Khashan argues, 
contributions from out side West Asia seem to have more 
influence on the march of Islamic radicalism. American CIA 
provided various material support and aid for the Islamic 
militants in Afghanistan in the heydays of the cold war with the 
Soviets.^'* Even in recent years a lot of assistance for the 
Islamic groups came from the western countries. According to a 
report by an Arab magazine, at least fifty radical Islamic 
leaders sought and obtained political asylum in Europe, twelve 
in Britain alone. However, Khashan concludes that the most 
important source of weapon supplies to Islamic militants is 
probably local. 
The rise of political Islam nowadays raises many 
important issues at the international and domestic levels. First 
of all it poses a political threat to their governments and West 
by ^ combination of their propagation and violent measures. 
Militancy and security matters are considered in this context. 
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Some scholars like Samuel Huntington consider it just a step to 
massive "civilization clashes" with the West. Secondly, it 
causes a socio-cultural repression domestically by Islamists 
dogmatic interpretation of Islam and violence on their 
opponents. 
The need is to study and look at these issues one by one. 
Political Islam rejects the legitimacy of non-shariah (non-
Islamic law) governments and completely refuses the West. And 
some of the militant groups launch violent attacks on not only 
government agencies but also civilian facilities. 
Samuel Huntington's view that the resurgent Islam is just 
a signal to the coming of "civilization clashes "is shared by 
many western scholars. Many thinkers and authors have 
opposed Huntigton's dangerous notion, which can provoke 
unnecessary global conflict. Xiaodong Zhang for instance says: 
"Anyway, the Islamic threat is exaggerated unlimitedly. On the one 
hand, most of the rulers in the Middle East have been trying to 
utilize the Islamic threat for asking the financial and military aids 
from the western countries for controlling power and the society. 
On the other hand, some people in the West want to find a new 
enemy to replace the communism and to provide the basis for their 
own domestic and diplomatic policies. Civilization can threaten 
another civilization only out of ethnocentrism and culture-
centurism, or forcing one culture on another."^'' He seems to try to 
188 
explain that such is not the reality of Islam today. Generally 
speaking, the Islamic world is on the defence against other 
civilizations. 
Samuel Huntington puts a special emphasis on the 
meaning of terrorism. He tries to explain that terrorism is not 
just a passing phenomenon, but an important strategic tool by 
which Islamic world challenges the West. He says that after the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Islamic world has literally 
waged a "quasi war" against the West. Many more westerners 
have been killed in this quasi-war through terrorism that were 
killed in the real war in the Gulf. So, he says a quasi war is 
still a war.^* Huntington's notion that Islamic world is waging a 
quasi-war seems to be based on the asserted "State-sponsored 
terrorism," by some Muslim countries against the West. 
However, it is clear that the violent attacks are launched by 
extremist fundamental groups, who are not welcomed and liked 
even in their own countries. On the contrary, it is still unclear 
whether these clandestine and violent activities are sponsored 
by certain states. So, Huntington's notion of quasi war seems to 
be exaggerating the meaning of terrorism. 
Finally, a special emphasis and attention should be given 
on the aspects of socio-cultural repression posed by militant 
Islamic groups in their countries. An incident in Egypt that 
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shows this repression clearly is stabbing of Nobel-Laureate 
Egyptian novelist and thinker Naguib Mahfouz on 14 October 
1994. He was stabbed in the neck by an Islamic extremist 
outside his home. Radical Islamists have blamed Mahfouz of 
blasphemy and apostasy. Some Egyptian intellectuals planned a 
March on the street to protest against this incident, only to 
cancel it due to the security concerns.^^ Fauzi M.Najjar 
described this incident and raises the issue of socio-cultural 
repression posed by the radical Islamists. He analyses 
Mahfouz's attitude toward Islam by examining various works 
and activities of Mahfouz and shows that it is not much of an 
infidel's as is accused by the radical Islamists. Najjar argues 
that Mahfouz's attitude towards religion is evasive and 
doubtful, due to his allusive style, and to the fact that his 
novels are wrapped in symbolism and allegory. And he 
describes Mahfouz as "a Muslim, raised in a religious family 
and society, he certainly identifies with his own culture."'**^ 
According to Najjar, most of the Muslims have no objection 
and quarrel with this kind of atti tude. '" In their insistence on a 
strict interpretation of Islamic law, the extremists go too far, 
posing a threat to creativity and human reason. Najjar describes 
this kind of socio-cultural threat thus: "In recent years, Egypt 
and rest of the Muslim world have been deluged with a large 
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number of religious booklets and tapes, containing extremist 
fundamentalist ideas and teachings, dealing in restrictions on 
women, rejection of western civilization, and the denunciation of 
the arts as the product of infidelity. The woman is to stay at home. 
Her face is a blemish (awra) even in picture or on TV screen, and 
her voice is also blemish, even if she is reciting the Quran. The 
cinema, TV, theatre and the camera are haram. All arts are haram. 
music is from devil, and singing is a kind of effeminacy 
(takhamuth), acting, painting and photography are acts of Kufr-. 
The booklets are magnificently produced, and are distributed free 
or for a nominal price. They are written by authors who have no 
claim to religious knowledge; they are mediocrities compared with 
men of religious learning.""*^ 
C. Major Islamic Militant groups in Arab world 
(i) Islamic Militancy in Egypt 
Anwar al Sadat became president of Egypt after Nasser's 
death in September 1970. Anwar al Sadat decided to deal with 
Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood activities with a soft hand. 
Hundreds of Muslim Brothers were freed from the Jails. He did 
so to legitimize his campaign against Nasserism. Sadat depicted 
the war of 1973 as a great Egyptian victory in Egypt's 
government controlled media. The very first operations in Suez 
Canal during the war were named "operation Badr" and it was 
propagated by government agencies that angels had aided the 
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Egyptian array in the same way as they had helped prophet 
Muhammad in the war of Badr. Sadat was of the opinion that 
encouraging the Brotherhood and Islamic groups will help him 
to check and stop activities of Nasserists and Marxists.'*^ 
Though, Sadat adopted a friendly policy towards Muslim 
Brotherhood, the honeymoon between Sadat and Brothers was 
soon over. Muslim Brotherhood opposed Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp-David accord of 1978, and the 
signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in 1979. The criticism of 
Brotherhood led to the arrest of hundreds of Muslim Brothers 
in September 1981. Islamists also opposed to the personal 
status law, which gave women greater rights with respect to 
divorce, alimony, and custody of children. But despite of all 
conflicts with government of Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood of 
seventies and eighties was never a revolutionary movement. 
Before interdiction in 1981 the Muslim Brotherhood mainly 
stressed on Islamic legal system and elimination of immorality 
in mass media. They did not advocate the radical 
transformation of political structure of Egypt or the use of 
militancy to achieve their goals.'*'* 
After Qutb's death some young advocates of radical 
transformation of Egyptian society started opposing the 
policies of Muslim Brotherhood. They believed that Muslim 
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Brotherhood has lost the revolutionary fervour. These young 
men started their own militant Islamic groups and 
organizations, notably Islamic Liberation Organization 
{Munadhdhamat al -Tahrir al-lslami). Society of Muslims 
{Jama'at al Muslimin), and al-Jihad (Holy war). 
The Islamic liberation Organization (ILO) was founded in 
1971 by Dr. Salih-Siriyya, a Palestinian with a doctorate in 
science education. Siriyya was working with Jordanian branch 
of Muslim Brotherhood before establishing his own group. 
Most of the members of ILO were students. In 1974, Egyptian 
police suppressed an attempted coup by this active militant 
group. Most of its activists were killed or imprisoned by 
Egyptian authorities and ILO effectively ceased to exist after 
this. The ideology of Islamic Liberation Organization was total 
re- Islamification of Egyptian society and state.''^ 
The Society of Muslim was founded by a former Muslim 
Brother in his mid-thirties, namely Shukri Mustafa, a science 
graduate. Egyptian police for distributing Brotherhood 
pamphlets at the University of Asyut in 1965 arrested him. 
Mustafa started his movement while in prison. After his release 
in 1971 he recruited hundreds of students and youth in his 
organization. His group usually referred in the Egyptian media 
as al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration) 
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because of its belief that all Muslims who did not share its 
ideology were infidels and all real believers in Islam should 
withdraw from the unbelieving society around them. The group 
first came into limelight in 1977, the year of Sadat's November 
trip to Jerusalem. In July of that year, the members of the 
society kidnapped a renowned Islamic scholar Muhammad al-
Dhahabi, who was a former minister of waqf. The kidnappers 
demanded release of their "brothers" and a ransom of about half 
a million dollars. The government rejected their demand with 
the result they killed their hostage. This led to a heavy 
crackdown on leaders and members of Society of Muslims. 
Over six hundred of its members were arrested and Shukri 
Mustafa was hanged.'*^ The group was highly influenced by the 
writings of the Khwarjites, Ibn Taymiya, Jamal al-Din Afghani, 
al-Banna, Mawdudi and Shariati.'*^ Presently the Society of 
Muslims is loosely organized with no single readily identifiable 
operational leader. Shaykh Umar Abd-al-Rahman is the 
spiritual leader of this organization. The third prominent 
militant Islamic organization to have emerged during the 
seventies is al-Jihad, the group that is believed to be 
responsible for the assassination of Sadat in 1981. Like the ILO 
and the Society of Muslims, al-Jihad also attracted students 
toward itself. But the group also had some adherents in the 
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armed forces, notably Khalid al-Islambuli, the lieutenant who 
boasted, " I have killed the Pharaoh" after Sadat's death/^ 
Two days after Sadat's assassination on October 6. 1981, 
members and Sympathizers of al-Jihad seized control of the 
upper Egyptian town of Asyut. But Egyptian troops crushed the 
revolt. Most of al-Jihad members were killed or imprisoned by 
Egyptian para-troops.^^ At present al-Jihad appears to be 
divided into at least two separate factions; remnants of the 
original Jihad led by Abdul al-Zumar, currently imprisoned in 
Egypt, and a faction calling itself Vanguards of Conquest 
(Tallaa' al-Fateh or the new Jihad Group). The faction of 
vanguards is led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri, the right arm of 
Saudi Arab militant leader Osama bin Laden who is on the run 
because of American strikes on Afghanistan.^' 
(ii) Islamists and Islamic militants in Syria 
The Syrian Muslims Brotherhood came into existence in 
mid-1930s. The student of Shariah returning from Egypt formed 
it. Muslim Brotherhood was having many branches in different 
cities of Syria and were known as Shahab Muhammad (Yong 
men of Muhammad). The Brotherhood stood for an end to the 
French mandate (imposed in 1920), and for social and political 
reform along the Islamic lines. In 1944, Mustafa al Sibai was 
elected the general supervisor and headquarter was moved to 
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Damascus. Mustafa al-Sibai was born in a very religious 
family, his family provided preachers for the grand mosque in 
Homs. Sibai was a graduate of Al-Azhar and a close friend of 
Hasan al-Banna. He followed the way of al-Banna and adopted 
the same lines for running Brotherhood of Syria. After the 
departure of French in 1946, the organization concentrated on 
socio-economic issues, and stressed its opposition to secularism 
and Maxism.^^ 
The Syrian Brotherhood became more organized and 
active when, in the wake of ban on the Egyptian Brotherhood, 
in 1954 many Egyptian activists took refuge in Syria. For the 
first time the Syrian organizations demanded the rule based on 
the teachings of Islam. However, when Syria joined Egypt in 
1958 to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the ban on 
political parties was extended to Syria, Sibai formally 
dissolved the Brotherhood. But it functioned secretly and 
underground. The growing unrest and disaffection with Nasser's 
presidency of UAR in Syrian society helped the Brotherhood to 
expand its base. The Brotherhood was able to win ten seats in 
the election held in December 1961. However, the parliament 
was dissolved and all other parties were banned including 
Muslim Brotherhood in March 1963 following a military coup 
by the Arab Bath Socialist party." 
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The Bathist rule remained uninterrupted in Syria since 
March 1963. Bathist rule can be divided into three phases: from 
1963 to 68; from 1968 to 70; and from 1971 on wards. During 
all these phases confrontations took place between Bathists and 
Islamists. Encouraged by the popular urban discontent due to 
the economic downturn in early 1964, the Muslim Brotherhood 
stepped up its activities. In April, following anti-government 
rioting in Hama, a strong hold of sunni Islamist, the muezzin 
of the famous al-Sultan mosque issued the crusading cry: 'Islam 
or Bath', This brought the security forces to the neighbourhood 
of mosque. When they responded to the firing directed at them 
from the mosque with shelling one of the mosque's minarets got 
damaged. This led to widespread strikes in major Syrian 
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Cities. 
The second round of clash between the Brotherhood and 
the government came in early May 1967 following the bitter 
attack on government by Shaikh Muhammad Hasan Habanka, 
the chief alim of Damascus, on the basis of an article in Jaish 
al shaab (The Peoples Army), the army official journal. The 
main theme of the article was that God, religion, feudalism, 
captialism and colonialism, and all the values that prevailed 
under the old-society are no more than mummies in the museum 
of history. And absolute belief of man's ability should be 
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treated as the new value.^^ Demonstrations against the 
government were held on a large scale in Damscus. Government 
forces arrested the protesting leadership as well as the author 
of the offending article. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
To underline the Islamic forces and to defame them the 
government started building mosques at a large scale. 
The defeat of Arab's in 1967 caused a division of Muslim 
Brotherhood in to two factions. One faction was of moderate, 
guided by Issam al Attar, operating from exile in West 
Germany. The second faction was of radicals, based strongly in 
northern cities of Homs, Hama and Aleppo. This faction of 
Muslim Brotherhood was headed by Marwan Hadid, who 
advocated a Jihad against Bathist rule. Hadid and some of his 
follower militants travelled to Jordan where they received 
commando training from al-Fatah, a constituent of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, at a Palestinian camp. Their 
action played an important role for the militarization of the 
Brotherhood.^^ 
The second phase of the Bathist rule (1968-70) saw 
difference between two leading Alawi Generals, Salih Jadid and 
Hafiz al Asad, reach breaking point. Leading the radical, 
political wing of the party, Jadid proposed a people's war 
against Israel. Hafiz al Asad opposed his plan of war, he was 
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defence minister and headed the moderate military wing of 
Bath. In this struggle the moderate Brotherhood leader Attar 
backed Asad." 
In Nov. 1970 Hafiz al Asad assumed supreme authority in 
a bloodless coup. Asad reduced the import controls on 
consumer goods and encouraged small private enterprises. This 
process placated merchants and small manufacturers, the 
traditional backbone of the Muslim Brotherhood. But because 
of his Alawi background he was looked upon as a suspicious 
person. Islamists argued that Alawis were neither Muslim nor 
the people of book (Christian or Jew), they were infidels and 
idolators, who worshipped Ali. Asad tried to project himself as 
a faithful Muslim by participating in prayers in various 
mosques throughout the Syria, and declared publicly that he, an 
Alawi, prayed regularly and fasted during Ramadan. He used to 
start his speeches with Quranic verses and replaced the secular 
oath for government officials, 'I swear on my honour and 
beliefs,' with the traditional, ' I swear by Allah great.'^^ 
Yet the Islamists and Brotherhood believed that Bath rule 
was against and far away from Islamic rule. They attacked the 
new constitution of 1973, which described the Syrian Arab 
Republic as a 'democratic, popular, socialist state.' Islamists 
demanded that Islam should be declared as the state religion. 
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Anti-government riots and boycotts followed in the big cities of 
Syria. Asad compromised by directing the Assembly to specify 
that the head of the state must be a Muslim. At the same time 
government troops arrested the ulama responsible for the riots 
and crisis. The ulama called for nation wide demonstrations. 
Demonstrations were held but they turned violent. Later the 
ulama instructed their followers to abstain in the referendum on 
the constitution. Sporadic agitation continued through the sunni 
dominated areas of Syrian cities. Stone throwing and 
skirmishes between demonstrators and security forces caused 
death of twenty people in Aleppo, Homs and Hama. Asad 
adopted the policy of stick and carrot to suppress the anti-
government forces. He offered state honours and higher salaries 
to the ulama and cultivated close relations with them.^^ 
Asad used the war of 1973 against Israel to stabilize his 
relationship with the growing Islamic forces in Syrian society. 
In his broadcasts during the war Asad described the conflict as 
Jihad against 'the enemies of Islam', and referred to the Syrian 
forces as the "Soldiers of Allah". Another strategy adopted by 
president Asad to please Islamists was the sacking of many 
Alwai officers for poor performance in the 1973 conflict and 
replacing them with suuni officers. This action improved Asad's 
standing among sunni officers as well as civilians.^° 
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However, this state of affairs was short lived. From 1976 
Asad faced a popular Islamic challenge, which shook the 
stability of his regime. Anti government propaganda was 
distributed, strikes organized, government officials 
assassinated, and other acts of armed opposition carried out. 
Such events reached a climax in February 1982 when skirmish 
between security forces and members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Syrian city of Hamah escalated into the 
city-wide uprising. Fighting raged for several days as the 
Syrian army stormed the city with heavy bombardment, killing 
an estimated five thousand or more people in the process. 
During this period the Syrian branch of Muslim 
Brotherhood, led by Adnan Sa'ad al-Din, Sa'id Hawwa and 
others took the leading role in the Islamic opposition to the 
regime of Asad. Other opposition Islamic organizations, which 
were against Asad's government, were the Islamic Liberation 
Party, the Islamic Liberation Movement, and the Youth of 
Muhammad. In 1976, the deepening economic crisis, Syrian 
intervention in Lebanon and the increasingly Alawite character 
of the regime, led the Brotherhood to declare a Jihad against 
the Asad's government. The membership of Brotherhood grew 
rapidly and violence against the government was intensified. In 
June 1979, eighty three Alawi military cadets were killed at the 
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Aleppo Artillery Academy by militants aided by sunni military 
officers. In June 1980, some four hundreds people were killed 
during an attempted escape of political prisoners in Palmyra. 
The government responded in July 1980 with a law, which made 
Muslim Brotherhood membership a capital offence. 
Nevertheless, armed confrontation continued, with 1981, seeing 
a massive bomb attack against government installations in 
Damascus and 1982-seeing the uprising in Hamah. 
In late 1980, the Muslim Brotherhood joined with other 
Islamic organization to form the 'Islamic front in Syria', the 
aim of which was to overthrow of Asad's regime and the 
establishment of an Islamic state based on the Shari'ah. In 
1982, in the aftermath of the Hamah massacre, a National 
Alliance for the liberation of Syria was formed, with which the 
Islamic Front (together with Nasserities, pro-Iraq Bathists and 
other opposition groups) played an active part, 
(ill) The seizure of Ground Mosque and the crisis in Saudi 
Arabia 
In 1960's Saudi regime faced a less organized opposition. 
The opening of girl's school in the early sixties provoked riots. 
In 1963, a delegation of ulama protested against broadcast of 
women's voice from Radio Mecca. And when television was 
introduced conservative ulama protested against it. A grand son 
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of Ibn Saud led a small band of zealots in an unsuccessful 
attack on the television station in Riyadh. But these protests 
were of less importance when compared with the seizure of 
Mecca's Mosque in November 1979.^'* 
The revolution in Iran was the first climax of the Islamic 
fin de Steele. The year 1979 coincided with the year 1399 of 
the Islamic era, which had been re-introduced as the official 
calendar in Iran a year earlier. A new century was approaching, 
and the turns of the centuries regularly promoted chiliastic 
expectations in the Islamic world. If Islamic cadres and their 
propaganda were to be believed, this was to be the century of 
Islam.^^ 
This turn of Islamic century was used as a weapon against 
Saudi regime. In Medina, the stronghold of the conservative 
wahhabiya, several students had already, after the assassination 
of Faisal in 1975, formed a plot against the royal family and 
had sought for a leading personality who could lead the 
opposition in a right direction. A member of the group, 
Juhayman al-utaybi (1940-79), who had served in Saudi 
National Guards for eighteen years, suggested that previous 
rector of the University of Medina and then head of the Saudi 
Darl-iftah (Chief legal officer), Ibn Baz, might be won over as 
a leader. The group simply called itself the Ikhwan, i.e. 
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brothers (in the spiritual sense), though without wishing to 
suggest any connection with the Ikhwan movement of 1920's. 
Alutaybi was a radical critic of the Saudi monarchy. During the 
1970s, he traveled throughout the Saudi Arabia condemning the 
Saudi government for its decadence. Juhayman and his 
followers he collected during late seventies mostly belonged to 
the families of those who had fought the Ikhwan revolt of 1928-
30. Juhayman saw the revival of pure wahhabism as a political 
programme that might lead to establishment of a new system 
other than republic or monarchy. He was of the opinion that the 
revival of traditions of Prophet Muhammad would necessarily 
give rise to the system of this kind, in which neither rulers nor 
the ulama would be entitled to a special social position. 
During 1970s, Juhayman wrote a series of articles in 
which he bitterly condemned rulers who did not govern 
according to the Quran and Prophet's traditions. He specifically 
condemned the Saudi royal family for its corruption, its close 
ties with infidel governments, and its persecution of every 
domestic opposition. He also wrote a series of circular letters 
and got it published in Kuwait. These activities led to his arrest 
with hundreds of his followers in Riyadh in 1976. He and his 
followers were released through the intercession of Ibn-Baz.^^ 
Juhayman and several hundreds of his followers seized 
Mecca's sacred mosque at the dawn on November 20, 1979 as 
the fifteen century of Islamic calendar was about to begin. 
After few days Juhayman declared that his brother-in law 
Muhammad Abdullah al-Qathani was the messianic Mahdi who 
had come to rid the world of injustice an corruption. The 
prevailing view about the seizure of Grand Mosque in Saudi 
Arabia was that the rebels had desecrated the holiest place in 
Islam, where violence in not supposed to occur. King Khalid 
had no trouble in convincing the leading ulama of the kingdom, 
including Ibn Baz, to issue a legal decree condemning the 
seizure of the mosque and permitting the government to use 
force to crush the rebels if they do not surrender peacefully. 
According the official version, the rebels were armed with 
heavy, modern, sophisticated weapons. Independent observers 
declared, however, that the weapons were obsolete, and that 
these militants had accumulated from remainders of stockpiles, 
which had entered the country from the Yemen wars.*^^ 
Within two weeks, troops have retaken the mosque. Where 
as Juhayman's allegedly messianic brother-in-law was killed in 
the very first days of the fighting, Juhayman himself was taken 
alive on December 5, 1979 exactly two weeks after the revolt 
began. On January 9, 1980 he and sixty-two of his followers 
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were beheaded. In addition to forty-one Saudi Arabs, the 
executed included ten Egyptians, six south Yemenis, three 
Kuwaitis, one North Yemeni, one Sudanese, and one Iraqi. 
Despite the presence of so many foreigners in the revolt, there 
is no evidence that it was organized outside Saudi Arabia. But 
Khomeini suggested on Tehran Radio "it is not beyond guessing 
that this is the work of criminal American Imperialims and 
interantional Zionism." Rumors to this effect sparked the 
burning of American embassy in Pakistan, and attack on U.S. 
mission in Libya, and demonstrations in many other Islamic 
. • 70 
countries. 
The wound of Grand Mosque was fresh and it was about 
the same time that unrest broke out among the Shi'i minority in 
the Eastern Saudi Arabian province of al-Ahsa. Shi'i community 
demanded the open procession to commemorate the death of the 
Imam Hussain. On 27 November 1979, they decided to hold the 
procession in the style of Islamic Revolution. The insurgents 
occupied factories and destroyed banks, especially in the city 
of al-Qatif, and demanded the proclamation of Islamic republic. 
Three days later the rebellions, which had no connection with 
the militants of Mecca Mosque was violently suppressed. But 
soon afterwards, on 1 Feb. 1980, Shi'i groups again 
demonstrated their sympathy for Iran, when they protested 
206 
against the Saudi regime on the anniversary of Khomeini's 
arrival in Tehran.^' 
The Saudi Royal family, which had so far shown restraint 
over the question of Islamic revolution, now mobilized its 
whole propaganda against Iran. Iranian revolutionaries 
promptly reacted, identifying Saudi Arabia as the stronghold of 
'American' Islam and the centre of apostasy. The Cold War 
changed into the Islamic Cold War. The Islamic discourse had 
now become the essential medium of the conflict for hegemony 
in Islamic world, 
(iv) Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
The Palestinian factions of the Islamic Jihad are the 
Palestinian offshoots of Islamic Jihad movements, which 
appeared in the sunni part of the Arab world in 1970s. These 
movements, which were an outgrowth of the radicalism of some 
Muslim Brothers, were characterized by their rejection of the 
Brotherhood's 'truce' with most of the existing regimes in the 
Arab world. Thus, the clear difference between them and the 
Muslim Brotherhood was and remains their advocation of 
violence as the major toll in changing the face of the societies 
and regimes.^^ 
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was founded in 1979-80 by 
the Palestinian students in Egypt, who has split from the 
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Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza Strip. The founders of 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad were highly influenced by the Islamic 
revolution in Iran on the one hand, and the militancy and 
radicalization of Egyptian Islamic student's organizations, on 
the other hand.''' 
Th founders-Fathi Shaqaqi, Abd al-Aziz Odah and Bashir 
Musa-were disappointed by the mainstream and moderate 
approach of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. They believed that 
Islamists of Egypt neglect the priority that should be given to 
the Palestinian problem. Shqaqi and Musa, therefore, proposed 
a new ideological doctrine, which became the foundational base 
for the new organization. They claimed that the unity of the 
Islamic world was not a precondition for the liberation of 
Palestine, but on the contrary, the liberation of Palestine by the 
Islamic movement was the key to the unification of the Arab 
and Islamic world.'^ 
The admiration of the Iranian revolution of Fathi; Shaqaqi 
Odah, and Musa was at the time unique of its kind in the Arab 
world and among the Sunni movements. Not only did they 
consider the Iranian revolution as a model for the Arab world, 
but they also propagated the idea of vilayet-I-Faqih (The 
leadership of men of religion) although, it was a shi'ite 
concept. Shaqaqi was the first sunni to write a book glorifying 
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khomeini and Iranian revolution in 1979. The distribution of 
this book was banned by Egyptian authorities. 
The Palestinian students in Egypt maintained close 
relations with the radical Islamic students, some of whom were 
involved in the assassination of president Sadat, in October 
1981. As a result Egyptian authorities expelled them from 
Egypt and they returned to the Gaza strip, where they formally 
began their own organization, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 
After some time the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was divided 
into two factions. One faction was led by Shqaqi and the other 
faction by Odah. Both factions were involved in subversive and 
militant activities in the 1980s. During the year 1987, prior to 
the intifadah, they carried out several attacks on Israelis in the 
Gaza strip. In August 1988 the two faction's leaders, Shaqaqi 
and Odah, were exiled to Lebanon, where Shaqaqi reorganized 
the faction, maintaining close contacts with the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards unit stationed in Lebanon with 
Hizbollah. Shaqaqi expanded the political connections of the 
faction and became the prominent member of new rejection 
front which emerged after the Israeli/PLO Oslo agreement.^^ 
Israeli agents assassinated Shaqaqi in October 1995 in 
Malta, allegedly. His successor is Dr. Ramadan Abdullah 
Shalah, who had resided several years in Florida U.S.A. and 
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moved to Damascus at the beginning of 1996. Salah is not 
considered to be as capable as Shaqaqi and as a result the 
organization has lost its position in Palestine. 
The group has been active on the political scene in the 
territories, mainly in the Gaza Strip, among students and 
intellectuals. Until the formation of the Palestinian authority in 
1994, the Islamic Jihad group did not have any connections 
with Hamas, and were regarded even as rivals in the Gaza Strip. 
Since then, and mainly after Hamas switched to the strategy of 
suicide bombings, there was some operational cooperation 
between the two organizations in carrying out attacks like the 
one in Beit-lyd, in February 1995. Shaqaqi;s death undermined 
the PIJ's position to a greater extent and Hamas no longer sees 
it as a threatening rival. 
The group has offices in Beirut, Damascus, Tehran and 
Khartoum, but its activity is focused in Lebanon where there 
are several hundred of its members. It has some influence in 
Palestine, mainly in the Islamic University in Gaza strip.^° 
Since its establishment the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was 
divided into many groups but the main faction which has 
survived is the Shaqaqi group. The other groups were the 
Islamic Jihad organization-the al-Aqsa Battalions, The Islamic 
Jihad- the temple, and the Islamic Jihad squad.^' 
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(v) Hizbollah 
In the last two decades, Islamists in Lebanon have become 
a significant force not only in that countries politics but 
throughout the Arab world. Nowhere in the region do such 
groups have the freedom they enjoy in the Lebanon, giving 
them a wide cultural influence. 
Hizbollah, the party of God, came into limelight in 
Lebanon in late 1983. Its men attacked the western and Israeli 
targets that left hundreds dead and wounded, leading to the end 
of U.S. and French intervention, and Israeli withdraw from 
most of the Lebanon soon after. These events marked a new 
phase for the Lebanon's Shi'i community and the country as a 
whole.^^ 
On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber blew up the U.S. 
embassy in Beirut. Sixty-one people were killed and 120 
wounded. Six months later, on October 23 the head quarters of 
U.S. Marines and those of French forces were attacked in a 
similar manner. Two hundred thirty nine Marines and twenty-
three French soldiers were killed; another hundred were 
injured. A week later, on November 4, 1983, Israeli Army 
headquarters in Tyre was hit. Twenty-nine soldiers and 
members of Israel's general security service were killed; tens 
more wounded. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the 
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strikes, but it soon became clear that it was the military wing 
of Hizbollah, which used a different name to avoid taking 
direct responsibility.^^ 
HibzoUah was founded in 1982, at the initiative of group 
of ulama close to the Husain Fadlullah in the wake of Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. The role of Fadlullah in the establishment 
of Hizbollah is still unclear. One account maintains that he 
preferred to have Muslim Shia fundamentalists working within 
the body of the Amal movement in order to reach the broadest 
possible audience in the Shi'a community. But the tide of pro-
Iranian sentiments within the Shia community was growing at a 
pace that could not be restrained within the confines of Amal's 
alliance with the Syrian regime. Furthermore, Iran was in 
search of an organization in Lebanon to advance its influence 
among the Shi'a and to strike at the enemies. The presence of 
US and Israeli troops also became the cause of Iran's direct 
g A 
involvement in Lebanon. 
The core of Hizbollah's ideology is the role of ulama in 
transformation of an un-Islamic society into Islamic one. The 
leaders of the party are of the opinion that ulama alone can 
bring about Islamic consciousness, or what party calls it 'the 
consciousness of unification'. A leader and a dedicated member 
of Hizbollah Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin see the power of the 
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ulama unlimited. Hizbollah believes that justice and equality 
can be achieved through human efforts, through a revolutionary 
process. FadluUah ignored the old shiite concept of Taqiya and 
advocated armed struggle against the secular Muslim 
governments. Especially he advised the Muslims to organize 
along the party lines and to take up arms against such 
governments. But unlike Islamic Amal's Musawi, FadluUah has 
been less willing to accept whole-heartedly the idea of an 
Islamic republic in Beirut.^^ 
Hizbollah, which led a military Jihad in 1980s against 
Israel, the West and all those who opposed the idea of Islamic 
Lebanon, has entered a new phase since 1989. This phase might 
be called the 'political Jihad'. The party accepted the Taif 
agreement of 1989 and the subsequent efforts to stabilize 
Lebanon's political life, but has not accepted the new concept 
of inter-sectarian accommodation. Hizbollah has participated in 
Lebanon's political system and the early revolutionary model 
has been overshadowed. Hizbollah was able to win eight seats 
in 1992 parliamentary elections.^^ 
Hizbollah's political participation does not mean that it 
has left military actions. It is still a strongly anti-western and 
anti-Israel party. The group is suspected to have attacked the 
Israeli embassy in Argentina in 1992. Main areas where 
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Hizbollah operates is al Biqa (Beka valley), the southern 
suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. It has established 
cells in Europe, Africa, south, America, North America, and 
else where. It has 5,000 active fighters in Lebanon. It runs 
three hospitals seventeen medical centers, and a commercial 
network that included supermarkets, gas stations, departmental 
stores and construction companies in Lebanon, 
(vi) Hams or Harkat al-Muqawamah al-Islmiyyah 
Harkat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah popularly known as 
Hamas came into existence in December 1987, when the 
Palestinian uprising Intifadah had just begun. The Muslim 
brotherhood which had kept itself away from political activism, 
established Hamas to participate in the uprising. Through 
Hamas the Brotherhood hoped to play a major role in the 
Palestinian politics during that crucial period. Thus Hamas 
formulated its ideology in rivalry with the secular national 
Palestinian forces the within the PLO, and in order to refute 
Zionist-Israeli claims to the land. Like most other local Muslim 
Brotherhood movements in Arab world, Hamas is also greatly 
influenced by the teachings of Hasan al-Banna the founder of 
Egyptian mother movement. However, the preference and 
centrality for the Palestinian conflict with Israel and the 
unresolved question of the Palestinian nation formation have 
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placed these issues at the center of Hamas ideology 
consequently, it has drawn practical conclusions going beyond 
those reached by earlier Islamist thinkers.^^ 
At the heart of Hamas ideology is the emphasis on the 
'Islamic essence' of the Palestinian course. Hamas bitterly 
criticizes the PLO for portraying the conflict as one between 
Palestinian Nationalism and Zionism. Hamas believes that such 
a characterization misconstrues the problem and the way of its 
solution. Hamas argues that the failure to regain 'our usurped 
holy land ' is the fault of those who kept Islam away from the 
battle front with the Israelis and who fought under secular, 
misguided, feeble human banners. And it is the Islam that can 
mobilize the full potentials of the people, and only 'Islam will 
break the Jews'.^^ 
The armed wing of the organization is known as Izal-Din 
al-Qassam forces, which carried out a number of daring 
military attacks well inside Israel during and after intifadah. 
This armed wing of Hamas is named after the brave Shaykh, al-
Qassam, who was killed by the British during the revolt of 
1936.'° 
Initially the Hamas was created at the advice of some 
individuals but in February 1988 the Muslim Brotherhood 
formally adopted it as its "strong arms" or political organ in the 
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occupied territories. In the same year, in August Hamas 
published articles, which it called convenant. In these articles 
Hamas approved of its military operation against Israel as 
Jihad. It was argued that this Jihad was not new but a part of 
the same holy struggle initiated in 1930s. Furthermore Hamas 
declared Israel as being illegitimate, which has no right to exist 
and therefore holy war is must to liberate Palestine. Palestine 
was declared as a pious religious endowment (waqf) whore 
protection from Israel is a religious duty.^' Intifadah, initially 
started by the Islamic Jihad was almost overtaken by Hamas, as 
well as the United National Leadership of the uprising (UNLU) 
which was created by PLO in 1988.^^ Both PLO and Hamas 
followers continued their struggle inside the occupied 
territories until the outbreak of the Kuwait-Iraq crisis and the 
subsequent Gulf War in 1990-91. From 1989 the PLO 
leadership started losing its interest in uprising, which the 
Hamas utilized well to further increase and widen its political 
base. In August 1993, both the Israelis and PLO members 
started a series of secret negotiations held in the Norwegian 
capital, Oslo. Both reached an agreement on mutual recognition 
and cooperation and a plan for a Palestinian autonomy in west 
Bank and Gaza. Hamas strongly opposed this agreement.^^ 
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Militant elements of Hamas advocate the use of violence 
to advance their goals. Its members have conducted many 
suicide attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets. In 
October 1994 there militants kidnapped an Israeli solider and 
demanded release of thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli 
prisons. However, the hostage and his there captors were killed, 
when Israeli soldiers tried to rescue the hostage. During the 
year 1995 Hamas attacked many Israeli's by blasting the bombs 
in busy Israeli areas.^"^ In 1996 Yahya Ayyash, an, engineer, a 
Hamas activist and the main architect of bombing against 
Israeli agents. This incident broke the peace process between 
Hamas and Israeli/PLO authorities initiated in 1995.^ 
(vii) Arab militants in Afghanistan 
With the passage of time along with the Palestinian 
question, another central concern of the Arab world was the 
issue of Islamic militancy originating from Afghanistan. Arab 
Islamic militants arrived in Afghanistan and helped Afghans in 
wining a war against Soviet troops. Their exploits were 
celebrated across the Muslim world. Now, in the recent years 
they have become the number one enemy of world's number one 
power. The Arab militants who fought in Afghanistan are 
considered most dangerous by Arab governments also. Most of 
these militants are form Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and 
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Algeria etc. According to an analyst at Egypt's Al-Ahram 
center for political studies "Americans imagine these people 
come from middle ages and that is not true, most of them come 
from Universities they are modern and use modern methods." 
These Arab Islamic militants of Afghan war transformed 
their old crusade in recent years into a new one against 
"illegitimate" Arab rulers, against Israel that occupied 
Palestine, against America that supports both the Arab rulers 
and Israel. 
It was not unusual to find wealthy Saudis and Arabs in 
Afghanistan during the periphery of Afghan struggle against 
Russia. They used to arrive in Afghan refugee camps open 
briefcases full of cash and distribute money to war windows 
and wounded veterans.^^ 
The work of Hasan al-Banna Qutb, and Mawdudi became 
the main sources of reference for the Arabs who fought 
alongside the Afghan mujahideen in 1980s, one of these was the 
Palestinian scholar, Abdullah Azzam, who had fought with the 
PLO in the 970s but became disillusioned with the Palestinian 
leadership because of its secular outlook. He studied Islamic 
law at Cairo's Al-Azhar, where he met the family of Sayyid 
Qutb, and went into teach at University in Saudi Arabia, where 
one of his students was Osama Bin Laden. In 1979, the battle to 
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liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation gave Abdullah 
Azzam a golden opportunity to put his revolutionary Islamic 
ideas in to practice. Known as 'Emir of Jihad', he was one of 
the first Arabs to join the Afghan mujahedeen, along with 
Osama Bin Laden. Together they setup a base in Peshwar, 
where they recruited and housed Arabs who had come to join 
the holy war. They established an organization, which later 
came to be known as al-Qaida. Azzam published books and 
magazines advocating the moral duty of every Muslim to join 
the Jihad and he traveled the world calling on Muslims to join 
the fight.^' 
Saudi Arabia, which follows the conservative wahhabi 
school of Islam, had become a natural haven for radical 
Islamists and scholars, including the radical Egyptian Islamists 
Ayman al-Zahwahri. The Kingdom now threw its political and 
financial weight behind the Afghan Jihad, which was also 
backed by United States and Pakistan. The Saudi Islamist Sadd 
Al-Faqih says that the Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia were 
careful at that time not to talk in terms of Jihad against any one 
other than the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. But he says that 
war in Afghanistan created a long term "mentality of Jihad" 
which some found hard to abandon.^^ 
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According to Dr. Tamimi, director of institute of Islamic 
political thought in London, "once the Soviet forces had been 
expelled from Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam believed that the Arab 
fighters should return home and resume their former occupations. 
But followers of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement, an extremist 
offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood led by al-zawahri, argued that 
Afghanistan should be the platform for the liberation of entire 
Muslim world. And it was Azzam's assassination in a car Bomb in 
Peshawar in 1989 that caused Zawahri's more hardline to 
prevail".""" Zawahir's was strengthened by 1991 Gulf War, 
which brought U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. After the end of 
Cold War and the 1991 U.S. victory over Iraq, the religious 
zealotry espoused by the Islamic militant groups who were 
differently supported in war against communism, took on Pan-
Islamic sheen. Armed volunteers emerged out of the shadow in 
different parts of the world. After devoting their lives to the 
liberation of Muslim territory from foreign occupation, it was a 
bitter blow for Bin Laden and his Arab followers to see a land 
they regarded as sacred occupied by 'infidel' American soldiers. 
In the recent times these Arab-Afghan militants attacked 
America by bombing US embassies in Africa on 1^^ August 
1998 that led to the US strikes against the locations in 
Afghanistan and Sudan. The main target of these strikes was 
the Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. US 
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president said that Bin Laden's followers were believed to have 
played a 'key role' in the bombing and bloodshed of 
American's. These Arab Afghans were also suspected in the 
world-Trade center bombing in 1993. They also attempted to 
kill Husni Mubarak Egyptian president, in Ethiopia. Some of 
the Arab returnees, from Afghanistan bombed the training 
center in Riyadh and may be responsible for the attack on the 
U.S. barracks in Khobar in June 1996. Furthermore some of 
these Arab militants have fought in the world's most trouble 
sports like Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and Tajikistan.'°' 
In Feb. 1998 Bin Laden helped to from world front for 
Jihad against Jews and crusaders, a coalition that brought 
together many Islamic militant groups. 
On 11 September 2001 in a horrific sequence of 
destruction, two plans crashed into the world Trade Center and 
both the towers of it collapsed. Within an hour another aircraft 
crashed at the pentagon. US president George W Bush said that 
apparently it was a terrorist attack.'°^ Alleged militant 
mastermind Osama Bin Laden quickly became the prime suspect 
for the attacks. Afghanistan's ruling Taliban militia denied that 
their 'Guest' Saudi extremist bin Laden, was responsible for the 
multiple attacks in united states.^°^ 
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The Federal Bureaus of investigation named the nineteen 
suicide hijackers who it said killed more than 5,000 people. 
More than half of hijackers appeared to be from Saudi or 
Yemen, the country of Bin Laden's citizenship and family. The 
FBI believe that many were linked to Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 
one of the famous Arab militant group, which is tied to Bin-
Laden closely.^° 
President Bush told the packed national cathedral in 
Washington that the emotional toll of the attacks was still too 
heavy to allow a considered perspective. " Americans do not 
have the distance of history but our responsibility is already 
clear-to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil" he said. 
Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, underlined Washington's 
determination to hold governments to account when he said that 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was at risk of American 
retaliation. He pinpointed Bin Laden more strongly than before 
as "attacking civilization, killing innocent people" adding: 'in 
our response we will have to take into account not only the 
perpetrators but those who provide support to perpetators.''°^ 
The Taliban said on 14 September 2001 that it expected to 
be hit by a massive attack by US and vowed that it would take 
revenge. " We are ready to pay any price to defend ourselves 
and to use all means to take our revenge", spokesman for the 
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Islamic militia's supreme leader Mullah Muhammad Omar 
said.'°^ Despite the impending threat of U.S. action, the 
Taliban refused to hand Bin Laden over. Even after many 
warnings from America Taliban government refused to 
handover Laden. Finally this led to the US heavy air and 
ground strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. 
Northern Alliance of Afghanistan, the main opposition to 
Taliban rule was able to control Kabul and other cities within a 
couple of months after the strikes, with the help of British and 
American troops. The war caused heavy damage to Al-Qaida 
and Taliban forces. Hundreds of Al-Qaida fighters mainly from 
Arab world and Chechnya were killed and arrested. The where 
about of most wanted man Bin Laden and Mullah Omar are still 
unknown. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Islam and Arab Nationalism stand among the most 
dynamic concepts in the Arab world. These two concepts and 
ideologies are interrelated. It was the emergence of Islam, 
which united the tribe torn Arabs under one banner and a nation 
was born. But in theory Islam does ^ not recognize any 
Nationalism. 
In the mid nineteenth century, the Muslim world faced a 
new challenge from scientifically developed Europe. The 
development of technology gave birth to an industrial Europe 
which succeeded in conquering the Arab world. The European 
challenge exerted an enormous influence in the transformation 
of Muslim thought and the direct confrontation provoked the 
first generation of reformists of the nineteenth century to 
address the question about the rise and decay of Muslim nation. 
Most of the Muslim leaders and intellectuals of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries were fully conscious of the 
backwardness of the Muslims for they were in a position to 
compare it with the advancing pace of the western societies, 
realize the weak political structure of the Ottoman empire and 
the aims of the imperialist powers to dominate the Arab world 
which was the heartland of Muslim empire. The Islamic 
activism in the nineteenth and twentieth century was not a new 
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phenomenon. The ground was prepared in eighteenth century by 
Abdul-al-wahhab of Nejid aimed at presenting Islam in its pure 
form so as to check and arrest the decline of Muslim society of 
the period. Again during nineteenth century, Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani, waged a political battle against the growing 
penetration of the western powers into the Islamic world and, at 
the same time, he and his disciple Muhammad Abduh of Egypt 
carried on politico-religious reforms to uplift the Muslim 
society. 
As long as the Ottoman rule lasted, the need to unite the 
Islamic world was not felt deeply, even though some efforts 
like pan Islamism by Sultan Abdul Hamid and al-Afghani, were 
made in this respect. Arabs like other Ottoman subjects 
remained loyal to the Muslim empire and it was definitely the 
Ottoman incompetence with the changing times that caused the 
unrest within Arabs. 
During the crisis surrounding the abolition of Ottoman 
caliphate by Kemal Ataturk in 1924, Rashid Ridha formulated 
his view advocating a modernized Islamic state. Ridha was a 
follower of al-Afghani and Abduh and it was because of his 
efforts that their ideas were circulated among the Islamic 
circles. Though Ridha was a supporter of the Ottoman 
caliphate, he came to accept its demise as a symptoms of 
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Muslim decadence. The ideal caliph, according to Ridha, was 
an independent interpreter of law (mujtahid) who would work 
in concert with the ulama. In the absence of a suitable 
candidate, and of ulama versed in the modern sciences, the best 
alternative was Islamic state ruled by an enlightened elite in 
consultation with the people, and able to interpret Shariah and 
legislate when necessary. 
At the time when Ottoman caliphate was abolished by 
secular forces in Turkey, the secularists were able to gain 
power in important Muslim countries including Egypt and Iran. 
These new realities of twentieth century shifted the concerns of 
reformers from the issue of external European challenge to the 
challenges of modern state in Muslim countries. The twentieth 
century Islamic thinkers and intellectuals were concerned about 
growing political ideologies such as nationalism, socialism and 
western liberalism. Out of these new challenges Islamic 
movements came into existence which were committed to the 
goal of transforming religion into an activist, purist, 
revolutionary and ambitious political and social programme. 
The most prominent of these movements originated in Egypt, 
where Hasan al-Banna, a school teacher, founded the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood grew out of 
deep concern of al- Banna about the effect of western seculi 
lar 
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form of modernization up-on Islamic life and values and failure 
of the government to address adequately the widespread socio-
economic disparities in Egyptian society. Al-Banna did not 
reject modernization and technology but rather the 
westernization and secularization of Muslim society, 
Internationally, the Brotherhood emphasized the unity of 
Muslim Community (ummah) and denounced the continued 
foreign domination of Egypt and other Muslim countries as well 
as the birth of neocolonialism in Palestine caused by the 
establishment of Israel in 1948. 
Hasan al-Bana contended that the Brotherhood had two 
basic goals; "That Islamic nation {watan) be liberated from all 
foreign powers" and "that there arise in this free nation a free 
Islamic state that will function according to the rules of Islam". 
The Muslim Brothers undertook large scale educational, 
social, charitable, and religious work in the towns and country 
side and were engaged in some economic enterprises. They 
began political activity in 1936 after the signature of the Anglo 
Egyptian treaty in that year and by taking up the cause of 
Palestine Arabs against Zionism and British rule. Gradually, 
they were able to extend the range of the movement to other 
Arab countries. They sent volunteers to fight with the Arab 
armies in the war of 1948, and thereafter seem to have 
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controlled an armed force capable of playing some role in 
political affairs. 
After Hasan al-Bannas death in 1949 the leadership of 
Muslim Brotherhood was in the hands of competent men like 
Hasan al-Hodeibi who was elected as the Murshid-e-Aam of the 
movement. Another prominent figure Abdul Kader Audah, 
became the secretaTy of the movement. However, one of the 
most important members of the movement at that time was 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) who can be considered as the ideologue 
of Muslim Brotherhood. His writings, next to Hasan al Banna's 
had a widespread influence on the mind of youth and is 
considered essential reading for any study of Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
In 1954 he became the chief editor of journal Al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimoon. By this time Qutb's political activities had not 
only drawn him into political arena but also into the conflict 
with the military regime of colonel Nasser. He opposed the 
Anglo Egyptian pact entered in to by Nasser with the British in 
July 1954. The military reacted by banning the Ikhwan paper in 
September 1954. As the movement was further drawn into 
conflict with the military regime, the latter began to fear that 
its influence on the masses would corrode its own chances of 
remaining in power. A deadly conflict between the Ikhwan and 
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military was therefore inevitable. Sayyid Qutb was arrested and 
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1955. Some of his most 
important works like Fi Zilal al Quran (under the shades of 
Quran) a commentary was completed under conditions of 
extreme pain and sufferings in the prison. In 1964 on request of 
Iraqi president Abdus Salam Arif, Nasser ordered his release. 
But the regime felt very uncomfortable with his release and 
after a year Qutb was again arrested on charges of conspiring to 
over throw the government. His last book Ma Alim Fal Tareeq 
(Milestones) was considered as inciting the people to 
revolution and military tribunal sentenced him to death. The 
death of Qutb was a great blow to Muslim Brotherhood but his 
writings have continued to be published in many languages. 
Syed Qutb had made a thorough study of human societies 
and found that the only society whose foundation rested on the 
principles of Justice was the Islamic society. The other society 
was the Jahiliyya (state of ignorance) society. 
Several years after the Qutb's death, a number of groups 
arose within Arab world. These groups are the offshoot of 
Muslim Brotherhood though they emerged with different names. 
These neo-activist Islamic groups are named as 'new brothers' 
and are heavily influenced by Qutb's thought. These young 
advocates of radical transformation of Egyptian society started 
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opposing the policies of Muslim Brotherhood. They believed 
that old Muslim Brotherhood has lost the revolutionary fervor. 
These young men who were previously working with Muslim 
Brotherhood started new militant groups, notably Islamic 
liberation Organization, society of Muslim and al-jihad. 
The "old" Muslim Brothers believed in the importance of 
Arab Nationalism (qawmiyya), even though their understanding 
of term Arabism was quite different from the secular thought 
associated with pan Arabism. They considered Arab unity as an 
essential prerequisite for the revival of Islam. They believed 
that liberation of all Muslim lands, especially Arab lands, had 
to precede a truly Islamic renaissance. In serving the cause of 
Arabism, then the Muslim Brotherhood was "serving Islam and 
welfare of entire world". 
This "Arab dimension" is absent in the recent writings of 
new brotherhood. In addition to the traditional attack on the 
secularism of Pan-Arabism, represented by the Ba'th party 
(which the brotherhood consider a toll of the Christian, 
colonial west), the new brotherhood views the Palestine issue 
as the conflict between Islam and Zionism which needs to be 
resolved as a part of a pan-Islamic solution. 
No account of contemporary resurgence of Islam would be 
complete without attention to the major role played by Abul 
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Ala Mawdudi. Mawlana Mawdudi (1903-1979) received an 
early traditional religious education, which was supplemented 
by his self-taught knowledge of western thought. He pursued a 
carrier in Journalism and in 1933 assumed editorship of 
Tarjuman al-Quran (exegesis of the Quran), which throughout 
the year served as a vehicle of his thought. He has been perhaps 
the most systematic modern Muslim writer, and his many 
writings have been translated into English and Arabic and 
circulated throughout the Muslim world. In 1941 Mawdudi 
established the Jamat-i-Islami (The Islamic Association) an 
extremely well organized association committed to the 
reestablishment of an Islamic world order or society 
(Politically, legally and socially). Although originally against 
any form of nationalism and thus opposed to the establishment 
of Pakistan, Mawdudi nevertheless migrated to Pakistan, after 
the Partition. 
Since the Second World War, the Muslim intelligentia and 
the political leaders have focused their attention on regaining 
the lost political freedom. Political parties were formed and the 
Muslim masses organized. Side by side the task of reforms was 
also carried on. And a number of intellectuals and writers 
aroused the conscience of the masses through their writings, 
appealing them to revive the original spirit of Islam and forge 
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ahead in society. Some of them even gave new interpretation of 
Islam so as to suit the need of modern Muslim society. 
In 1980's there has been a veritable avalanche of 
literature on Islamic political activism in Egypt and the Arab 
world. Much of this literature has attributed the growth of 
contemporary Islamic militancy to ideological influences from 
Iranian Islamic revival and revolution. Islam dramatically re-
emerged in politics across the Islamic world after Iranian 
revolution of 1979 and the assassination of Egyptian president 
Anwar Sadat in 1981. 
The victory of Ayatullah al ozma Aga Syed Ruhallah 
Khomeini in Iran is a dramatic development, in the Islamic 
movement active in the different parts of the Muslim world, 
from North Africa to South East Asia. Khomeini can thus be 
seen as in the direct line of succession in the movement of 
Islamic revival. He advocated Pan-Islamism, not simply the 
revival of Islam in Iran but the revival of Islam in the whole 
Muslim world. Khomeini though a senior shi'ite leader played a 
great role as a healer of centuries-old and bloody rift between 
the sunni and shi'ite divisions of Islam. Khomeini emerged as a 
central figure in the revolution of Iran. He was one of the first 
to systematically elucidate clerical opposition to Reza Shah's 
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reforms. He was the staunch, uncompromising and outspoken 
opponent of Reaz Shah's regime. 
The victorious return of Khomeini to Tehran in early 1979 
seemed to mark an abrupt change in the logic and direction of 
events on the West Asian scene. 
Though Khomeini emerged as the central figure of Iranian 
Islamic revolution, it was Dr. Ali Shariati who facilitated the 
transition of Iranian intellectuals and students to a commitment 
to a new revolutionary concept of Islam and to the Islamic 
revolutionary movement. Considered the 'Precursor' and the 
'martyred teacher' of 1979 Iranian revolution, Shari'ati's 
writings and ideals became one of the main source for political 
awareness programmes on the radio during the revolution in 
Iran. 
Iranian revolution and the ideology of Khomeni and 
Shariati had a deep impact over the Islamic groups active in 
Arab world. It was the result of Iranian revolution that in 1980, 
the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria joined with other Islamic 
groups to form the 'Islamic Front'. The aim of this front was to 
overthrow Asad's regime and the establishment of an Islamic 
state based on the Shariah. It was soon after the Iranian 
Revolution that the unrest broke out among the Shi'i population 
in the eastern Saudi Arabian province of al-Ahsa. They also 
•?4-^ 
decided to hold the procession in the style of Islamic 
Revolution of Iran and occupied factories and banks. They 
demanded the proclamation of Islamic Republic. In 1980 the 
Shi'i groups again went for demonstrations against the Saudi 
regime on anniversary of Khomeini's arrival in Tehran. 
The foundation of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 1979-80 by 
Palestinian students in Egypt was also an outcome of Iranian 
Revolution as its founders were admirers of Khomeini and 
Shariati. Its main founders Fathi Shaqaqi, Odah and Musa even 
advocated the same revolution in Arab world. Shaqaqi also 
wrote a book glorifying Khomeini and Iranian revolution. When 
the Egyptian authorities saw the popularity of this book they 
banned it. 
Another famous Islamic militant group which came in 
existence after the Iranian revolution is Hizbollah of Lebanon. 
This group came into limelight in 1983, when its military wing 
attacked the western and Israeli targets. 
The recent regeneration of Islamic ethos appears to have 
caught the non-Islamic world by surprise. The scholars and 
statesmen of non-Islamic world, tend to disregard or 
underestimate the regenerative capacity of Islam. 
During the early eighties Islamic militants of Arab world 
came under heavy crackdown of their respective governments. 
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Majority of ideological and militant leadership shifted their 
bases to Saudi Arabia, which was not uncomfortable with 
their brand of Islam. The most prominent radical militant 
islamists present in Saudi Arabia were Abdullah Azzam and 
Ayman al- Zahwahri. In Saudi Arabia they got a good chance 
to put their radical ideas in practice and started recruiting 
volunteers for Afghanistan , which was occupied by Soviet 
troops in 1979.Saudi regime and America fully supported this 
recruitment . Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia were careful at 
that time not to talk in terms of jihad against any one other 
than Moscow. But soon after the Soviet withdrawal Arab 
militants who had fought in Afghanistan along with some 
Mujahideen groups turned against America. It was endless 
American support to Israel and the Gulf war of 1991 which 
caused distress among these militants for US. These militants 
transformed their old crusade into a new one against 
"illegitimate" Arab regimes, against Israel that occupied 
Palestine, against America that supports both the Arab rulers 
and Israel. 
These Arab militant are believed to be behind the attacks 
on American embassies in Africa in 1998 and Pentagon and 
World Trade Center in September 2001. The point at which \]^ 
perhaps realized the fallacy of its perception about encouraging 
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Arab youth to fight against former USSR were the attacks on 
Trade Centre and Pentagon. Alleged militant mastermind Osama 
Bin Laden who was staying in Afghanistan as a "guest" of 
Taliban regime, became the prime suspect for the attacks on the 
Trade Centre and Pentagon. To take revenge America attacked 
Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban government. These strikes 
caused a wave of anti-American sentiments in the masses of 
Muslim world. 
One of the most significant attributes of contemporary 
Islamic revivalism is its pervasiveness. The movement of a 
return to Islamic roots is a transnational phenomenon; it has 
been occurring virtually in every Islamic society or community 
regardless of size or political, economic and cultural 
environment. The transnationalism and the Islamic revival is 
not limited to particular social and economic classes or 
occupations rather its grass root support has come from every 
class of society. The unique characteristic of Islamic rebirth 
movement is its polycentrism. Indeed, the emerging 
"transnational ummah" possesses no single revolutionary or 
organizational epicentre. 
Contemporary Islamic political and militant activism is an 
expression of the fundamental unity of spiritual and temporal 
affairs that is the foundation of Islamic belief system. The 
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assumption of unity has been manifested throughout Islamic 
history in the social, political and cultural patterns of Islam as 
a way of life, signifying not only the unity of spiritual beliefs 
but also a pervasive orientation to the temporal world that 
constitutes a continuous, if ambiguous, cultural pattern across 
time and place in Islamic history. Popular Islamic political 
activism has become a dynamic force in West Asian politics. 
The Islamic political activist movement may merely be the 
harbinger of an Islamic ideological renaissance a reawakening 
of the political values manifested in Islamic political thought 
and a search for institutions that represent these values. 
Political Islam and Militant activism today is constantly 
on the upward trend. Due to the inability of the ruling elites of 
the Arab states to cope with their economic and social 
problems, frustrated intellectuals and young students come to 
sympathise more and more with the antigovernment slogans of 
the radical Islamic groups. Massive urban migration enhances 
this trend. Masses uprooted from their home places find social 
shelters in big cities in charity organizations run by these 
radical islamists. Rapid increase of population and high 
composition rate of young people add to this situation. 
Marginalization of the Arab economy from globalization is seen 
to be continuing and the Arab-Israeli conflict is not expected to 
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cease in the near future. Taking in consideration all these 
factors, the growing unrest in Arab world is expected to keep 
its momentum at least in the near future. 
However, the growth of radical Islam will accompany a 
serious political instability in the Arab world. The governments 
will try to crush there islamists by force. And even if any of 
the legal Islamic groups gains power, the western intervention 
will overthrow them. 
Several studies have found that most Arabs dislike the 
United States, but not for the reasons often cited by American 
officials. 
The negative perception of the US is based on American 
policies-particularly concerning Iraq and what is seen as US 
bias towards Israel in the West Asian conflict and not a: dislike 
of western democracy and values. 
The regimes and governments in Arab world have failed 
to make Arab economies more efficient or to provide the Arabs 
with realistic hope of achieving prosperity, i.e. Arab Socialism 
and Arab Nationalism have largely failed in the Arab world. 
The Arabs are in the state of great ideological flux after the 
end of cold war and emergence of U.S. as a sole superpower. 
Hoping to discover a renewed sense of identity and lift 
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themselves out of all economic and cultural crises they are 
turning to radical Islam. 
Islamic militancy is a product of the Islamic revival. This 
revival was the result of an inability among Islamic societies to 
cope with the ideas of modernisation presented to them by 
West, despite encouragement by ruling regimes to merge 
Islamic social political and cultural traditions with the 
imported culture. Consequently a Jihadist doctrine developed, 
with the idea of a clash of civilizations at its centre. One of the 
biggest success of the Islamic revival groups was their ability 
to present this inevitable cultural clash as the cornerstone of an 
ideology of 'genuine Islam', thereby attracting support from 
relatively large propositions of the Muslim masses. The next 
stage of this revival process was the molding of the Muslim 
mindset to the idea that they were in a state of constant war, 
presented a part of the eternal global war between Muslim and 
the long line of enemies generated through out the history of 
Islam. The twentieth century brought a sense of permanent 
retreat to many Muslims, besieged by the threat of western 
culture and secularisation and faced with the decline of Islamic 
political and social culture. Fear of the West and Communism 
created a mindset of self-defence, and Jihad was considered the 
only proper answer. Due to the sense of being under siege both 
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from the West and from secular Arab regime, the leadership of 
Islamic movements propagated that the Muslim ummah is under 
threat from all direction, internal as well as external. 
The next stage involved the formation of Jihadi groups 
aiming to create a new generation of soldiers who viewed 
themselves as the oppressed and defenders of Islam. In recent 
decades, all of the Islamic revivalist groups have revived the 
memory of Islamic triumph over Christian Crusaders in the 
middle ages. This glorification of past has aroused hopes 
among the Muslims for a better and victorious future, which 
can be achieved through terrorizing the West. The roots of 
Islamic militancy therefore lie in the search of Islam's glorious 
past in Middle ages. 
This leads to the last phase of the development of such 
Islamist perception. The fall of Soviet Union allowed western 
societies to view Islamic revival as the new overriding threat to 
the free world. The US in particular seems to be on the verge of 
adopting the Islamic perception of global war. The analysis of 
the thought of Islamic revival in the West often reflects 
hostility towards Islam. There are people and government in the 
West, especially in the United States, who do not hide the 
sympathy for Christian or Jewish fundamentalism and yet 
preach secularism to Muslims. There are also those in the West 
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who use the situation of unrest in the Arab world to preach the 
incompatibility of Islam and democracy. 
The immediate need is that the ruling regimes of Arab 
world and the international community should concentrate their 
very efforts to improve the political and socio economic 
environment of the region in which radical Islam grows. If the 
attempts are made only to crush and suppress these groups, 
their efforts will not bring any long term and comprehensive 
results. Crushing one militant group may lead to rise of several 
others. 
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GLOSSARY 
Allah 
Amir 
Badr 
God 
Ruler, prince, governor of provinces 
The first war in Islamic history between 
Muslims and the Meccan 
Da'wah Islamia The call to Islam 
Fatwa 
Fiqh 
Hadith 
Hijrah 
Ijtihad 
Infitah 
Imam 
Jama'at 
Jahilyiya 
Jihad 
An authoritative opinion issued by a 
religious authority on a matter of law 
Islamic Jurisprudence 
A saying attributed to Prophet 
The migration of the Prophet and His 
companion from Mecca to Medina in 622. 
The Muslim lunar calender is dated from this 
event 
The exercise of independent judgement to 
ascertain the appropriate shariah ruling 
Open door policy or economic liberalization 
Leader of Muslim community or head of a 
Muslim state 
Association or Islamic groups 
Ignorance, refers to the period of pre-Islamic 
civilization 
Sacred struggle or holy war 
269 
Khalafah 
Khalife 
Khedive 
Khutba 
Mahdi 
Madrasa 
Majlis al shura 
Maktab 
Masjid 
Mufti 
Mullah 
Namaz 
The institution of government legitimized by 
succession of the ruler from the Prophet 
Successor of the Prophet; temporal leader of 
the ummah in the Sunni doctrine 
Name given to the Ruler of Egypt from 1867 
to 1914. He governed as semi independent 
Viceroy of the Sultan of Turkey 
Sermon delivered in a mosque at the Friday 
congregational prayer 
The title of the divinely guided figure who is 
expected to come in the last days and 
establish the rule of the God on earth 
The traditional theological seminary of 
Islamic sciences 
Consultative assembly 
An elementary religious school 
Center for Muslim worship 
A religious official of the Sunni rite with the 
authority to issue authoritative opinions in 
matter of Islamic law 
A lower ranking clergyman 
Religious prayer 
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Quran Record of the revelation Muslims believe 
Ramadan 
Salaf 
were sent to mankind through the Messenger 
of God, Muhammad 
The holy month of Islam 
The pious ancestors who lived at the time of 
Salaffiyah 
Shariah 
Prophet Muhammad 
Reformerism in the twentieth century who 
called for a return to the principles followed 
by salaf 
Religious law or Islamic law governing all 
aspects of human life 
Shaykh-ul-Islam An honorific title for important Muslim 
scholars it is the title of the highest official 
in the government structure 
The traditions of the Prophet, comprising 
what he said, did and approved 
A secular ruler of the Islamic community 
Muslim scholars or Religious experts 
The Islamic community 
The puritanical movement led by Abdul-al-
Wahhab in IS*** century in the Arabia 
Waqf Religious endowment 
Sunnah 
Sultan 
Ulama 
Ummah 
Wahhabism 
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